



Policy recommendations to regain
"losers of feminism" as mainstream voters

Summary of findings (WP2)

Deliverable 2.3




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1. Introduction

The Summary of findings is a deliverable that belongs to Work Package 2 of the UNTWIST project. This document summarises and describes the main findings from the 18 focus groups developed in the United Kingdom, Hungary, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Spain. This report, therefore, builds on the previous deliverable 2.2 (Technical summaries of focus groups), which contains all the technical information relating to the design and implementation of the focus groups.

The overall aim is to measure and analyse right-wing populist parties (RWPP)' voters' subjective perception of their needs and demands, their horizon of expectations, and their level of 'gender fatigue'. The coding and classification of those needs should help together with the data from WP1, WP3 and WP4 to test the hypothesis of UNTWIST for its first methodological phase, that is, if RWPP is acting as niche parties in the representation of certain gender aspects disregarded by RWPP. However, we also have device-specific hypotheses for the focus groups connected to our second methodological phase (testing if gender plays any role in voting for RWPP) with the purpose of start exploring this important expectation in ways that are also valuable in the design of our survey questionnaire. Those three hypotheses are based on the theoretical elaboration of the concept of "losers of feminism", embodied in the theory of Gendered Positional Deprivation (<http://hdl.handle.net/10433/16611>).

As stated in deliverable 2.2, all the focus groups were conducted considering two main variables: gender (with a minimum of two same-sex groups per country, one with men and one with women) and voting behaviour (current voters of RWPP who have previously voted for mainstream parties or abstained or have doubts

about RWPP and mainstream or abstain in case of voting for the first time). Moreover, other specific sociodemographic variables were considered for each national context (see Appendix A for detailed information).

This document is structured as follows. First, we present a qualitative examination of the focus groups, highlighting their global narrative and principal themes brought out by the participants. Second, the descriptive results of applying a coding protocol based on our UNTWIST typology (see Appendix B), and the main patterns of similarity and difference by country and gender are discussed. Based on these findings, sections 4 to 6 present the evaluation of the original hypotheses regarding 'gender status loss' and propose new theoretical expectations and future avenues of research. Finally, Appendix A contains the national reports for each analysed country, Appendix B includes the coding protocol, and Appendix C provides the moderation guidelines.

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2. Tone and narrative in the groups

The following section summarises the atmosphere, tone, and narrative of the eighteen focus groups conducted within Work Package 2 of the UNTWIST project.

2.1. Global tone of focus groups

Overall, the atmosphere of the groups was relaxed, cordial and respectful. The participants were polite and courteously engaged with each other, demonstrating a commendable adherence to respecting speaking turns. Discursive dynamics were very smooth. Although, in some cases, the moderation was difficult due to some persons trying to dominate the discussion (for example,

see the Appendix for more information about the Swiss men's focus group), there were no relevant difficulties that compromised the quality of the empirical evidence generated with the groups. Some groups, especially female ones (for example, the Spanish working-class female group or the Hungarian female group in Miskolc), were particularly emotional. The women shared laughter and aspects of their lives and intimacy, even expressing by the end of the group how well they felt. For these participants, focus groups were, in some sense, a kind of therapeutic opportunity to share their anxieties and fears with people like themselves.

Besides that, the prevailing tone throughout the groups remained moderate. Social desirability was noticeable, and the participants' opinions were entirely moderated. However, some exceptions to this are found in the three Hungarian groups (where racism, sexism and homophobia openly emerged) or in the Spanish working-class men's group (in which one individual made statements in favour of violence, which were censored by the rest of the participants).

More interestingly, the global tone of all focus groups was permeated by pessimism, disillusionment, and negativity. We found negative evaluations of the current social, economic, and political situation in all eighteen focus groups. This pessimist discourse relates to a nostalgic, idealised image of the past, understood as a scenario where harmony reigned, and prosperity prevailed. Pessimistic feelings and frustration are embedded in several themes: social order, individualism, economic difficulties, insufficient standards of living, inflation, low wages and salaries, high living costs, difficulties of housing, political polarisation, lack of political responsiveness, low citizen mobilisation, perception of eroding of national identities, multiculturalism, viability of the Welfare system etc. Therefore,

this pessimism permeates the evaluation of the present and encompasses the future since participants expect all these trends to become more pronounced.

A caveat is in order in this section since participation in the focus groups was entirely voluntary, and our profile included only RWPP's voters who had previously voted for mainstream parties. All of these might explain the relative moderation of participants, while more extremist RWPP's voters did not take part in our groups. However, it is precisely this profile that we hypothesise as a possible target for whom improved representation could appeal.

2.2. Argumentative lines

This sub-section presents a qualitative overview of the main argumentative pillars of the focus groups of the UNTWIST project. We will first examine the similarities, i.e. the recurrent themes that have appeared in several contexts. Then, we will focus on the idiosyncratic themes in each country.

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Transversal themes

- Criticism towards political elites, *statu quo*, political system, and government. Traces of anti-elitism.

One of the crosscutting themes that emerged in most groups, regardless of gender or group composition, is the intense criticism of politicians. Participants showed profound discontent with mainstream parties and distrusted their ability to solve people's problems. In other words, they stated that politicians 'don't care about ordinary people' and only act in their self-interest. Thus, participants

attributed most social and economic problems to selfish political elites. We find a strong perception of a lack of responsiveness from the political in addressing important issues.

In addition, negative opinions also extend to current national governments (especially in the case of the Spanish or British groups). The only exception can be found in Hungary since some participants showed favourable opinions regarding the rightist governing party coalition Fidesz-KDNP (see the Appendix for more details concerning the Hungarian party system). At a more general level, the criticism mentioned above also reaches the political and institutional system, as participants affirmed that the institutional system does not offer solutions to people. Accordingly, participants identified a lack of responsiveness regarding politicians and institutions, which translates into a very low self-perceived political efficacy.

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The critique of mainstream politics has a clear anti-elitist undertone, especially in the focus groups from Spain, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Germany. It should be noted that anti-elitism is one of the main pillars of populism according to the so-called ideational perspective (alongside Manichaeism – understood as a cosmovision that juxtaposes the good, pure people versus the evil, corrupts elites in moral terms–, and people-centrism – as a core definition of “We” the people as a glorified and virtuous entity which embodies ideals of hard-work and honesty, as well as an allusion to the ordinary and common human being). In this sense, participants not only had bad opinions about the political elites but also made moral judgments and portrayed them as evil by nature. Related to this, Spanish and Hungarian participants discussed conspiracy theories

according to which elites and lobbies would be involved in a secret plan to pauperise the people and erode national identities.

In general, these findings align with previous literature, which has illustrated, amongst other explanations, electoral support for RWPPs as a sign of rejection, protest, and fatigue with mainstream politics. In some focus groups (United Kingdom, Spain, Hungary, Germany, and Denmark), the participants openly stated that they supported RWPPs. Perhaps this support is not rooted in a firm conviction that these parties can carry out preferred policies but in a rejection of the mainstream parties and traditional politics. However, this idea will be examined in detail in section 6 when dealing with hypothesis 2 regarding expressive and instrumental voting.

- Economic insecurity, perception of pauperisation, and other discussions related to the material dimension.

A central theme throughout all focus groups was the personal and collective economic insecurity and the rising cost of living in each national context. The participants were unanimous in their negative evaluation of the current economic situation, regardless of their socio-demographic profile and background. The discourse around economic uncertainty is rooted in the general belief that things have gotten worse and will continue to worsen. Hence, the global negative evaluation of the economic situation concerns the present and the future, while the past is imagined as a nostalgic scenario in which life was easier. As stated in the sub-section 'Global tone and narrative of focus groups', participant's discourses were permeated by pessimism, disillusionment, and negativity.

We find that judgment sometimes accompanies reflections on economic hardship and its possible causes. Here, group members argued that economic pauperisation is caused by political elites, lobbies (feminism or environmentalism, amongst others), secret conspiracies (for example, 2030 Agenda), or immigration.

Also, the general discussion on the material sphere covers other specific topics such as salaries, housing, food prices, the alarming situation of public services or the outward labour mobility to other countries due to the economic situation.

In sum, it is possible to affirm that the perception of economic insecurity seems to play an important role, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the discourses of RWPPs supporters regardless of idiosyncratic social, economic, and political particularities across the six analysed countries.

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- Positive evaluation of gender equality focusing on women's incorporation into the labour market.

The participants generally agreed that there have been significant and positive advances in gender equality in recent decades and that women's position in society has substantially improved. Although, at first, the discussion on this topic is somewhat vague or refers to the achievement of certain civil rights (e.g. female suffrage in Switzerland, which was achieved in the 1970s), it then focuses exclusively on the labour sphere. Hence, gender equality progress was therefore conceptualised for both men and women as the incorporation of women into the labour market. In essence, we find a transversal conceptualisation of gender equality in (neo)liberal terms through which women's emancipation is assimilated

into their incorporation into capitalist market relations. Nevertheless, the only exception to this general pattern is found in focus group number 4 in Hungary (see Appendix and Deliverable 2.2 for details regarding research design), where men openly formulated sexist remarks and complained about the disappearing female responsibility concerning household duties.

The discussion about gender equality progress and women's incorporation into the labour market cannot be understood without considering another argumentative pillar in the focus groups: economic anxiety and pauperisation. Especially male participants stressed how positive and necessary it is that women are working because two salaries are necessary in the current economically challenging context. Basically, the role of women as economic providers in a scenario of economic pauperisation is emphasised.

Finally, it is also remarkable that although female participants evaluated their entry into the labour market as positive, they also demanded better working conditions that allowed them to balance work and family responsibilities. This aspect is probably one of the most important demands to be drawn from the focus groups' examination and analysis.

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- Strong criticism of mainstream feminism, gender fatigue and negative opinions about gender quotas.

Another common theme in the groups conducted concerns the criticism of mainstream feminism. Although with different emphases and intensities across countries, in general, all participants (men and women) showed an anti-gender discourse and declared that mainstream feminism had gone too far and had

become a toxic, harmful and dangerous ideology that only seeks the superiority of women over men. In overall terms, participants agreed that contemporary feminism has evolved into a paternalistic movement that creates polarisation and silences those who disagree. We also find the idea that feminism is a movement created for some women to become richer (in fact, feminism is mentioned earlier in this sub-section as one of the groups creating the economic pauperisation of ordinary people).

In this sense, especially among the female participants, we find a postfeminist attitude according to which feminism was only justified in the past. This statement is linked to the positive evaluation of the incorporation of women into the labour market: feminism used to be useful, but now that women work, it no longer makes sense. The idea that the current feminist mainstream “does not represent us or the real women” and that gender equality has to be deepened is found in several women’s discourses. However, they do not offer explicit conceptions of alternative feminism.

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Additionally, male participants declared that because of feminism, they are at a disadvantage and suffer a grievance, and they may be accused of sexism or rape without proof. Similarly, some female participants expressed their worries about the future of their sons and the potential negative implications of feminism when interacting with the other sex.

In addition to the rejection of feminism, we also observe in some groups (men in Spain, Denmark and Switzerland, for example) a significant questioning of gender quotas, understood as an imposed mechanism that only created inequality. Thus, men stated that women can succeed on their own, without any

legal support. As in the case of the debate regarding the incorporation of women into the labour market, we find a decidedly (neo)liberal discourse.

- Perception of the breakdown of social order and favourable opinions to stricter law and order measures.

In line with the global atmosphere of pessimism in all focus groups, we identify a strong perception of the breakdown of social and sense of community order across the different national contexts examined within the UNTWIST project. Participants denounced the loss of social ties and said that today's society is much more polarised, divided, dangerous, individualistic, passive, and selfish than it was in the past. Moreover, they perceived a lack of respect for authority and elders. Nonetheless, the participants did not only present a pessimistic diagnosis of the situation but also offered possible solutions: primarily, stricter law and order measures and education policies.

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In synthesis, this perceived disintegration of the social order is linked to the sense of disintegration and erosion of many traditional identities due to recent social, cultural and economic transformations occurring in the aftermath of post-modernity and late capitalism. For many RWWP supporters, this new landscape is perceived as changing and uncertain, and this is why they choose (among other factors) to vote for the RWPPs since these parties advocate the importance of national identities and more rigid, exclusionary social schemes.

- Anti-immigrant orientations and nativism.

Anti-immigration statements constitute another of the focus groups' argumentative pillars, with particular prominence in Denmark and Germany (two of the contexts examined in which the immigration issue is probably most politicised). Overall, participants explicitly or implicitly identified two dimensions in which immigration would negatively impact: cultural (immigrants will weaken national identity and cultural traditions) and economic (in the sense that non-natives compete for resources with natives). Nativism, understood as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that nonnative elements are threatening the homogeneous essence of the nation-state, is therefore found in the focus groups members. While this is not a surprising finding, given that anti-immigration positions have traditionally been noted as an essential element for RWPPs on both the demand and supply sides, their relatively low qualitative prominence in the discourses is noteworthy. This means that anti-immigration ideas are not central in the discourse interweaving but are embedded in other argumentative pillars, such as economic pauperisation, the perception of erosion of traditional identities, or the demands regarding law and order.

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- Euroscepticism

Another thematical pillar that has emerged from the focus groups concerns critical views on the role of the European Union. Eurosceptic statements appeared in the British focus groups, which is not surprising given the Brexit process and the recent sociopolitical transformations in the United Kingdom, but also in the case of Switzerland, Germany and Denmark with different intensities and nuances.

Participants reflected on the loss of national sovereignty as a result of the policies of the European Union and more generally on the loss of status and international competitiveness.

Specific themes by countries

Some themes that have only appeared in specific national contexts also merit a brief discussion as they may be relevant to the overall objectives of the UNTWIST project. These issues are mostly related to each country's idiosyncrasies. For example, discussing social benefits and the perception that they are unfairly assigned is particularly prominent in the Spanish groups. Likewise, in the case of Switzerland, we observed a relevant discussion on the pension system and, in particular, on the precarious situation of women and the negative impact of immigration. Another pertinent point is that the participants from Switzerland and Denmark discussed education and that the education system cannot attend to each student individually. Finally, in the case of the Hungarian groups, we observed a frontal rejection of the LGTBI collective on the part of some participants.

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2.3. Importance of gender in the global dynamic

The importance of gender in the global dynamic of focus groups was broadly similar across the six countries examined. Overall, participants did not strongly emphasise such as gender issues, nor did they bring them up spontaneously in the conversation. In fact, gender-related topics were not raised until prompted by the moderators in most of the focus groups. This is, in part, the consequence of our methodological strategies not to bring gender to direct

discussion to avoid common places and the simple repetition of RWPP's established discourses by participants. In general terms, we were asking participants about their lives. It is worth noting that gender permeated, in different ways, their different discourses in various dimensions, even if there was no explicit section dealing with the specific topic of gender as such.

In summary, according to our empirical evidence, the discussion of gender *per se* does not seem to occupy a central position in the discourses of RWPP supporters but rather is embedded in other concerns and demands. However, this does not mean that gender is unimportant or secondary, as we note how many of the topics discussed were gendered (there was a built-in gender dimension transversal to them).

First, gender often appeared in the groups linked to market, economic and labour-related issues. A common finding in all groups is related to a (neo)liberal interpretation of equality and gender relations. Hence, both women and men claimed that progress in equality made in recent decades has been positive, referring mainly to the incorporation of women into the labour market. The only exception to this general pattern is found in focus group number 4 in Hungary (see Appendix and Deliverable 2.2 for details regarding research design), where men openly formulated sexist remarks, complained about the disappearing female responsibility concerning household duties and criticised the supposed loss of masculinity.

However, the consensus on the positive aspects of women's entry into the labour market has a second gendered dimension to its discussion. On the one hand, women tended to develop personal reflections on gender issues by connecting them to demands for better working conditions: for example,

advocating for more part-time opportunities that allow them to conciliate work and family care. In this sense, women showed what is being called 'emancipation fatigue', which consists of the challenges faced by some women who work and simultaneously must deal with the caregiving sphere. For example, references to these tensions can be found in the Spanish or Swiss groups. On the other, some men judged women's incorporation into the labour market pragmatically: in economic hardship, two incomes are needed.

Second, gender-related topics were embedded in the global narrative of pessimism and fatigue regarding the social, economic, and political context. This means that gender references were almost always made in the midst of discussions on other topics. In conclusion, gender was transversally present as an implicit theme. Although it was one of the most central themes in the eighteen focus groups conducted in explicit terms, many of the debates held by the participants were gendered. However, our hypothesis that RWPP's voters would support a sexist retropia, a desire to go back to previous times they 'think were better for people like them (their sex)' is more clearly rejected in our data.

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Coding results

The following section presents the descriptive results from applying the coding protocol from WP2 of the UNTWIST project to the focus groups. The aim is to provide a quantitative overview of the groups' content, pointing out the salience of the different themes, highlighting co-occurrence patterns, and comparing these findings with those of the previous section. 'Gendered Positional Deprivation' theory, which is being developed in the UNTWIST project. The protocol contains a

structure of different topics with different hierarchical levels (for more information see Appendix B). Specifically, it consists of nine thematic areas with their respective sub-themes at various hierarchical sub-levels:

- *Focus*: This category tries to identify where the participants locate gender problems and how they make sense of or understand gender grievance or injustices in general terms from their subjective point of view.
- *Location: self and belonging*: It tries to identify how the participants categorise their perceived "gender problems" or "gender needs" as individual/particular or as collectively shared.
- *Needs*: This theme aims to capture how the participants see their needs as embedded, caused by their particular circumstances, or perceived as part of broader societal and structural processes that ask for strategic changes.
- *Aggrievance-Entitlement and Injustice*: This topic aims to capture when a need or problem expressed by participants becomes a collective grievance, with potential for mobilisation.
- *External Solutions*: It tries to capture participants' demands and evaluation of possible solutions for gender needs and problems. These are solutions located outside the control of the participants. It is for institutions, society, and culture at large to bring those solutions)
- *Internal-Mobilising strategies*: This category aims to capture the different mobilising strategies that participants may use to adjust society (particularly gender status and gender relations) to their liking.

- *Feminism*: it tries to identify when the participants refer to feminism as a theory, movement or ideology in a broad sense.
- *Gender Roles/Stereotypes*: It tries to capture how the participants understand and define gender roles and societal stereotypes).
- *Domains*: This thematic category aims to capture the different spheres where participants locate their needs, difficulties, or problems.

Following common guidelines, UNTWIST participants applied the protocol to the focus group paragraphs using Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). We seek to segment the information from the focus groups to compare the salience of different topics in the narratives and discourses of RWWPP voters in relation to gender needs and demands.

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3.3. Cross-country comparisons

In this subsection, we present the descriptive results of topics mentioned by same-sex focus groups in each analysed country. Since the results are separated by gender, we can examine different patterns of similarity and distinction between the national contexts of women and men. This allows us to inductively identify potential shared interests for women and men in each of the six countries. It should be noted that not all topics of the protocol will be reviewed, but only those of most substantive interest.

Before going further, we must clarify that the interpretations below refer to the percentage of mentions for different thematic codes and subcodes within each national context. Since the focus groups have different lengths and frequencies of codes, it is not possible to directly compare the percentages across

countries. Thus, we conduct cross-country comparisons by comparing the relative weights of each topic within each of the six countries.


Further exploration of the codification will be enhanced with interactive graphical visualisations developed by ViT in Observable (<https://observablehq.com/>).

Male participants

Some interesting notes can be drawn from the code Location, which captures where the participants locate their problems and needs. Male participants refer more to the collective sphere (and, within it, to gender superordinate groups) than to the individual sphere (see figure 1). This is observed in all countries except for the UK, where the individual sphere is more salient than the collective one.

Grosso modo, the male participants locate their perceived gender problems/needs as primarily located in their individual sphere rather than belonging to a collective one in Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, while the collective sphere of belonging predominates in Germany, Denmark, and Hungary. In addition, within the gender superordinate groups, the most frequently mentioned identity in four of the six countries (Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK) is logically that of men, which is to be expected given that these are male groups.

Figure 1: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Location (self and belonging) category for male groups in the six analysed countries.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

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Other interesting findings are shown in figure 2, which shows the extent to which the gender superordinate groups mentioned above interact with other identities. In Germany and Spain, references to one's own national or regional identity predominate over all the other themes, ranking second in Switzerland. The debate of generational identity is the most salient in the Swiss case, occupying second place in Germany and a prominent place also in Spain. Finally, it is worth noting how mentions of sexuality and sexual identity have the highest relevance in the UK, which is in line with the qualitative importance of LGBTBI+ rights concerns and worries in the British groups.

Figure 2: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Location (self and belonging): intersections category for male groups in the six analysed countries.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

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A remarkable pattern of similarity is that men in all countries discuss the perception of injustice (that is, the self-perception that they do not unfairly enjoy material or non-material benefits) more often than the idea of entitlement (understood as the self-perception of having a legitimate right to enjoy specific material or immaterial conditions or benefits) (see figure 3). Only in Switzerland has the notion of entitlement a relatively higher relevance in relation to perceptions of injustice.

Figure 3: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Entitlement-aggrievance category for male groups in the six analysed countries.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

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
As shown in Figure 4, a notable finding is that negative mentions of mainstream feminism appear among men in all countries except the United Kingdom. In line with what was said above, there is a two-fold dimension in these mentions. On the one hand, participants point out that feminism has made significant and valuable social advances in the past, particularly related to the incorporation of women into the labour market, but now it is no longer necessary. In addition, gender fatigue shows substantial weight among male groups in all countries. Hence, negative views of mainstream feminism and perception of fatigue regarding equality policies are cross-cutting findings for male RWPP voters in the countries studied in our focus groups.

Within the general code of Feminism, discussions on gender alongside arguments related to biology or sexual attributes (coded as binary conception of gender) are a common trait among men in all our case studies. The same is also found to be true with regard to discussions of sexual identity orientations. It should also be noted that the *antifeminist immigration subcode* is present in the Danish and German groups. These are probably two national contexts in which immigration is a more politicised issue and is widely present in the social debate.

In Denmark, the discussion about gender alongside arguments related to biology or sexual attributes (coded as binary conception of gender) has prevalence over all other themes, ranking high also in the United Kingdom. In Germany, gender fatigue is the central topic within Feminism, occupying second place in Switzerland and a prominent place also in Spain. The debate on gender supremacy (or, in other words, the belief that there is a cultural, political, economic and social system in which members of one sex control status, power and resources while other groups are subordinate) is the more salient theme within Feminism for men in Switzerland, Spain and Hungary (in the latter two cases, with gender fatigue in second place, suggesting that these are two related issues).

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Figure 4: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the Feminism category for male groups in the six analysed countries.




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Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

In relation to how participants understand and define proper roles for men and women and how they embody societal stereotypes, it is quite interesting to note that men in all national contexts are more interested in discussing femininity than they are in debating their own masculinity (except for Switzerland, where the percentage dedicated to both topics is the same) (see figure 5). Also, they devoted more attention to defining fatherhood than motherhood in Germany, Denmark, Hungary, and the UK. Only in Switzerland is the theme of paternity more salient than that of maternity, while in Spain, the prominence of both is the same.

Figure 5: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Gender Roles category for male groups in the six analysed countries.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

We now turn to review the category Domains, defined in the codebook as the different spheres where participants locate their needs, difficulties, or problems.


Within the economic sub-code (see Figure 6), the most frequently mentioned topic by men in Denmark and Hungary is working conditions, which refers to discussions regarding salaries, types of contracts, promotions, working time, etc. Moreover, this theme has a significant relative weight also in Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. The economic crisis is the most mentioned topic in

Germany, with significant salience also in Denmark, where it occupies the second place in terms of salience, and Switzerland, fundamentally. It is noteworthy that in the case of Spain, the most salient issue is working legislation (which is probably linked to the important role that the discussion on gender quotas has had in the Spanish groups, as mentioned before in this report) and in the case of the UK it is the discussion on employability and competence. The code about employability and competence, which also occupies the second place in terms of salience in the Spanish groups, covers the discussions about the accessibility of entering the labour market and the difficulties/facilities encountered in it.

Figure 6: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: Economy for male groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.

28

Notes: Own elaboration.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Regarding the family sub-code, we observe an interesting pattern. Specifically, we see that the discussion on childcare is the most mentioned topic in all countries except Germany, where it ranks second. On the other hand, Figure 7 also shows that discussion about housework (i.e. if they spend a lot of time, if it is a problem, if they do not work in order to focus on the household, etc.) is the second most salient issue in Spain and Switzerland, and the first in Germany. Care for dependents and the elderly emerges as the second most important issue in the UK and Denmark, and third in Germany, while its importance is residual or non-existent in the other countries. Finally, it is also worth noting the reproductive labour code's overall absence, as it only appears in Hungary and Spain (where it is the least relevant of all the issues addressed).

Figure 7: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode *Domain: Family* for male groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.

29




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 8 illustrates that social order —which covers participant’s concerns about social harmony, coexistence and respect for law and authority— is the most discussed topic across the six countries analysed within the sub-code of security. This is clearly related to the point made above about the importance of the participant's perception of the decline and erosion of the social order (see section 2). On the other hand, the perception of economic insecurity is higher in terms of salience compared to physical insecurity in Denmark, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. In this sense, the discussion of economic insecurity is absent in Hungary and has less prominence than that of economic insecurity in Germany.

Figure 8: Table 5: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: Security for male groups in the six analysed countries.


30



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Overall, as shown in Figure 9, education is the most prominent topic for men in Spain and Switzerland, and it also ranks high in Denmark and the UK. The discussion on social benefits (code: unemployment and pensions) is also relevant, with a considerable relative weight in Germany (being the most important issue), Denmark, and Spain (being the second most salient issue). Another interesting finding is the prominence of the code about family policies in Hungary and the role of discussions regarding the health system in Denmark.


Figure 9: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Domain: Welfare category for male groups in the six analysed countries.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 10 shows how references to migration seem to be mixed across the focus groups. Men in Spain primarily conceive the phenomenon as a *cultural threat*, while in Denmark and Switzerland, they see it as an *economic threat*. In the rest of the national contexts (except for the United Kingdom, where these topics are not mentioned), the relative importance of both spheres is balanced.

Figure 10: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: Migration for male groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Female participants


Except for Germany, women tend to locate their perceived gender problems/needs primarily in their individual sphere rather than in the collective one. This finding contrasts with the one found for men, as male participants located their needs more in the collective sphere. Furthermore, it is remarkable that women mention male identity more than female identity in all contexts except Switzerland (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Location (self and belonging) category for male groups in the six analysed countries.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 12: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Location (self and belonging): intersections category for male groups in the six analysed countries.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

34

With regard to intersections (see figure 11), women and men are similar regarding the high salience of national and regional identity. Thus, for women, this category is the most prominent in all countries, with the exception of the UK. Finally, we observe that generational identity (code: age) has significant importance and ranks in second place in Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK.

As men, women also tend to focus on the feeling of injustice over that of entitlement. That is, women talk more about their own perception of being treated unfairly in some areas than about the idea that they have a right to enjoy certain material or immaterial goods or conditions. However, female groups differ slightly in the relative larger importance of entitlement as compared to male groups in all countries (except Germany) (see Figure 13 and Figure 3).

Figure 13: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the *Entitlement-aggravance* category for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).


35

Regarding the Feminism category, it is worth noticing how the feeling that equality policies have gone too far and are no longer necessary seems to affect more women than men since this is the more salient code discussed by women in Germany and Spain and the second in importance in Hungary and Denmark, with minor relevance in Switzerland (while it is absent in the UK) (see Figure 14 and Figure 4). We also find a generalised criticism of mainstream feminism (code: negative feminist feminism), but it has lesser prominence than gender fatigue or other themes, while it was the first one for men in several of our countries.

Another interesting finding is that only in the Spanish group do women discuss alternative feminist conceptions. In the male groups discussed above (see Figure 14), participants mentioned alternative conceptions of feminism in


Germany and Hungary. We observe that the most discussed topic by Danish women is the one related to gender and biology or sexual attributes (code: binary conception of gender), as well for Danish men (see Figure 14 and Figure 4). Furthermore, the binary conception of gender is also the most relevant theme for women in the UK. Specifically, the British groups show a differentiated pattern for men and women: while for women, the most salient themes are the binary conception of gender and sexual orientation interacting with gender, for men, this ranking is reversed.

Figure 14: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the Feminism category for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 15: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Gender Roles category for female groups in the six analysed countries.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).


With regard to how participants discuss the proper roles of men and women and how they embody social stereotypes (figure 15), it is quite interesting to note that women in all national contexts are more interested in mentioning femininity than masculinity (however, the prominence of both codes scores equally in Switzerland). In fact, femininity is the topic with greater salience in three countries: Germany, Denmark, and Hungary. In this sense, a common pattern is that RWPP's voters, both females and males, devoted more effort to discussing femininity than to masculinity. On the other hand, women focus to a greater extent on defining and discussing motherhood compared to fatherhood in Germany, Denmark, and

Hungary. In contrast, the salience of both codes is similar in Spain, and the ranking is reversed in Switzerland (that is, Swiss females talk more about fatherhood than motherhood).

We now turn to examine the category Domains, defined in the codebook as the different spheres where participants locate their needs, difficulties, or problems.

Concerning the Economy sub-code (see Figure 16), female groups present a pattern quite different from male groups. In five out of six countries, the discussion on the balance between participating in the labour market and addressing the private sphere is the first or second most important theme, while its relative importance was marginal in male groups (except in the case of Germany).

Figure 16: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Economy for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Similarly, the discussions regarding working conditions go hand in hand in terms of importance for female groups, being the most salient theme in Germany, Denmark and Hungary, and the second one in the rest of the countries (Spain, Switzerland and the UK). These findings are in line with the qualitative in-depth examination presented in section 2: the women mainly discuss material issues, particularly those related to their participation in the labour market and the difficulties of balancing the private sphere and work. It is interesting to note how women tend to discuss working relations (that is, those personal reflections on

their relations with their co-workers and on the working environment) to a lesser extent than men (within male groups, the code is absent, in fact, in four out of six countries, as shown in Figure 6). Only Danish and German female focus groups pay attention to it, while it was present in five out of six countries for male groups (only German men abstain from discussing it). Only Danish and German female focus groups pay attention to it, while it was present in five out of six countries for male groups (only German men abstain from discussing it).

As shown in Figure 17, women devote a lot of attention to discussing and debating education (defined as mentions to the educational system in a global sense). This theme is the most salient in Spain and Switzerland and highly important in Germany, Denmark, Hungary, and the UK. As we pointed out before, education was also relevant in the male focus groups. In Hungary, the most important topic is related to family public policies, defined as pronatalist governmental policies introduced to support childbearing and demographic trends through family support as different loans for housing, etc. Mentions about social benefits (that is, public policies such as unemployment benefits or pensions) are highly prominent in Germany (ranking as the first domain in importance), Denmark, and Spain. Finally, it should be noted that participants' reflections on the welfare care system from a personal perspective, experiences, opinions and perceptions when using them (for example, childcare, elderly care, domestic help for dependents, etc.) receive considerable attention in Germany and the UK.

Figure 17: Relative frequencies of sub-codes within the Domain: Welfare category for female groups in the six analysed countries.




41

Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Migration—including those references to the global migration processes, as well as to the immigrants from any perspective in any sense—is perceived basically as a cultural threat by women in Germany, Denmark and the UK, occupying second place in Spain (figure 18). On the contrary, the notion of economic threat is more salient in the female groups of Hungary, Spain, and Switzerland. Other conceptualisations and worries about migration appear in Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK. How migration is conceptualised in diverging

ways apart from the cultural and economic threat that it may represent for RWPP voters is a noteworthy departure in female groups vs. male ones. Only Swiss and German males touched into other conceptualisations of migration, and only marginally, while in the female groups, those conceptualisations are quite more relevant.

Figure 18: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: *Migration* for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.




Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 19 shows that women stressed economic security as the most relevant concern in four out of six countries (Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK). However, the most relevant code was social order (understood as those mentions regarding social harmony, coexistence and respect for law and


authority) being the first concern in Denmark and Hungary, and second in all other countries. Finally, interventions on perceptions of physical insecurity rank last in terms of salience in the four countries in which they appear (Germany, Hungary, Spain, and the UK).

Figure 19: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: Security for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

Figure 20: Relative frequencies of subcodes within the subcode Domain: Family for female groups in the six analysed countries. Relative frequencies.



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%).

44

Regarding the Family code, we observe a common pattern, as shown in Figure 20. In the six countries analysed, the most mentioned theme is related to work in the private sphere, and the second most discussed topic is concerned with raising and educating children. The findings for women contrast with those for men, as in male groups, we find that the most salient theme across countries was childcare, followed by household/housework (see Figure 7).


3.4. Within-country comparisons

The following subsection compares women's and men's discourses in each country by applying the UNTWIST coding protocol. This allows us to discern differences and similarities between male and female supporters of RWPP in each context. Before examining the results, two aspects must be taken into account: on the one hand, data from Denmark will not be shown due to the mixed nature of the groups, which makes it impossible to compare by gender; on the other, only the findings concerning the topics that provide the most substantive information will be shown. For each country, the explanations are accompanied by graphical representations to facilitate the understanding of the results.



Germany

45



Figure 21: Comparison of male vs female focus groups, Germany.





Feminism



Domains: Economy



Domains: Family





Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%) of different topics.

In Germany, both male and female participants show predominantly higher levels of perceived injustice than entitlement. In other words, the feeling of being aggrieved and treated unfairly is more intense than the idea of being entitled to enjoy certain benefits. Moreover, the difference in salience between these two topics is much more pronounced for men than for women.

The discourse of women concentrates on gender fatigue and the negative comments of mainstream feminism. These two codes are also the two more relevant for German men, but they pay less attention to them as a bunch of all

other sub-codes emerge in their discourse. To summarise, gender fatigue, associated with negative evaluations of mainstream feminism, seems to play a larger role within the discourse of German women than it does for German men.

Focusing on the economic domain (code economy), male and female focus groups differ primarily in the relative importance they put in discussing working conditions (that is, reflections on salaries, working time, contract, etc.), which is much more relevant for women than it is for men. In contrast, male groups discussed the economic crisis more thoughtfully than women. Both sexes pay similar attention in Germany to family/work balance. Other minor differences regard a slightly higher salience in discussing their motivation for work in the male group, while women are slightly more concerned about employability and competence.

Regarding the code Security, which covers participant's concerns and 48 perceptions of security, we find that economic security is the most important for women, and social order is the most prominent for men. In comparative terms, economic security is more important for women than for men, and physical security is mentioned more in the men's group than in the women's group. Also, social order is more prevalent in the male group than in the female group. These findings are in line with what was noted earlier in the qualitative examination of the groups: women generally discuss more materially based concerns, and men mention issues related to perceived cultural decline and social breakdown.

There is a notable difference between women and men regarding the migration code. Women focus much more on discussing migration as a cultural threat—that is, reflections on an immigrant's culture understood as a threat to the native culture—than men do.

Finally, within the family domain, the most discussed topics are reproductive work (which refers to participants' reproductive work in the private sphere) for women and household/housework (reflections about dedication to housework) for men. In this sense, it is remarkable that childcare and adult dependent and elder care codes are salient in both sexes, but reproductive work only appears in women's discourses, and discussion on marriage and new families only emerges in men's discourses.

Spain

We find a clear similarity in Spain, as both sexes devote much more attention to talking about their perception of being unfairly treated (code: injustice) than to discussing the notion of entitlement, defined as the feeling of being entitled to enjoy certain benefits.

49

The discourse of Spanish women concentrates on gender fatigue and the negative opinions of mainstream feminism. Even though the first topic is also salient for men, they focus on it to a lesser extent than women. In contrast, the salience of negative opinions of dominant feminism is much more significant for men in relative terms. Another interesting finding is that females talk about alternative views of feminism, whereas for men, this issue is totally absent. Finally, other minor differences refer to the presence of discussions about gender from a biological point of view, the perception of gender supremacy or debates about sexual identities interacting with gender in men's discourses, while in women's groups, these elements are not found to be relevant.

Concerning the subcode economy, several significant differences by sex can be found. Firstly, Spanish men mention aspects related to working legislation

(which covers reflections on legislation within the labour market, both positive and negative). This code, which includes opinions on gender quotas, is the most commented topic in the economy domain, while women do not address this issue. As explained before, male participants in Spain exhibited a critical discourse toward gender quotas policies. Another specificity regarding women is that they mention the economic crisis and the balance between the private sphere and work, while men do not. This is of great importance for the UNTWIST project because women seem to express their concerns about work-life balance and material issues very clearly. Hence, Spanish women speak openly and explicitly about specific material needs and concerns. Finally, a similarity is that mentions of employability and competence have almost equal levels of salience for both sexes.

50

Focusing on the family domain, a remarkable similarity is that both men and women discuss childcare in a similar way (code: X). From the point of view of distinctions by sex, two aspects need to be addressed: first, women mention the theme of reproductive work (that is, the work within the private sphere), while men barely discuss it at all; second, men talk about marriage and new family models, while women do not.



Concerning the theme of migration, which covers reflections on migration phenomenon in a broader sense, we observe that men primarily conceived it as a cultural threat to a greater extent than women. Alternatively, economic threat is more salient for female groups than for male groups.

Finally, we see a similar pattern with respect to the issue of security, where the salience of the economic sphere (code: economic security) is higher for women, and that of the cultural sphere (code: social order) is higher for men.



Figure 22: Comparison of male.vs female focus groups, Spain.




Domains: Economy



Domains: Family





Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%) of different topics.

United Kingdom

In the UK, men and women mention their perception of being unfairly treated (code: injustice) rather than discussing the notion of entitlement (understood as the feeling of being entitled to enjoy certain benefits). Nevertheless, the difference between these two codes is more pronounced in the female group.

It is remarkable that both men and women talk about issues related to sexual orientation (code: sexual identity orientation interaction with gender) and gender distinction in biological terms (code: binary gender based on biology). These discussions are probably associated with the criticisms on LGBTI and trans rights pointed out earlier in the qualitative examination. However, the importance of the debate on sexual identities is slightly more intense for men than for women. Interestingly, negative mentions of mainstream feminism and the reception idea of gender supremacy are only present in the male groups, while the perception of gender fatigue only occurs in the female groups.

Regarding the economy code, the topics most addressed by men are employability and competence (this code refers to personal experiences within the labour market, including competence with particular groups such as women of immigrants), and by women, the ones related to motivations for paid work, followed by family/work balance and mentions about economic crisis. In this sense, it is noteworthy that mentions of concerns about how to conciliate the private sphere and work seem to concern women in the UK to a greater extent.



54

With regard to the family code, both sexes seem concerned about childcare and the care of the elderly, although men devote more effort to addressing these topics than women. British women mention the topic of work in the private sphere (code: reproductive work) quite prominently.



Finally, both sexes mention the three codes within the security domain, although some notable substantive differences are found. For example, men talk more about physical security and social order than women. Similarly, women discuss economic insecurity more than men. Again, women seem to be more concerned with economic issues and men with cultural/identity-based problems.

Figure 23: Comparison of male vs female focus groups, UK.



Aggrievance-entitlement and injustice





Feminism





Domains: Economy





Domains: Family



Domains: Migration



Domains: Security



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%) of different topics.

Switzerland

In Switzerland, men and women mention their perception of being unfairly treated (code: injustice) rather than discussing the notion of entitlement (understood as the feeling of being entitled to enjoy certain benefits). The levels of emphasis of the two codes are comparatively similar for both sexes.

Men and women show a similar pattern in their discourses: the most salient issue for both groups is the one related to the negative evaluations of mainstream feminism, followed by gender fatigue in the case of males (that is, the consideration that the feminist movement was needed and had a positive effect in the past but is no longer needed because, in contemporary society, equality has been reached), and gender supremacy in the case of females (that is, the perception that cultural, political, economic and social systems systematically benefits one sex)

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Regarding the domain of economics, the most relevant finding is that women focus on the themes of family/work balance and working conditions (which cover opinions about the conciliation between participating in the labour market and work in the private sphere and mentions on salaries, working time, contracts, etc., respectively.), whereas men devote their attention to other issues such as economic crisis, employability and competence or working legislation. In this sense, it is remarkable that Swiss men discuss working legislation while women do not


We find that Swiss men locate their discourses on topics related to childcare and household. Alternatively, females put more effort into discussing work in the private sphere, followed by childcare and elder care.

With regard to the migration code, we find a remarkable difference in that men emphasise the phenomenon more in economic terms and women more in terms of cultural threat. As for the British focus groups, we find that concerning migration phenomena, men mention the material dimension to a greater extent, and women mention cultural/identity aspects. This may be because men are more integrated in the labour market and may, therefore, see immigrants as economic competitors to a greater extent than women.



Finally, in the security domain, male and female focus groups differ primarily in the relative importance they attribute to the discussion on physical security, which is only addressed by men. Furthermore, Swiss females show higher salience regarding economic security and social order compared to males.

Figure 24: Comparison of male vs female focus groups, Switzerland.



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

Feminism



Domains: Economy



Domains: Family





Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%) of different topics.

Hungary

In Hungary, both men and women mention their perception of being unfairly treated (code: injustice) rather than discussing the notion of entitlement (understood as the feeling of being entitled to enjoy certain benefits).

There are some remarkable findings in the Hungarian focus groups regarding the feminism domain. Firstly, we observe negative mentions of mainstream feminism only in men's discourses. Also, gender fatigue, gender

supremacy, and sexual identity interacting with gender subcodes are present in both groups, with similar relative distributions (although mentions of gender fatigue and sexual identity interacting with gender are slightly higher in the women's groups than in the men's groups).

Within the economy domain, the discussion on working conditions seems to get the most attention from Hungarian women (code: working conditions and salaries), followed by mentions of the economic crisis and motivations for paid work. Moreover, male participants also emphasised the topic of working conditions, followed by one related to the labour market (which comprises reflections regarding the working sphere in a broader sense).

The discussion on childcare receives most of the attention from both men and women in the Hungarian groups. However, the most salient topic in the female groups is related to the work in the private sphere (code: reproductive work).

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

As regards migration, women mainly discuss it as an economic threat (also, the category 'other' has salience), while men consider the phenomenon as both a cultural and an economic threat.

Finally, a very interesting finding is that the idea of economic insecurity is absent in all Hungarian groups. It is also noteworthy that both men and women emphasise the code of social order—which covers participant's concerns about social harmony, coexistence and respect for law and authority— more than that of physical security.



Figure 25: Comparison of male vs female focus groups, Hungary.





Domains: Family



Domains: Migration



Domains: Security



Notes: Own elaboration. Bars represent relative frequencies (%) of different topics.

Hypotheses testing

Based on the results of the qualitative and quantitative assessments presented before, this section evaluates what the findings mean for the three hypotheses linked to the theory of Gendered Positional Deprivation. We examine the hypotheses overall, pointing out differences and similarities for the countries analysed. This exploratory hypothesis testing aims to refine current hypotheses and identify plausible future hypotheses in line with the UNTWIST project objectives. In addition, the specificity of the research design must be taken into account in the sense that the focus groups point out aspects of interest rather than indicating rejection or acceptance of the hypotheses in a categorical way.

Table 1: Hypotheses testing for different national contexts.

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Hypotheses Countries	H1	H2	H3
United Kingdom	☑☑ partial support	☑☑ partial support	☑☑ partial support
Hungary	☒ rejected	☒ rejected	☒ rejected
Switzerland	☒ rejected	☒ ! not applicable/unclear	☒ ! not applicable/unclear
Germany	☑☑ little partial support	☑☑ partial support	☒ rejected
Denmark	☑☑ little partial support	☒ ! rejected/unclear	☒ ! rejected/unclear
Spain	☑☑ partial support	☑☑ partial support	☒☒ rejected

Notes: own elaboration. H1: RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening; H2: Concerning sex and gender,

participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies); H3: Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP.

HYPOTHESIS 1: RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening.

In connection with extended discourses by RWPP, in our initial hypothesis, we explored if RWPP's voters feel they have lost or fear losing gender status (their social value as men or women) due to feminism. Before going in more depth into the examination of this hypothesis, it is noteworthy that the participants unanimously agreed that women's position has improved over the last decades and that this has been very positive. However, this discussion is focused almost exclusively on the labour sphere, so the participants considered women's incorporation into the labour market as the main emancipatory milestone for women. Overall, participants did not bring up a 'sexist retropia' discursive frame across the different focus groups in other countries. Even those who did claim to have felt their gender position decline did not articulate discourses or ideas on how a perceived gender status loss could be compensated by a return to pre-or pseudo-emancipatory principles.

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Focusing on hypothesis 1, the examination of empirical evidence yields mixed results depending on the national contexts and the participants' gender. On the one hand, we identify several countries (mainly Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Denmark) in which hypothesis 1 can be partially

supported because there is a perception of gender status loss among RWPPs supporters. Notwithstanding, significant variations can be highlighted regarding the loss of gender status between men and women. Several women in the aforementioned groups (specifically, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany) reflected critically on what they perceived as a regression in their gender position, referring to the difficulty reconciling work and family responsibilities. Hence, female participants discussed how, in today's society, women face social pressures related to work and care. However, as mentioned at the beginning of the explanation, this discourse does not reflect a desire to return to the traditional patriarchal scheme but rather a demand for better working conditions and policies that alleviate this tension. More interestingly, women do not blame feminism as a cause of their gender status loss but instead structural socioeconomic transformations and economic pauperisation. Besides that, male participants in the mentioned countries also perceived the decline of their gender status, but in distinct ways. For example, although the discourse around gender status loss is pronounced in the case of the Spanish groups, it is much weaker in the case of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Germany. What is similar across these groups is that neither men nor women blame feminism for this decline in gender status but rather for socio-economic transformations or, in the case of British groups, discussions about transgender and non-binary rights. In the groups from Spain and Denmark, the blaming of feminism does appear, although not very strongly, and because of the moderator's intervention.

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It also should be noted that in two national contexts (Switzerland and Hungary), we do not find support for hypothesis 1 either regarding the perception of gender status loss or the blaming of feminism.

Overall, we find partial support for hypothesis 1 in some contexts. RWPP's supporters showed in their discourses a sense of loss of gender status, albeit with substantial differences between men and women. For women, the self-perception of gender status was particularly strong and linked to socio-economic transformations and their impacts on work/family balance. In the case of men, they reflected on their gender status loss but in a weaker way compared to women and without linking this decline directly and clearly to feminism. In sum, gender status loss emerged during the focus groups, although the blaming of feminism did not seem to be as evident.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies).

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Mixed findings emerged regarding hypothesis 2. We observe consistent evidence concerning the so-called expressive voting logic in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In terms of voting rationale, participants justified voting for RWPPs as a form of protest and rejection toward mainstream parties in general and their positions and policies in particular. As highlighted in the above explanation regarding the main argumentative lines of focus groups, voting for RWPPs seems to be embedded in a general criticism of mainstream politics and the political system. In any case, it should be noted that the expressive logic shown here only refers to sex and gender issues in indirect, general and diffuse ways. However, it does not mean that gender is not present or does not play a role at all since we have observed, at the same time, how perceptions and needs are

gendered. It means that important divergences are found between men and women in the way they perceive reality and position themselves in their national context. Truly, we did not find any hints of an instrumental logic in voting RWPP in our groups; participants did not articulate a discourse about the potential impacts of their voting decisions in public policies on sex/gender issues or the competence of RWPPs in these themes. Contrary to expectations, some participants in the female German group explicitly stated that they would not view the arrival of AfD in power as a favourable outcome due to their gender-related positions or policy proposals.

Unfortunately, the other three countries analysed (Denmark, Switzerland, and Hungary) did not offer much ground on which to discuss the hypotheses due to the idiosyncrasy of qualitative research design and the specific discursive logic of focus groups. In particular, Danish and Swiss participants did not discuss their voting decisions, as other topics monopolised the debate. Hence, we cannot ensure that the mentioned voting logics did not exist categorically but that the research design did not adequately capture this aspect. Moreover, when testing hypothesis 2 in the Hungarian case, we must consider that the governing party coalition (Fidesz-KNDP) is a RWPP actor. So, it is not surprising that, in this case, the participants did not show the aforementioned protest vote against mainstream politics, as they actually voted for the incumbent party.

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In sum, we find partial support for hypothesis 2 in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany, but only regarding the expressive logic of voting. Participants alluded to their frustration and rejection of mainstream politics when discussing their voting decisions. In contrast, no conclusive findings can be drawn from the Danish, Swiss, and Hungarian focus groups.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP.

Finally, the third hypothesis posits that men and women have different rationales for evaluating their loss of gender status and voting for RWPPs. *A priori*, validating this hypothesis implies that evidence has been found that women and men have felt gender status loss or have expressed motivations to support RWPPs. Based on the partial support for hypotheses 1 and 2 across countries and within countries (that it is, between men and women), very little support can be observed for hypothesis 3 in our focus groups. As previously stated, in some countries, no explicit references to gender status loss were found, which makes it impossible to evaluate potential differences in rationales between men and women. Additionally, as previously mentioned, male and female participants in specific contexts (Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany) shared a common expressive logic of voting for RWPPs based primarily on their rejection towards mainstream parties. Consequently, we cannot draw firm conclusions regarding the second part of the hypothesis.

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In conclusion, as discussed above, neither previous findings on hypotheses 1 and 2 nor the examination of participants' discourses supported the idea women and men have different rationales regarding gender status loss and motivations to support RWPPs. As such, we would assess this hypothesis as negative or invalid. However, further hypothesis proposals derived from this original expectation can be found in section 6 of this report.

Further findings

This section summarises other relevant findings from the deep exam of the focus groups developed within work package 2 of the UNTWIST project in the United Kingdom, Hungary, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Spain. The different national reports in the Appendix should be consulted for a more detailed discussion of the findings for each country.

- The United Kingdom pointed out inconsistencies between the explicit opposition of male and female participants to overt sexism while expressing gender-stereotypical attitudes at the same time. In the UK groups social media was believed by both groups to be one of the major problems in current society and a cause of a breakdown of social order.
- Hungary paid deep attention to the concept of gender-based violence (developing new codes) while noting the reluctance of participants to address the word feminism. Related to the Economy codes, the Hungarian team also created a new code for the discussion of labour force emigration from the country (while the UNTWIST code protocol only paid attention to immigration initially).
- The Swiss team noted the discrepancies among participants between problem awareness and available (valid) solutions regarding gender and economic pressures (for detailed information, see Appendix A). Due to the lack of solutions, the participants back into systemic explanations or the other way around: because they are unable to picture a vision outside of the system, they are incapable of visualising solutions. Therefore, they fall back

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into neoliberal arguments (demand/supply), patriarchal values and stereotypes (respect, women's talk, etc.), and democratic local politics and values.

- Germany reflected on the fact that participants' attention to gender-related needs was mostly a reaction to external stimuli, and thus, while this mechanism does not exclude those highlighted in the Gender Positional Deprivation theory, it suggests that gender-related needs might not be perceived as structural issues but rather as collateral issues of an overall nationalist, socially conservative discourse which seems to align with priorities and positions of political actors, although not perfectly overlapping. They suggest that the perception that the structural anchorage of gender politics in far-right voters' discourse is thinner than UNTWIST expected when considering socio-structural explanations of far-right support. In other words, the dynamics of the group—on gender-related and not gender-related topics—suggest a politicisation process that arguably is only partially rooted in structural features and highly mediated or moderated —if not produced— by political actors' agency, at least on some relevant topics.
- Spain pointed to the relevance of the rejection of gender quotas in the groups, driven, among other things, by the perception that it is a paternalistic, ineffective, and imposed policy. The Spanish team also stressed that most participants rejected social benefits, arguing that those are not distributed correctly and go to undeserving groups (e.g., immigrants, lazy people, and young people). They also found traces of populist elements

in participants' discourses. Finally, the point is that immigration does not play a central role in the participants' discourses.

Conclusions and further hypotheses

Based on the focus group analysis results, this final section presents the main conclusions of the deliverable and several hypothesis proposals that can further guide the UNTWIST project. Nevertheless, it is recommended that national reports be consulted to examine the main findings, hypotheses and further research questions for each country (see Appendix A). This means that only findings and potential hypotheses that have a global significance for the project as a whole are presented in the following. These global considerations will guide the formulation and suggestion of policy recommendations, which is one of the pillars of UNTWIST.

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Firstly, a conclusion that has significant implications for the project concerns the tone and disposition of RWPP's voters. In general, the focus group participants were quite moderate and showed a civic-minded, relaxed, and peaceful discourse. As an example of the above, the general tone of ideas in favour of the incorporation of women into the labour market on the part of the participants in the groups was remarkable. Likewise, the expressions related to anti-immigration positions were, in general, quite restrained in both their content and their form. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that this is partially a product of the group's design idiosyncrasies. On the one hand, it should be noted that we have selected people who have switched their votes from the mainstream parties to RWPP.

In other words, it is possible to think that these voters may be less radicalised than those who have not voted for mainstream parties before and now support

the RWPPs. Another important issue to be considered is the structural censorship inherent in focus groups as qualitative techniques and social desirability, which can lead to subjects not talking about or resisting giving their opinions on sensitive issues on which there are socially accepted discourses and broad consensus. Although our moderation guide was designed to lessen these negativities, they cannot be excluded, particularly in the few instances when the empirical composition of any of the groups was sub-optimal (large internal heterogeneity, small number of participants, participants known to each other, etc.).

At the same time, the fact that the participant's discourses are mostly moderated may give reasons to believe that possible responses in terms of representation and inclusive policy responses to their gender-related demands and needs are viable and feasible.

In other words, UNTWIST's policy recommendations can lead to coherent, feasible, and viable responses to neutralise the RWPP's exclusionary and polarised proposals, thus strengthening democratic cohesion and equity in the different national contexts. In any case, the use and application of this work package's results should always consider the nature of the research design. In doing so, we will avoid misinterpretations.

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We identified another important point regarding the nature of the needs and demands of RWPP's voters. According to the results, explicit gender references do not seem to occupy a central position in the discourses of RWPP's supporters but rather are embedded in other concerns and demands. More interestingly, gender does not seem to be identified as a strong and important element in the decision to vote for RWPP parties either. Rather, what we find is that the decision to vote for the RWPPs seems to be guided by an expressive logic based on discontent and

dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties. All this may lead us to propose that, rather than 'gender needs and demands' (i.e., needs and demands intrinsically and directly linked to gender), a more precise conceptualisation might be 'gendered needs and demands'. That is, needs and demands in particular areas, such as the family or the labour market, are defined and experienced in significantly different ways by men and women)

This semantic nuance reflects the fact that many of the concerns and demands that group participants show are not directly situated in the gender sphere (or rather are not subjectively perceived as such by participants) but are located in other spheres. In tangential, secondary, and contingent forms, they appear to be gendered. This difference, although subtle, could have important implications. In particular, in bringing back RWPP's voters to parties more aligned with European and democratic values, it is possible that many of the responses to the demands and concerns of RWPP's voters need not be framed so much directly or explicitly as gender equality policies, but linked to other policy spheres (economy, labour, education, etc.) however adjusted to the specific needs experienced by current male and female voters of RWPP within those realms.

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Another relevant conclusion is the difference we found in the discourses of men and women with respect to some themes. This set of differences can be qualified as 'gendered needs' insofar as there are needs and concerns of a different nature and orientation depending on the position occupied in gender relations. For example, regarding the incorporation of women into the labour market, all the participants evaluated it as a positive and important achievement. However, we observe two different logics between men and women. On the one hand, male participants mainly stressed how positive and necessary it is that

women are working because two salaries are necessary in the current economically challenging context. Basically, males emphasised the role of women as economic providers in a scenario of economic pauperisation.

On the other hand, women assessed their entry into the labour market as positive but emphasised the need for better working conditions that allow them to reconcile work and family. In the female participants' discourses, the so-called 'emancipation fatigue' can be observed. From this, one of the main demands of the RWPP's female voters is the desire to work and, at the same time, to be able to take care of their families. Hence, a major conclusion is the need to deepen policies that improve women's material conditions and, at the same time, enable them to take care of their personal spheres. In other words, the need to reclaim, enhance and value care relations (family, home, children) as a central axis in people's lives is something that can be drawn from the Work Package 2 of the UNTWIST project.

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Furthermore, within the framework of the general negative discourse with mainstream feminism, we observe a negative assessment of quotas (mainly from men but also from women). These measures are perceived as unfair and unilaterally imposed. A possible lesson for concrete public policies would be to improve the way in which equality policies, and in particular gender quotas, are communicated to citizens. That is to say, to do a much more thorough pedagogical work so that they are not seen as an arbitrary and unfair measure.

Secondly, several hypothesis proposals directly linked to the original objectives (that is, to illuminate the link between voting for RWPP and the needs and demands of men and women regarding gender) can be drawn. The principal hypotheses suggested and drawn from the findings and results of Work Package

2 are summarised in the following. However, the national reports in Appendix A provide a detailed explanation of each of the specific hypotheses proposed by the consortium members.

- Hypothesis: When the discussion of gender relations is absent from the political agenda, it poses an obstacle to the explicit articulation of gender-based needs.
- Hypothesis Political polarisation is associated with a lack of policy options and, consequently, can increase the support for RWPP.
- Hypothesis: The impact of non-structural gender-related issues on voting behaviour for right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) is crucially mediated by the framing of gender politics in RWPP's discourse.

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The group's findings point to the need to test the impact of the supply side (in particular, parties' programmatic approaches and political competition). All suggest that the supply side may also have a direct impact on voting behaviour regarding RWPP.

- Hypothesis: Populist attitudes may positively correlate with anti-feminist orientations in the electoral support for RWPP.

Given that populist elements have been found in the focus groups, it would be interesting to explore the presence of populist attitudes. Particularly, it would be interesting to examine the potential interaction between populist attitudes and anti-gender orientations.

- *Hypothesis:* In the case of women, the thematisation of their concern that their own situation is not as it should be in terms of gender relations would be felt as a status deficit in itself.

It is possible that RWPP women voters' demands and grievances about their own situation may constitute a process of self-perceived loss of status.

To conclude, findings in the WP2 are integrated in WP5 to allow for testing the hypothesis that RWPP are acting as niche parties in the representation of certain gender needs and demands disregarded by mainstream parties (our main hypothesis in UNTWIST first methodological phase). However, at the same time, the groups have allowed us to start testing some hypotheses on the voting rationales of RWPP's voters and helped us in developing new ones, all of which feed the designs of our survey questionnaire in WP6.

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Appendix A: National Papers

United Kingdom..... 79

Hungary.....101

Switzerland152

Denmark 208

Germany..... 234

Spain260

United Kingdom

UK Focus Group Research Paper

Group summary

Focus groups were held with participants who had previously voted for a radical right-wing party in the UK. Two in-person single-sex groups were held in Manchester city centre; one group of 6 men and one group of 9 women. The groups were hosted and moderated by the third-party research organisation Deltapoll, who also recruited the participants. Each group lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes and was moderated by a same sex moderator. Participants were told that they were participating in a focus group on 'social transformation' in British society.

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Tone and narrative

Tone

The general tone of both focus groups was friendly and collegiate. Participants were polite and friendly to one another and there was no argumentation. Where there were occasions of differences of opinion between participants, these were respected and not outright challenged. In many cases, participants appeared to be seeking common ground. For example, if a participant aired an opinion and a second participant voiced disagreement, the first speaker would then clarify or reframe their original statement. Participants in both groups appeared to express

support for the idea that all have a right to an outspoken opinion, so even where these opinions differed slightly, there was still a respectful atmosphere.

At the beginning of each group, moderators hosted a round of introductions where participants provided some general information about their lives including their jobs and family situation. Several participants also talked about their hobbies and pastimes which sparked conversation among the group and helped to establish a friendly atmosphere.

There was also a sense of shared identity within each group. In the women's group, gender formed a common shared identity, and participants often spoke collectively 'as women'. This was less prominent in the men's group, and participants were less inclined to speak 'as men', unless it was prompted by the moderator.

However, in both groups, participants spoke from a collective identity established by age/generation. While this was, in part, influenced by questions asking participants to reflect on generational differences, participants also formed this shared identity themselves when discussing other issues.

Secondly, participants in both the male and female groups distinguished themselves as a collective group, separate from elites. While there was a mix of class status within the group (from working to upper-middle), participants regularly and consistently differentiated between their lives as 'ordinary' citizens and political or business elites.

Third, the female group formed a collective identity around race and ethnicity, othering immigrants and ethnic minorities. Participants outlined rising immigration, particularly of 'young men on boats', to be a problem in British

society. While race was not explicitly mentioned in these discussions, it formed a clear underlying narrative, with one participant referring to immigration as an 'invasion' and a discussion within the group of how the then-Home Secretary Suella Braverman was able to push hardline immigration policy due to her own race as a British-Indian-origin woman. Participants also expressed frustration that 'modern' discourses around diversity have led to a policing of language around race and ethnicity.

These instances of collective identity formation allowed participants to maintain a collegiate atmosphere throughout the session.

Main argumentative lines

In both groups the main argumentative lines were focused on a) the declining state of British society, particularly a breakdown of social order and social cohesion b) anti-elitism and political apathy, c) economic insecurity and associated issues.

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a) Declining state of British society

The first question asked in both groups to spark initial discussion was 'If you had to sum it up in one word/sentence, how do you think things are going in Britain today?'. In both groups this received very pessimistic responses such as 'broken', 'beyond repair' (male group), 'ruined', 'terrible', 'mess' (female group). This line of thought was continuously returned to throughout the group, regardless of the specific issue being discussed, with the major problem identified being a breakdown of social order or sense of community. This was both a temporal and relational perception. Participants expressed that things had 'gotten worse' in recent years. Temporal comparisons were generally very

recent, blaming the COVID-19 lockdowns and Brexit as causes of economic and societal hardship. However, when asked to reflect on society 30 years ago, participants strongly expressed that there has been a decline in social order, a lack of respect and society, and a growth of divisions as a result of identity politics. This theme was regularly returned to throughout both sessions with influences including economic insecurity, crime, lack of investment in the National Health Service (NHS) and social care, lack of strong political leadership, discourses around diversity/identity politics, social media, and more.

b) Anti-elitism and political apathy

Participants in both groups commonly attributed problems in British society to 'selfish' and 'greedy' political elites. There was a strong distrust of the current UK government, in part influenced by the context of senior governmental figure's actions throughout the COVID-19 pandemic as well as their connections to big business. In line with commonly held beliefs of populist voters, participants often framed themselves as 'ordinary' or 'downtrodden' people that are mistreated by political elites. A common theme was that political actors 'don't care' about the everyday man or woman but only act in their own self-interest. Political apathy was regularly expressed as participants in both groups argued that the major parties could not be distinguished from one another, and that voting would have little effect on changing society.

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c) Economic insecurity

A common theme throughout both focus groups was personal and collective economic insecurity and the 'cost of living crisis' in the UK. This was linked to specific causes, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and was seen as both a

cause and result of various policies. This concern with economic insecurity also fed into discussions of changes in gender roles and particularly in women's participation in the labour market.

These key themes may be influenced by the framing of the focus groups around 'social transformation' in British society and current political and socioeconomic contexts of the 'cost of living crisis', and distrust in the government following the COVID-19 pandemic and political turbulence within the Conservative party.

Importance of gender in the global dynamic

The importance of gender in the dynamic of the focus groups was different across the two groups. As discussed above, the women's group formed a collective identity around gender, particularly in discussion of the changes in women's roles in society. Participants shared their own experiences but also used collective phrasing such as 'we' when discussing topics around gendered social roles. The men were less inclined to speak 'as men', unless it was prompted by the moderator. However, when their collective gender was brought into the conversation, they also assumed a shared identity. Gender also featured to a different extent in both group's discussions, however in both groups gender-related topics were not raised until prompted by the moderator. When introduced, the women's group spoke in more detail and with more personal reflection about gender-based issues, whereas the men's group addressed some gender-based issues but often brought this back to more general points around economic insecurity and social order in the UK.

Coding results

Male Group

Focus

Discussion was primarily discourse-centred (1.1), focusing particularly on social cohesion and the breakdown of communities, alongside increased identity politics. There was also discourse-centred discussion of young people's lack of respect for authority and how the future will be bleaker for young people. Actor-centred (1.4) discussion focused commonly on political elites. This is in line with a common theme of anti-elitism throughout the group, with negative views held about the government, political parties, and individual politicians (leading to the creation of an additional code '99_MAN_Political distrust & disillusionment'). Participants also expressed negative views about the role of social media, particular its effects on children. Other actors that were viewed negatively include the police force. Policy-centred (1.3) discussion centred on the cost-of-living crisis and on the ramifications of COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, both economically and on social cohesion. There was also discussion of employment and the impact of automation on future generations (this linked to anti-elitist attitudes about business elites who supposedly care about profits not workers). The theory-centred code (1.2) was the least applied, limited only to a discussion about feminism instigated by the moderator. Here participants expressed a support of gender equality in theory but demonstrated negative attitudes towards specific elements of modern feminism, especially discourses around LGBTQI+ rights.

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Location

Participants most often talked from the perspective of the individual self (2.1), reflecting on their own lives and using anecdotal evidence to address issues. However, they did talk from the perspective of collective belonging as men (2.2.1.1) in discussion of increasing automation and impact on manual labour and in discussion of the change in gender roles from previous generations to now, reflecting on how women have entered the labour force and the impact on families.

Intersections such as nationality (2.2.2.1) were coded when participants compared the state of the UK to other countries such as the USA. There are also several instances of the intersection of gender and sexuality (2.2.2.3) from one participant, a gay man who spoke about the changes in attitudes towards LGBTQ+ people over the last 20–30 years.

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Needs-type

Participants mentioned practical needs (3.1), primarily focusing on economic insecurity and the ‘cost-of-living crisis’ in the UK and the need for greater investment into services such as elder care. Temporal comparisons (3.2.1.1) were very common with participants forming a collective identity around their generation and particularly comparing themselves to their children/younger generations. While this discussion was influenced by the questions in the discussion guide about changes in society, participants also consistently made these comparisons themselves, unprompted, often talking about how things ‘used to be’, for example complaining of a lack of respect from younger generations towards authority figures. Relational comparisons (3.2.2.2) were also made, often

in instances where participants saw themselves as collective 'ordinary' people who have been disadvantaged by the actions of political and business elites.

Aggrievance

There were limited instances of the 'entitlement' (4.1) code, however in several cases participants expressed 'injustice' (4.2) in discussion of how current generations are not grateful for the material goods that the participants did not have in their youth and that younger generations do not value hard work.

External solutions

There was limited discussion of external solutions and most conversation featured negative evaluation of existing solutions, rather than offering new solutions to problems. For example, participants offered negative evaluations of LGBTQ+ pride events (5.4) and of increasing tolerance towards transgender people and gender non-conforming people (5.6).

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Internal solutions

There was generally negative sentiment expressed toward internal solutions with participants agreeing that voting for mainstream political parties did not affect change (6.2) and offering negative opinions on LGBTQ+ activism (6.4).

Feminism

Within the theme of feminism, conversation primarily revolved around gender identity, specifically negative attitudes towards transgender women (7.1.4), and sexual identity (7.1.6), with this discussion heavily influenced by one participant who expressed that they were gay and lead a brief discussion of the positive changes in attitudes towards homosexuals. However, it is worth highlighting that

this participant also expressed negativity about modern-day LGBTQ+ pride events.

Gender roles & stereotypes

Discussion of gender roles only surfaced when introduced by the moderator. Discussion centred predominantly on the responsibility for childcare in the family. Participants expressed the view that parenting should be equally split between men and women, however referred predominantly to emotional labour rather than the practical burden of care. Additionally, all agreed that it is better for one parent to stay at home and care for children but believed that this should be a pragmatic choice for individual couples. However, participants also shared a belief that women are naturally better suited to care for children (8.1) Participants also discussed changes in women joining the labour force and expressed the positives of women having greater opportunities in the present-day (here participants drew from their own lives, such as talking about their daughters) and but also held the view that women entering the labour force is instead a result of economic necessity rather than personal choice. This tied in with discussion of how it is preferable for one parent to stay at home and raise the children/care for elderly relatives but that current societal infrastructure mean that this is not feasible.

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Domains

The most commonly discussed domains were economics (9.1.1) particularly in terms of employment and labour (9.1.2.4) and economic insecurity (9.3.1). A very common topic of discussion was social order (9.3.3) which intersected with many other discussion topics. Physical security (9.3.2) was discussed in reference to rising crime and anti-social behaviour in the local area. Discussions of family (9.5) centred predominantly on childcare (9.5.1.2) but there was also discussion the

changes in society that mean people are less willing/able to care for elderly relatives (9.5.1.3). An additional domain code was added under '9.3 Security' to capture references to the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown regulations (9.3.900_MAN_COVID19 lockdown) which was a common point of discussion.

Female group

Focus

Discourse-centred (1.1) discussion ranged from general discussion of declining social order in the UK and lack of respect in younger generations, to specific issues such as changes in attitudes toward mental health, elder care, and LGBTQ+ people. There was a particularly interesting discussion of how changes in gender equality/gender roles have affected women, with a common feeling that women were 'sold the failure' of balancing work with family life. Theory centred (1.2) discussion was fairly limited to a negative discussion about gender identities and gender non-conforming people and an agreement that women are naturally more suited to caregiving than men. Policy-centred (1.3) discussion focused on the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown regulations (this was often spurred by one participant who regularly voiced conspiracy theorist views throughout the session). The group also discussed immigration policy in a negative light, which was linked to discussion of declining social order and a 'loss' of British society. Actor-centred (1.4) discussion focused on political elites and tied in with a theme of anti-elitism/political apathy that ran throughout the group. Participants expressed frustration with the selfishness and greed of political actors and a lack of strong leadership (however, they simultaneously voiced negative views about politicians abusing their power).

Location

Participants were more inclined to speak as a collective or ‘on behalf’ of British people than to speak specifically of their own lives. Where they did speak from the ‘individual self’ (2.1) it was often discussion of changes in gender roles and social order from their childhood to their own children. Participants spoke collectively ‘as women’ (2.2.1.2) in discussions of the expansion of women’s rights since the introduction of suffrage and in changing social roles for women in the home and in the labour market. Here there was a genuine sense of shared experience among the participants and a sense that they were speaking of a universal women’s experience.

The most common intersection coded was nationality (2.2.2.1), which overlapped with race/ethnicity (2.2.2.5) in a discussion of immigration in which participants formed an in-group as (white) British citizens and immigrants as non-British (racialised). This intersected with gender as participants were particularly concerned with ‘young men’ causing violence/crime. At points in the discussion, some participants engaged in more overtly racist discourses as well. The nationality (2.2.2.1) identity was also used in comparison of the UK to other countries, mostly the USA, in terms of political ideals but also specific policies like healthcare.

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Needs-type

Practical needs (3.1) focused on UK-specific policies such as economic insecurity, immigration policy, healthcare, and energy. Temporal comparisons (3.2.1.1), encouraged by the discussion guide, focused primarily on changes in social order with a shared feeling that current younger generations do not value material possessions and have a lack of respect toward older generations. However,

participants also noted some positive changes such as improved education and attitudes towards mental health. Temporal comparisons were also made in discussing changes in opportunities for women and in women's social roles. Looking to the future, participants held negative views about the economy, social order, and societal pressures on younger people. Relational comparisons (3.2.2.2) focused on primarily on two main areas a) 'ordinary' citizens vs, political elites and b) (white) British citizens vs. (non-white) immigrants. However, relational comparisons were also made between men and women, with a belief among some participants that women have a natural instinct as caregivers that men do not.

Aggrievance

There were a few instances coded as 'entitlement' (4.1), focused mostly on tax and welfare benefit systems. More common was 'injustice' (4.2) where participants expressed anger that immigrants/refugees were afforded housing and access to education and healthcare while British citizens suffered. The women's group also expressed injustice about the changes in gender roles in the last 20-30 years and women's participation in the labour market (see ***Gender roles and stereotypes*** section below for this in detail).

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External solutions

Discussion of external solutions focused on evaluating current systems rather than offering solutions to problems. Participants had strong negative views about the care system (5.1), expressing anger and frustration that lack of funding meant that families took on the burden of care for elderly relatives which in turn put pressure on families and couples (here participants discussed the impact on families as a

whole, rather than particularly on women). There was a discussion of activist solutions (5.4), but the resounding opinion was that these are generally ineffective.

Internal solutions

Participants shared the view that voting cannot bring change as the electoral system ensures that mainstream political parties stay in power (6.2). Several participants stated that they had voted for UKIP in the past because they wanted to instigate change but admitted that they never believed that they would win. Instead, their aim was more to influence political discourse. There was a brief discussion of protest as a method of change (6.4), but the evaluation of these methods was impacted by a participant who expressed suspicion of the funders of online petition sites and data harvesting.

Feminism

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Participants discussed the impact of feminist discourses/politics on their lives and opportunities (7.1). While some participants appreciated the increase in opportunities for women, for example in access to higher education, there was a general agreement that feminist discourses had applied pressure to women's lives. Participants expressed that they felt that they were expected to get an education and a good career but also to have children and that there was not the support for them to achieve both. This is best summarised by one participant who stated:

"[Women are] expected to do it all. We want it, but we're also told that if we don't, if we're not able to achieve all of it, that we've somehow failed and that we're not enough." However, less than being blamed on feminist discourses, this was more blamed on lack of support from men/government/society."

There was also a discussion of gender identity, specifically participants expressed their disapproval of discourses around non-binary identities (7.1.4) and employed a relational comparison to the past where these discourses were far less widely accepted. However, several participants also made clear that they supported gay and lesbian men and women (7.1.6), as well as some support for transgender people that they personally knew but were suspicious/disapproving of broader discourses around gender identity and the impact it will have social order.

Gender roles & stereotypes

As mentioned above, the group discussed changes in gender roles throughout their lifetime and the pressure on women to both work and look after children (8.3), commenting that women faced pressure to work out of economic necessity. Notably, participants believed that it was better for children if one parent stayed at home but did not think that this should always be the mother. They believed that it should be a dependent on personal circumstances and offered anecdotes about themselves/their friends and family to justify different divisions of labour within families. However, several participants did feel that women have a more natural or biological instinct to care for children. This was also coded under themes of femininity (8.1) which additionally included discussions of gender identity and biological sex, as well as discussion of the sexualisation of young girls and the perpetuation of this by social media.

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Domains

The most frequently discussed domains were healthcare (9.4.2.1) with a recurring worry among the group about privatisation of the NHS and the impact of immigration on healthcare (9.2.1). Within welfare, there was also discussion of higher education (9.4.2.4) and social care (9.4.2.2). Economic security (9.1.1) was a

common theme and linked both the contextual factors such as Brexit (for which a new domain code was created: 9.00_MAN_Brexit) and the COVID-19 restrictions (9.3.900_MAN_COVID19 Lockdown). Discussions of family (9.5) centred predominantly on childcare (9.5.1.2) but also a discussion of how the lack of social care provision from the government meant the burden fell on families (9.5.1.3). Finally, the cultural impact of immigration was another common domain (9.2.3).

Hypotheses testing

Hypothesis 1: RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening -> Partial support.

NB: Here 'gender status' is interpreted as men and women's gendered roles in society/family.

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Participants in both groups acknowledged that women and men's roles in the home and in wider society has changed over the last 20-30 years. Both groups made comparisons to family dynamics when they were children, where their mother took on the labour in the home while the father was employed. However, this dynamic was not viewed as wholly positive or something to which we should return. For example, the men's group reflected negatively about fearing their father's and the normality of physical punishment when they were children. Indeed, both groups were generally positive about women entering the labour force and working outside of the home. This was viewed as a positive outcome of feminism by both men and women.

Rather than feminism, the common argument from both the women and men's groups was that the economic system has caused changes in men and women's gender status. Both groups stated that higher prices and lower wages meant that it is necessary for women to join the labour force because families require two incomes to survive. Hence, the woman staying at home was no longer a choice but a matter of economic necessity.

The women's group did reflect more critically on the difficulties of their changing gender role, particularly in combining the demands of work with childcare. However, rather than blaming this on feminism, the participants expressed frustration that society, run by men, has not made changes to accommodate women entering the labour force. For example, in this quote:

"...and I think kind of, as things have moved on, and women have got, got more opportunities, and got more confident, they do kind of, they do want it all, but then you get the other side of it, where the men will say, well, you wanted all this, you wanted the equality, you wanted to work, you want to be able to drink pints and no one's going to say anything about it, but, so, it's your fault, not me, so just get on with it." (F4)

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The clearest example of participants fearing a loss in gender status came from negative discussion of transgender and non-binary rights. Both groups expressed negative attitudes towards transgender people and the women toward non-binary people. However, it is notable that both groups were clear to state that they supported rights and opportunities for gay and lesbian people, sharing personal anecdotes about friends and family. But both groups expressed concerns about transgender women. The men's group discussed (cisgender) women's safety from transgender women, while the women's group discussed how men may

transition in order to maintain control over women. In these discussion, participants regularly used phrases like 'gone too far'. Hence, while both groups articulated that there have been undeniable positive elements to feminism, they shared the view that current feminist discourses around gender identity are 'dangerous' for the future.

Hypothesis 2: Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies). -

➤ **Partial support**

Both the men and women's group outlined an expressive logic for voting RWPP. A very common theme in both groups was (a) a frustration/disenfranchisement with mainstream parties and (b) a specific opposition to the actions and behaviour of the current (Conservative) government. In regard to (a), both groups expressed frustration with mainstream parties' lack of solutions to issues like the cost-of-living crisis, articulating that all mainstream parties are the same and there is a need for strong leadership. Several participants in the women's group expressly stated that they had voted UKIP to try and instigate change in political discourse as the mainstream parties are 'two wings of the same bird' (F9).

Regarding (b), both groups were very opposed to the current Conservative government, particularly throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.¹ The anger toward the Conservative government is interesting given that it is generally assumed that RWPP voters come from right wing parties. However, participant's aggrievance

¹ Members of the Conservative government, including then Prime Minister Boris Johnson and current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, received fines for breaking lockdown social distancing rules and attending parties in Number 10.

was more with the greedy/selfish/ 'corrupt' behaviour of individual politicians, rather than with the Conservative parties' issue agenda. This frustration with political elites also extended to politicians from other parties.

It is less clear from the focus groups whether participants held an instrumental logic in voting RWPP. The women's group did articulate a desire for stronger immigration policy, which is a key RWPP issue. Hence it may be inferred that this would be an instrumental logic to voting RWPP, but it was not made explicit in the group discussion.

Hypothesis 3: Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP -> Partial support

As discussed above, men and women were in fact fairly similar in evaluating the changes in gender roles. Both groups articulated that women entering the labour force and gaining more equality of opportunity was a positive change. Both groups felt that it was better for the children and for social order if families had one parent stay at home to care for children and elderly relatives. However, both men and women articulated that this need not necessarily be women and that the decision should be pragmatic one for individual couples. Yet, at the same time, both men and women held the belief that women are biologically better suited to caring due to maternal instincts. Both groups also shared similar views on gender status loss concerning LGBTQI+ discourses, fearing the loss of traditionally understood categories of 'men' and 'women' (meaning cisgender men and women).

The one distinct difference between men and women's evaluation of gender status loss was in the impact of women's changing gender roles. When asked

about gender responsibilities in the home, men spoke mostly about the emotional labour of childcare. For example, they reflected on the positives that they are more involved in their children's lives than their fathers were in their lives. Whereas the women's group had an in-depth discussion of the difficulties of work/life balance on themselves as individuals and women more broadly. While not made explicit, their conversation reflected that changes in gender status had benefitted men while added increased pressure to women. However, these conversations were never linked to feminism and women articulated no solutions to this imbalance of power other than increased resources e.g., childcare, and social care.

Men and women also expressed similar logics in voting RWPP, most clearly an expressive logic based on frustration with mainstream political parties and a demand for stronger leadership. It is unclear that gender status comes into RWPP support, other than around a concern with LGBTQ+ discourses. Participants expressed a shared concern with the deterioration of social order and a growth of identity politics, but this was blamed on factors such as economic insecurity, crime, the impact of social mobility on local communities, a lack of discipline/respect in younger people, social media etc. rather than changing gender roles. Hence, while gender status changes have influenced many of these issues, the connection was not drawn by focus group participants.

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Further findings

An interesting evaluation from both groups was that participants expressed an explicit opposition to overt sexism but simultaneously expressed gender-stereotypical attitudes. For example, in both groups there was explicit support for

women having independent freedom, being educated and joining the labour market. There was also interesting discussion of the dangerous sexualisation of young girls in modern society, and the role that social media plays in this. Participants in the men's group expressed worry over being labelled as sexist and stated that they believed themselves not to be sexist.

However, both groups also demonstrated sexist attitudes, such as thinking that women were naturally more suited to caring than men due to maternal instincts. Additionally, in both groups, participants held divergent views on LGBTQ+ issues. All were explicitly supportive of rights for gay men and lesbian women but were also explicitly opposed to greater rights and freedoms for transgender and non-binary people. In particular, the men's group voiced concerns with (cisgender) women's and girl's safety from transgender women and the women's group worried about the impact on younger generation's mental health from gender identity discourses. In the male group, one participant was a gay man and made this clear in discussion about how rights and social acceptance of homosexuality is an improvement from past generations. The group appeared to treat sexuality and gender identity as two separate issues where the former is completely acceptable, but the latter is not. This set of attitudes towards sex/gender and gender equality were also expressed as a common feeling that modern discourses on gender have 'gone too far'.

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A second finding that was not as expected was participant's strong concern with the role of social media as a cause of a breakdown of social order. Social media was believed by both groups to be one of the major problems in current society, with specific issues including the impact on the mental health of young people, the impacts on young people's ability to communicate with one another, and the

fuelling of disrespect and a breakdown of local communities. The discussion of social media was tied into gender-related concerns with both groups reflecting on the sexualisation of young girls online. However, the discussion of social media also links to participant's status as 'losers of globalisation'. For instance, the men's group reflected at various points on the impact of automation on their economic security, worrying about future generation's ability to find stable work and the impact on their own lives because of a lack of skills relevant to current labour needs. Participants appeared to view the internet and social media as a clear divide between themselves and younger generations and this may feed into perceptions of RWPP voters as 'losers of globalisation'.

Hypotheses/survey question proposals

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Below is a set of points for consideration to be addressed either as hypotheses or to be developed into survey questions:

- Exploring ambivalence around RWPP voter's attitudes towards women and gender roles
 - For example, do RWPP voters support equality of opportunity between men and women while simultaneously holding regressive attitudes about men and women's appropriate gender roles?
 - Do RWPP voters hold a specific understanding of what gender equality is? I.e. understanding gender equality only in terms of opportunity/labour market participation etc.
- Pragmatism in the gendered division of labour

- Are RWPP voter's attitudes towards gender roles motivated by sexist attitudes or practical needs e.g., economic need for both partners to work/to be responsible for childcare
- Differences between 'ideal' division of labour and 'real-world' division of labour
- Whether 'modern' feminism has forgotten important values/issues
 - What do RWPP voters think feminism 'stands for'?
 - Has 'modern/current' feminism 'gone too far' or forgotten about the important issues?
 - Particularly concerning gender identity discourses
- Linking concepts of 'losers of feminism' with 'losers of globalisation'
 - Which characteristics of a 'loser of globalisation' are associated with being a 'loser of feminism'?
 - Do RWPP voters self-identify as losers of feminism?

Hungary

Analysis of Focus Group Results in the Hungarian Context

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Working Paper

Introduction

This working paper aims to provide a systematic overview and analysis of the most important empirical research results regarding the relationship between sex and gender needs and voting behaviour based on four focus groups conducted in Hungary during October 2023. We followed a purposive sampling procedure to collect meaningful data on the multifaceted nature of sex- and gender-related needs and Right Wing Populist Party (RWPP) voting behaviour in Hungary. Ultimately, the working paper contributes to the Horizon Europe UNTWIST project on *“Policy recommendations to regain “feminism losers” as mainstream voters”* with the overarching aim to identify sex- and gender-based needs and Right Wing Populist Party (RWPP) voting behaviour in different European contexts.

First, we review the sampling methodology of how focus group participants were selected and recruited. Second, we explain the tone and dynamics within the four focus groups. Third, we overview the general results stemming from the application of the deductively determined coding guidelines. Forth, we analyse whether we can accept the three hypotheses set up prior to the study with the qualitative data collected from participants in Hungary. Fifth, we summarise further findings based on themes identified inductively. Sixth, we advance potential new hypotheses for the Hungarian context on the relationship between sex- and gender-based needs and status loss and Right Wing Populist Party (RWPP) voting behaviour. Finally, we conclude on the main findings emerging from the focus groups conducted in Hungary.

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Methodology for sampling

We opted for a purposive sampling procedure, and in selecting the focus group (FG) participants, the following criteria were identified: voting behaviour at the last and before the last parliamentary elections, gender, place of residence and type of settlement, age, educational level, labour market status and family status. Except for gender and place of residence and type of settlement, we set up the composition of focus groups with homogenous criteria as follows:

Concerning voting behaviour at the last and before the last parliamentary elections, the main idea in organising the focus groups was to recruit participants who switched from mainstream democratic parties to RWPP in the last elections. In Hungary, the governing RWPP party coalition, the Fidesz-KDNP party has been able to increase the number of voters between 2018 and 2022 while the opposition coalition parties lost close to 900,000 votes (*ÁTLÁTSZÓ VÁLASZTÁS '22*, 2022). For the focus groups, we recruited persons who voted for the Fidesz-KDNP party in the 2022 parliamentary elections, but voted for an oppositional party before the last election in 2018. Oppositional parties in 2018 could be MSZP-Párbeszéd, DK, LMP, Jobbik, Momentum, MKKP, and Együtt.

In Hungary, there is one more RWPP, even more radical in its rhetoric than Fidesz-KDNP which is the Mi Hazánk (Our Country) party. We have decided not to target Mi Hazánk voters as Mi Hazánk represents an extreme right party in Hungary, and we did not want to invite the most radical and extremist participants to the focus group. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a large proportion of previous votes for the oppositional party of Jobbik went to Mi Hazánk in the last election. The reason behind this is that Jobbik shifted its ideology from radical right-wing

populism to a more mainstream people's party ideology, however, their previous voters did not follow the ideological shift. Thus, we restricted to one-third among the focus group participants, the voters of Jobbik at the 2018 elections.

Regarding age, we have opted to homogenise the group composition to include the younger middle-aged people between 30 and 50 years old. We have made this choice because this age group's voting behaviour will influence the elections for a long time, they have the highest participation rates in the labour market, and the highest chances of having young children under the age of 18. In relation to educational level, by including only participants with a secondary education level, we aimed to target the largest group of the adult population and among those employed. As regarding labour market status, to increase homogeneity in the group, we opted to recruit participants who were in employment, and had an active labour market status. In respect to family status, we decided to include participants who have children in order to represent family-related gender needs in the research.

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On the other hand, gender was a differentiating factor between focus groups rolled-out. As agreed by the UNTWIST project participants, we organised separate female and male focus groups. Additionally, in the Hungarian context place of residence and type of settlement was assumed to be a significant differentiating factor for the perception of gender-based needs and voting behaviours. According to statistics, the smaller the type of settlement was, the higher the chances were for voting for RWPP in Hungary, and the greater the loss of oppositional votes could be observed. In the countryside, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county was one the places where the oppositional parties lost the highest number of votes. Therefore, Miskolc, the centre town of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén was

selected to recruit voters who switched parties between 2018 and 2022 in the country-side. Therefore, as a place of residence and type of settlement two different places were identified: residence in Budapest, the capital of Hungary versus residence in the country-side with preference given to residence in villages and small towns as settlement types with conducting the focus group in the town of Miskolc. According to previous attitude and values surveys it is a well-known fact that there are significant differences concerning people's attitudes and ideas in the countryside and the capital, the former often representing a possibly less enlightened and liberal views and values in general terms and in gender relations too.

We hired an external service provider to recruit and organise the four focus groups discussions in Hungary. The number of participants in each focus group were eight persons. The four focus groups were composed in the following manner:

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- **Focus Group #1 (FG1):** Women only + residence in Budapest. Participants are named from F1-F8.
- **Focus Group #2 (FG2):** Women only + country-side residence (FG carried out in Miskolc, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, residence both in town of Miskolc and villages and small towns as settlement types in the county). Participants are named from F9-F16.
- **Focus group #3 (FG3):** Men only with residence in Budapest. Participants are named from M1-M8.
- **Focus group #4 (FG4):** Men only with residence in country-side (FG carried out in Miskolc, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, residence both in town of Miskolc and villages and small towns as settlement types in the county). Participants are named from M9-M16.

The interviewers in the male groups were the experts of the external service provider company, yet the interviewers of the women only groups were from the UNTWIST team of the Centre for Social Sciences².

Tone and Narrative in the Groups

The groups were mostly open and were cooperating well in the interview processes. The atmosphere can be characterised as harmonious in each case with a good mood most of the time. The female group in Miskolc (FG2) had even very cheerful moments with laughter and in the end of the interview the participants expressed how well they felt. In each group, however, there were more active parts and also periods when the groups showed the signs of fatigue and also certain questions seemingly motivated them less.

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Even though the basic tone was good, there were negative and rather pessimistic feelings expressed concerning the recent situation of the country (mentioning economic difficulties, insufficient standards of living, inflation, low wages and salaries, high living costs, difficulties of housing etc.) that appeared in all the four groups. Yet in the male group from Miskolc (FG4) these negative tendencies and experiences became relativized. Similarly in all the four groups the tone of the nostalgia for certain aspects of the state-socialist period (1948–1989)³ of the country also appeared (mostly the predictability and certainties in living

² Lídia Balogh and Judit Acsády were both present at the focus groups interviews as interviewers and co-interviewers and they exchanged this role between the two occasions. As it was agreed ahead about the dynamics of the questions, the co-interviewer had a mostly passive role during the two hour interviews, observing and making note, with very rare interventions (see the prescribed texts of the interviews where both interviewers are signified). (The dynamics between the interviewer and the co-interviewer were similar in the case of the male groups as well, however there the two interviewers did not exchange roles.)

³ This period can roughly be divided into two parts: Stalinism, between 1948–1956, Kádárism (or Kádár-era) 1956–1989.

standards were the central good values that they attached to this period). The tone of the groups concerning the possibilities of civil society and activism was identically disappointed, and resigned; they were mostly sharing a gloomy opinion about the usefulness and power of civil activism.

There were instances of hostile attitudes and intolerance. The motives of the lack of solidarity towards the vulnerable social groups appeared in different forms in three groups. The lack of tolerance, the extreme tones of racism and homophobia were also voiced by some individual members and it seemed that the other group members were not inclined to react on these or question these positions and tones openly.

Yet, in other aspects the tone of the discussions was varied and the atmosphere during the two hours of recording had periodical changes. The differences could be mainly observed between the tones of the male and female groups. Also the tone and the dynamics were slightly different at different sections of the focus group interview.

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At the beginning the female groups seemed to get more easily engaged in the interview process, especially in the case of the focus group in Miskolc (FG2), where there was hardly any hesitation in starting the answers. The tone of the male groups, however, was more fragmented including both active parts (with emotional engagement, enthusiasm and also clashes of opinions) and seemingly less motivated parts with signs of tiredness or less orientation. In the male groups (FG3 and FG4) the interview started with more hesitation and the atmosphere needed a little time to get warmed up.

As far as the dynamics of the groups is concerned, in the female groups there were also instances of multiple interventions like talking at the same time, interrupting

and cutting into each other's words, excitement. Yet, apart from the diversity in the tones, and often in the opinions as well, it can be stated that the members showed respect towards each other and were respecting the previously set norms and rules of the focus group interview event in all the four groups.

Main argumentative lines

Consensus was achieved in the dark and negative descriptions of the country's present state. There were several problems listed in all groups concerning the recent economic difficulties, the uncertainties, the housing crises, the worsening future prospects, the bad conditions in the health care and education system. There were worries also about the negative aspects of digitalization and the online world. In both of the female groups there were strong complaints about the education system, about the partial solutions of the family support and allowances, and they regretfully mentioned the outward labour mobility of young people who leave the country to take jobs abroad.

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In the line with the pessimistic and negative evaluations of the situation in Hungary, the only difference was expressed by the male group in Miskolc (FG4) whose members were dominantly appreciative towards the recent Fidesz government. Even that they acknowledged the difficulties as well, but they owed these problems to the influence on the country from the outside, in other words, they put the blame on external groups, outer political forces, often touching the realm of conspiracy theories, too.

Relevant issues in the group (gender related or not)

The relevant themes were mostly about the difficulties of everyday life in Hungary. Mentioned issues related to gender were primarily in the context of family life. For

example, there was a detailed discussion in the female group in Miskolc (FG2) of the state family support measures and several mentioning of these in other groups as well. In terms of gender relations, the arguments became unfolded and made explicit only when the interviewers directly asked about these. There were significant differences between the opinions and attitudes formulated in this sense between the male and the female groups, especially regarding the male group in the country town, Miskolc. While in the other groups there was a basic, more or less liberal interpretation of women's equality with men and also female participation at the labour market, in focus group #4 (FG4) in Miskolc openly sexist remarks were formulated as well in these matters, complaining about the disappearing female responsibility concerning household duties, but also they criticized the supposed loss of masculinity.

The question of gay couples and LGBTQ communities was voiced as well, and the groups expressed a limited tolerance in these matters. They expressed the view that sexual preferences should be kept privately and they should not be exposed or for example gay pride marches should not happen. A similar intolerant view was expressed against migrants as well, especially in FG4.

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Coding Results

Domains

SOCIAL ORDER

Under the 'Domain' sub-code, the most frequently (185) discussed topic was organised around the issue of social order. (Table 1) It deeply permeates people's

thinking about society. The interviewees reasoned how several acute social problems are rooted in the 'wrong' social order that has developed in Hungary and sometimes globally and that needs to be changed. In the women's focus groups, the disrespect of the young generation towards their elders and teachers was emphasised, and behavioural disorders and deviant behaviours (early smoking, prohibited ElfBar and energy drinks) were also mentioned. These were largely explained by the lack of or changing values in public education and the family, and also to too much general freedom in societies. The lack of public safety on the streets was also often discussed in relation to children, but the issue of a solitary society in relation not only to the elderly but also the young was a vital issue during the interviews.

In the men's focus groups, there was much more emphasis on criticism of the existing social order. The disrespect of the younger generation was also present in education, but more drastic effects were noted compared to women, such as parental aggression towards teachers, cases of teachers being stabbed in the last few years. Public safety was accordingly a central topic of discussion in the group. Several recent atrocities were reported, and the lack of public safety was attributed to the infrequent police presence on the one hand, the higher presence of Roma minority in settlements on the other, and the fact that the law tends to protect the "rights of criminals" rather than victims was repeatedly raised. This made them accept illegal individual solutions, such as running electricity into the fence against thieves. Unemployment as a cause was presented as a reason for low public safety, hence in socialist times apparent full employment at least kept people busy, whereas now they had 'more time for crimes'. They point to a disintegrating social order, which they say is indicated by a widening generation

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gap, exacerbated by a total lack of respect for the elderly, and by the "loss of culture" caused by migration, both legal or illegal, into the EU or Hungary.

There were also conflicting views on Hungary's foreign policy in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, with some arguing that the country was protecting the existing social order by helping to avoid a third world war. The sharp change in family roles was also repeatedly perceived as part of a disintegrating order, including a changing 'gender order'. In several cases, male interviewees referred to desirable traditional family roles going back even to citing premodern hunting societies. The issue of homelessness was also raised, albeit to a lesser extent, with some blaming the state and/or homeless people for their own unfair and inhuman conditions.

ECONOMIC SECURITY, WORKING CONDITIONS SALARIES – PROMOTION – TIME – STABILITY, ECONOMIC POLICY, and FAMILY POLICY

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Regarding economic inequality, both female and male interviewees emphasised the steadily widening gap between rich and poor, which can be traced back to **economic insecurity**. This includes that wages are stagnating while inflation is rising strongly, although the effects of the COVID epidemic would no longer justify it. The Russian-Ukrainian war was not mentioned in this context. Women listed the bankruptcy of Swiss franc foreign currency loans in Hungary, which is still affecting the lives of families today. It is typical in Hungary that **low wages** force people to take second jobs, often fostering outward migration. People did not engage into the issues of promotion at all, rather emphasized how present labour market expects individuals to change jobs often. It is also appeared that young people have fewer children due to economic insecurity, and high housing and rent prices are preventing young people leaving parental home. Both women and men often

mentioned more the difficulty of buying a home or a car compared to ten years ago, moreover, saving is also harder these days. They continued to cite examples of insecure Hungarian salaries and their low real value in parallel with economic uncertainty. Tax credits for young people were seen by many as unfair, further widening the generation gap. The government's **economic policies** have been repeatedly criticised, highlighting the high taxes and unemployment, as well as the deliberate destruction of Hungarian industry in order to prepare the ground for the flow of foreign capital into Hungary. Many interviewees worried that they will not even have a pension in old age.

Women and men alike repeatedly pointed to the need for better support for mothers returning from childbirth, which would also reduce the financial burden on families. Regarding the government's **family policies**, it was criticised more by male participants than the female group, but the themes were similar. Men delved deeper into the Hungarian tax problems, arguing that subsidies and tax breaks to encourage young people to start families and have children are only inflationary. Many agree that cash benefits (the Baby Waiting programme) encourage young people to have (more) children, but many also have little faith in the effectiveness of family policy because they disagree that it is only available to people under 30, there is a lot of abuse (spending the benefits to other than the children) and there are doubts about whether young people can raise these children.

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CHILDCARE

It is not surprising that the traditional family model often appeared among the female participants in Hungary. At the same time, somehow they avoided to speak openly about their work and family preferences, whether they want the partner to stay home with children instead of participating in the paid labour market. Rather,

vividly emphasised their dedication to raising and educate their children, and, in parallel with it, strongly criticized 'other' mothers how they spoil their children. Meanwhile, some of them admitted that raising and educating their children is a worry for them. Men also emphasised their dedication to raising and educate their children, however, in some cases they harshly criticized voluntary childless women because they are too comfortable, or they are afraid that their body would change in a negative way due to childbearing.

EDUCATION and DIGITALISATION'S SOCIAL IMPACTS

Education was a central theme in the discussions. The main educational problem is seen as a lack of teachers and an overly demanding, non-practice-oriented curriculum. The shortage of teachers is mainly attributed to low salaries and a lack of teacher commitment (counter-selection). Other reasons include the young generation's (and often their parents') lack of respect for teachers, deviance, too much generalised permissiveness – as described above in the context of the critique of the social order. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of digital education were discussed in depth in the women's groups, mainly in relation to COVID; the frequent turnover of teachers (men rather mentioned the lack of teachers), the negative effects of the use of mobile phones in schools, the shortcomings of pre-school preparation, and the lack of need for a diploma and language exams in rural areas for some teaching professions. On teachers' salaries, the men spoke in a more political context, saying that the government does not aim to improve education and train thinking people.

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The social impacts of **digitalisation** was discussed in the context of education by focus group participants (see above). The women's group tended to discuss children's use of bank cards and cashierless supermarkets, and blamed

digitalisation for children playing less in nature. The men were first to analyse the (rather negative) impact of digitalisation on the labour market. The idea of the loss of traditional values was raised, but also that those who are left behind in the process of digitalisation are lost. The negative impact of children and digitalisation was also raised by men, who argued that it is very detrimental to some of the cognitive abilities of young people, as well as their stamina.

SOCIAL WELL-BEING and HEALTH

In the context of social well-being, the group participants' reflections focused on two main themes: the negative impact of digitalisation on human relationships, and the loneliness of society, not only for pensioners but also for young people, as described above. In addition to these, women also touched on many more social well-being-related topics in the discussions than men. They lacked active relationships and communication in the areas of family, friends, relationships and education. Through the examples of their own children, they repeatedly brought up how the school community can be exclusionary to students from backgrounds with less than average economic capital.

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The steadily worsening health situation in Hungary was of course also a central part of the discussions. Men and women alike considered it tragic that they have to wait months or years for specialist care and surgery. At the same time, women spoke at much greater length about the problems, namely the unsustainable conditions in hospitals: lack of cleanliness, professional and empathetic care. The women's group argued both against doctors (they do not treat patients because they outsource them to their better-paying private practices; they do not consider their job as a profession and are forced to work in their mother country because

they are bound by contract with the state) and for them (highly qualified and talented doctors seek opportunities abroad).

Table 1: The number of references in the 10 most frequently mentioned domains by gender

	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
9.3.3. SOCIAL ORDER	4	54	131	185
9.3.1. ECONOMIC SECURITY	4	59	97	156
9.5.1.2. CHILDCARE	4	55	84	139
9.6.1 SOCIAL WELL-BEING	4	67	53	120
9.1.2.2. WORKING CONDITIONS SALARIES – PROMOTION – TIME – STABILITY	4	67	49	116
9.4.2.4. EDUCATION	4	50	50	100
9.1.3. ECONOMIC POLICY	4	48	51	99
9.4.3 FAMILY POLICY	4	36	63	99
9.4.2.1. HEALTH	4	54	28	82
9.6.3. DIGITALISATION'S SOCIAL IMPACTS	4	41	31	72

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Needs Type

PRACTICAL (CONJUNCTURAL) and STRATEGIC (STRUCTURAL) NEEDS

During the focus group discussions, social critiques of many areas of life were expressed, highlighting the needs and wants that are needed in practice, in real life and those needs that relate to broader, structural issues. (Table 2) In our analysis, we searched for the needs and wants that came up strongly during the discussions. The female groups were definitely more vocal about practical proposals, especially in the areas of education, medical care, prices, lower taxes, and higher wages. It is interesting that men's suggestions were more strongly linked to family and gender roles, namely, women would have more children if they were paid their full salary during their maternity leave; it would bring families closer together if more generations lived together (again). Men also emphasized more the need for a stronger police presence to improve public safety.

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TEMPORAL VERSUS RELATIONAL COMPARISON

The interview guide also included the question, but participants typically tried to emphasise or characterise social problems by comparing them over time. They 'worked' with several temporal reference points. On the one hand, for major structural problems (housing, public safety, respect for teachers, parents, police), they always went back to the period before political system change (1989) - but rather only to the 1970s and 1980s. For individual or meso-level problems (everyday living conditions, savings, renting), they tended to reach back to a period of about ten years ago, but not specifically because of the previous government (before Fidesz). The third point of reference was the COVID pandemic, where comparisons were mainly made over time in relation to education,

digitalisation and healthcare. In relation to traditional family and gender roles, it was not uncommon to go deeper back in time, even to examples of pre-modern societies.

Examining the relational comparison of people was an exciting experience. Ethnicity (Roma vs non-Roma), the gap between rich and poor with a missing middle class appeared in both female and male groups, along with the extra tax benefits for young people under 30 years of age, which explicitly angered 30+ people. Gender issues (men vs women) and the perceived divide in health care (doctor-nurse, private practice vs public practice especially for low pensioners) were typically found in the women's group, while men were concerned with migration (migrant vs patriots).

Table 2: The number of references related to need types by gender

3. NEEDS – TYPE	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
3.1. PRACTICAL NEEDS (CONJUNCTURAL)	4	88	25	113
3.2. STRATEGIC (STRUCTURAL)	4	30	29	59
Total		118	54	172
3.2.1. STRUCTURAL POSITION EVALUATION	0	0	0	0
3.2.1.1. TEMPORAL COMPARISON	4	132	142	274
3.2.1.2. RELATIONAL COMPARISON	4	27	71	98
Total		159	213	372

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Aggrievance

ENTITLEMENT AND INJUSTICE

Both over temporal and in relational comparison with other social groups, some of the participants' dialogues revealed that in some cases they legitimately

expected certain (missing) services and benefits from the state. (Table 3) The most frequently voiced basis was the payment of health insurance contributions, on the basis of which they would rightly expect to receive free, prompt and high-quality medical care. Another was a decent pension, paid in advance by citizens for decades.

The relational comparisons described above were often manifested in the interviews as a result of social injustices perceived subjectively by the interviewees. Interestingly, one of the greatest injustices was triggered by the social policy of the current Fidesz government in relation to tax benefits for young people. The majority of interviewees over the age of thirty agreed that, although it is necessary to support young people, it is unfair that they earn a fraction of the income of young people after two or three decades of tax-paying work.

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Table 3: The number of references related to aggrievances by gender

4. AGGRIEVANCE – ENTITLEMENT AND INJUSTICE	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
4.1. ENTITLEMENT	3	3	2	5
4.2. INJUSTICE	3	31	27	58
Total		34	29	63

Gender roles – stereotypes

Related to gender roles, femininity was the most frequently coded theme (110 references), followed by motherhood (64 references), thirdly masculinity (60 references), forth fatherhood (36 references), and finally grandparenthood (11 references). Interestingly, participants of male focus groups addressed all themes more frequently with masculinity being the only exception. The gender differences in thematising gender roles was twofold more frequent among male participants (185 by male participants vs 94 by female participants). The male dominance in the discourse on gender roles was especially pronounced for motherhood, fatherhood, and grandparenthood. (Table 4)

Table 4: The number of references related to gender roles by gender

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8. GENDER ROLES – STEREOTYPES	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
8.1. FEMININITY	4	43	65	110
8.2. MASCULINITY	4	31	29	60
8.3. MOTHERHOOD	4	13	51	64
8.4. FATHERHOOD	3	6	30	36
8.5 GRANDPARENTHOOD	3	1	10	11
Total	-	94	185	279

In relation to femininity women participants thematised distribution of household work, instability of relationships, appearance expectations, female attributes, equality of sexes, and the role of education for preparing for gender roles.

While several participants expressed satisfaction with the distribution of household tasks within their couple, they could all recall cases where the woman was covering the bulk of the household tasks. As an explanation for why they do more of this type of work, they referred to their lower threshold levels of stimulus. Only one participant expressed explicitly exhaustion with the overall workload that needed to be managed:

I know that women used to want to work and everything, but I think that women have to do more, more things, so I think that it's more their job to take care of the children, but they also have to keep the house in order, so I think that sometimes it's too much, that sometimes I really feel at night that "I can't do it, I can't do it", and then "but you can do it, but you can do it! "OK, then I can", so I talk to myself sometimes, because I feel it's so much that I really have to take it in, go and get it. (F5)

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Female participants expressed proudness for their capability to self-sustain and clearly opposed to the idea of being oppressed and suffering from gender inequality:

It's all gone now, women are able to look after themselves, run a household, bring up children, even on their own, I think that subordination has pretty much disappeared. (F13)

On the other hand, male participants expressed their dissatisfaction with the growing trend of childlessness or delayed childbearing what they clearly

attributed to the fact that “careerist” women wanted to advance in their careers and often became too old to get pregnant. Another concern was articulated about the overreliance on artificial dissemination and not necessarily wanting to form couples, or maintain any relationship with the father after conception.

It occurs to me, by the way, that a certain proportion of women, they don't really have children or they put off having children, they go in a careerist direction and then they may not have children. (M7)

Similarly, to female participants, men also expressed disappointment with instable relationships, extravagant appearance of women (involving plastic surgery and tattoos), not wanting to accept the natural aging process, and the lack of preparation of young generations by educational institutions for gender specific roles. While, female participation in the labour market was an accepted behaviour, some aversion was expressed towards female leaders in the workplace while Hungary's female president was referred to as a legitimate sign of equality of genders. Nevertheless, there was a clear expectation for dividing public and private life, moreover, public life (i.e. work) should not be detrimental to private life.

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...where I lived, there were no such high officials, the president of the council was all male and that has changed now, there are [FEMALE] mayors, there are ministers in serious positions. I think there's nothing wrong with that, but everyone should treat themselves in the right way, when they go home they should be a mother, they should be a wife, so they should have the intelligence to do that. (M12)

With regards to motherhood, female participants discussed the lack of quality time spent with the children on the one hand, on the other hand spoiling them and not making them learn how to become responsible for their own work.

Furthermore, criticism was expressed towards the strategy to apply external support services for childcare and household work as that further reduces the time with children and is not a good solution economically either. On the other hand, male participants, expressed nostalgia for the traditional and sustainable family model, though shared memories of abusive grandfathers and vulnerabilities of women. Participants acknowledged the economic necessity of the double earner family model nowadays, however would be in favour of compensating to greater extent women on maternity leave or beyond as they negatively perceive mothers spending less time with their children.

...so a lot of women, for example, stay with the child for 3 years because they're trying to take advantage of that time, because on the one hand the child needs the 3 years, at least according to me, according to mothers I've talked to, and on the other hand she would stay, she just needs to go to work (...) Now if she would stay at home and get that money, I think she might decide to have the next child. (M2)

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Child rearing has been pushed into the background, because women have much less time to spend with children, and if they spend their time focusing on the children, and then, say, there's a problem with the housework, then the man doesn't have to have dinner, but can order pizza or hamburgers or, I don't know, Chinese. And if she takes care of that, then it's to the detriment of married life, and then there's a problem with that. So there are problems here. (M13)

Regarding masculinity, the main themes of discussions among female participants evolved around negotiating equal roles within the couple. It was considered a question of good management of the relationship within the couple

to have equal distribution of household chores. However, female participants admitted to personally know many cases where this was not the case. Moreover, one participant explicitly opined that *“I think what a lot of men want, is for women to be subordinated.”* (F11) On the other hand, male participants, lamented on both women and men not being “women and men” anymore.

Going back to the fact that women can't cook, men can't cook, and some men can't even turn a screw. It's not such a big deal, but he doesn't know what to do with it either. (M11)

Moreover, male participants also criticised trans people and LGBTQ movements questioning that only a man can be a father and a woman can be a mother, as the Fidesz-KDNP also states.

I think that's what the left is trying to overturn, so they're trying to push this absolute Western pressure, obviously, where the money comes from, we know who's funding the left, to force this down people's throats, that anybody can be daddy, anybody can be mummy, anybody can be Jack, anybody can be Jill. So I think that this is a very bad thing, and I hope that the Hungarian people have the right minds not to want it. (M12)

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Regarding grandparenthood, mostly male participants expressed nostalgia for those times, when grandparents engaged more actively in the childcare of their grand-children as they could go on pension at an earlier age.

Location

Both individual and collective location of gender needs and gender problems could be observed in the focus group discussions, with a slightly higher proportion of individual location (17 individual vs 15 collective locations). Both for the individual

and the collective location, references in the female focus groups were more frequent (13 out of 17 for individual vs 10 out of 15 collective locations). When cases of collective belonging were identified, the gender superordinate groups of females and males were indicated with similar frequencies (6 vs 5 respectively.) No case of intersections of collective identity and locations were found in the Hungarian sample.

Table 5: The number of references related to location of gender needs by gender

2. LOCATION (SELF AND BELONGING)	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
2.1. INDIVIDUAL – SELF	3	13	4	17
2.2. COLLECTIVE – BELONGING	3	10	5	15
Total				

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Concerning gender needs and problems mentioned as specific individual experiences, bringing up children, managing the specific needs of children were at the core of discussion.

How the family has simply gone into this kind of machine, where there is nothing but "You take him to the extra class, I'll take him this way." "Where were you when you came back, okay, you took him to the gym, but I'm going to (...) who's going to make dinner? will you bring it? will you order?" And then

nothing, and then they fall into bed at 10 o'clock, and she doesn't know for weeks that her husband is about to leave his job. (F5)

In case of collective location of gender needs, issues of discrimination based on motherhood, lack of positions in decision-making bodies, positive and negative female attributes including a potential for survival, capability to exert force if women team up, and changes in attitudes related to tolerating suppression were mentioned among female participants.

We don't tolerate it anymore, no more my "little girl" anymore. (F12)

On the other hand, male participants stressed the informal balance of power between the genders, or the opinion of women having more power than men was also forwarded during the discussion.

But I think anybody who has or has had a wife knows that she is not oppressed because I am a man, and she can assert her interests in the same way, but in a feminine way. (M2)

I think women have the rights already, men have less rights I think, I would say. (M1)

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Feminism

Overall, the explicit thematising of feminism among focus group participants was moderate. Not more than 67 references were coded including all the sub-codes. In the Hungarian sample, sexual identity orientation interaction with gender opinions, gender supremacy ideas, negative feminism and 'gender fatigue' occurred the most frequently (respectively with 19, 14, 11, and 11 references) Female and male participants of focus groups voiced ideas about feminism with similar

frequency (30 vs 37 references), however some of the sub-categories were dominated by one or the other gender. While negative feminism, binary gender based on biological sex, and alternative feminism was only mentioned by male participants, women were the only ones to refer to “feminist feminism”, and “silence about feminism”. Opinions coded as ‘gender fatigue’ occurred in a balanced manner in both female and male groups, while gender supremacy ideas were more represented by male participants, and sexual identity orientation interaction with gender opinions were more frequently voiced by women. (Table 6)

Table 6: The number of references related to the type of feminism by gender

7. FEMINISM	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
7.1. FEMINIST FEMINISM	1	3	0	3
7.1.1. NEGATIVE FEMINIST FEMINISM	2	0	11	11
7.1.2. GENDER FATIGUE (FEMINIST FEMINISM)	4	6	5	11
7.1.3. ANTIFEMINIST INMIGRATION	0	0	0	0
7.1.4. BINARY GENDER BASED ON BIOLOGICAL SEX	1	0	1	1
7.1.5. GENDER SUPREMACY	3	4	10	14

7.1.6. SEXUAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION INTERACTION WITH GENDER	3	12	7	19
7.2. ALTERNATIVE FEMINISM	1	0	3	3
7.3 SILENCE ABOUT FEMINISM	2	5	0	5
Total		30	37	67

Focus

In the Hungarian context, clearly policy- and actor-centred focus was identified most frequently by participants in relation to gender problems (respectively 47 and 29 references) On the other hand, theory- and discourse-centred focus practically did not occur in our focus group discussions. (Table 7)

Content-wise, most of the opinions related to policy-centered opinions voiced either agreement or disagreement with the government's family policy measures as the so called Baby Waiting loan (Babaváró) or the Family Homebuilding Allowance (CSOK). Both measures target married couples with children or children to be born, and provide advantageous conditions for housing loans. Criticism with regard to these new policies was their exclusiveness towards other groups of society, the government deciding on what a family is, and no control over what the loans are utilised for in case of the Baby Waiting loan. Conversely, acceptance of these measures was related to the understanding that the government wants to improve the demographic situation in the country and design the family policy measures accordingly.

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Well, that's the only way to avoid having to bring in migrants, so we have to do that, we have to raise the population, the demography somehow. (M12)

Table 7: The number of references related to the focus of gender needs by gender

1.FOCUS	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
1.1 DISCOURSE-CENTERED	2	2	3	5
1.2 THEORY-CENTERED	0	0	0	0
1.3. POLICY-CENTERED	3	27	20	47
1.4. ACTOR-CENTERED	4	13	16	29
Total		42	39	81

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External and Internal Solutions

In relation to the surfaced gender needs and problems, focus group participants identified both external and internal mobilising solutions, however, external solutions mentioned were more frequent in Hungary. As external solutions to gender problems, participants advocated for attitudinal, cultural, and systemic transformation, as well as introducing more economic subsidies and support measures in the form of relief and resources. This is in line with former research indicating that Hungarians expect external help from the state (Kornai, 1998). Female participants mostly favoured potential relief and resources and attitudinal and cultural change. On the contrary, male participants preferred forms of systemic transformations. (Table 8)

Table 8: The number of references related to external solutions by gender

5. EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
5.1. RELIEF-RESOURCES	3	29	2	31
5.2. LEGISLATION	4	6	3	9
5.3. INCLUSION	2	0	6	6
5.4. ALLIANCE-NETWORK-ACTIVISM	2	5	9	14
5.5. GENDER LANGUAGE-AWARENESS	0	0	0	0
5.6. TRANSFORMATION	0	0	0	0
5.6.1. SYSTEMIC	4	2	18	20
5.6.2. ATTITUDINAL-CULTURAL	4	25	14	39
Total		67	52	119

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Among potential internal mobilising strategies, political parties, civil organisations, and family education were mentioned with the highest occurrences. It is important to point out that protest was not perceived as a viable form of way to bring change for the better. Female participants referred to civil organisations more frequently,

while male participants were more keen to share opinions about political parties.
(Table 9)

Table 9: The number of references related internal mobilising strategies by gender

6. INTERNAL – MOBILISING STRATEGIES	Number of files	Number of references in FEMALE focus groups	Number of references in MALE focus groups	TOTAL number of references
6.1. CIVIL SOCIETY	1			4
6.1.1. CIVIL	3	16	4	20
6.1.2. RELIGIOUS	1	0	2	2
6.2. POLITICAL PARTIES	3	9	13	22
6.3. EDUCATION	1	2	0	2
6.3.1. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM	2	4	1	5
6.3.2. FAMILY EDUCATION	4	5	9	14
6.4. PROTEST	2	3	2	5
Total		39	31	70

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Hypotheses Testing

In the Hungarian case, the **first hypothesis [H1]** about status loss and blaming feminism proved to be virtually irrelevant. Specifically, this connection arose only in the male group in Budapest, but those who intervened on the topic clarified that this is not happening in Hungary:

To push [women] even forcefully ahead by the state, well, I feel a bit like it's a permanent kicking down of men. But this is not so common here in Hungary, whereas abroad, it's absolutely the case (M2)

It's more prevalent in America [...] Feminism is more widespread there. They have such movements, almost every week there's some kind of movement happening somewhere (M5).

In response to the explicit question from the moderator, 'Is it necessary to be a feminist in Hungary at all?', one of the participants in the same group answered, but avoided using the term 'feminism':

I think women's rights are already [secured], men have fewer rights in my opinion, I would rather put it that way. (M1)

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In the other male group, in Miskolc, there was no mention of status loss but rather of the change in male and female roles, more as an organic process (the role of feminism did not come up), a kind of nostalgia was expressed,⁴ and along with disapproval, towards men as well:

And well, today's women are sometimes not women, sorry, excuse me if I phrase it wrong. (M13)

But today's men are not men either. (M9)

Women can't cook. (M11)

In men too, there are those who can't screw in a screw. (M11)

⁴ This sentiment regarding the question of manhood and womanhood may be quite universal – at least, if we think of the famous passage from Douglas Adams' comedic science fiction novel, *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*: 'Far back in the mists of ancient time, in the great and glorious days of the former Galactic Empire, life was wild, rich and largely tax free. [...] In those days spirits were brave, the stakes were high, men were real men, women were real women and small furry creatures from Alpha Centauri were real small furry creatures from Alpha Centauri.'

It's as if men have started to get somewhat too comfortable (M15).

The participants of the female group in Miskolc showed no interest at all in discussing the issue of feminism. The moderator's question, 'Do you think it's a problem that women are subordinated?', was unanimously rejected, stating that the subordination of women has already ceased. In the female group in Budapest, in response to the moderator's explicit question, 'What do you think about whether feminism still has a purpose or meaning?', the participants unanimously answered: 'Nothing!', and a participant even added:

It is already like messing with ourselves. (F3)

The context may help understand what she could have meant: as several participants mentioned that the burdens on today's women are too heavy, and the suggestion was raised that this situation is the result of emancipation. As we reach this point, we must not forget that among the participants, aged 30–50, the older ones spent their childhood before 1989–90, in the time of state socialism, while the younger ones were affected by the ideology and reality of this era through their parents. As for the gender dynamics of state socialism, Ildikó Asztalos Morell's offers an account:

The goal of women's emancipation was women's assimilation to the 'masculine norm'. Society was to take over the responsibility for women's socially 'crippling' reproductive role with the socialisation of child-rearing and domestic work. Many searching for the reasons for the failure of the state socialist emancipation attempt, and its failure to deliver on its promises in regard to the socialisation of reproductive duties, find the cause of that failure in the lack of economic resources. In my view the state socialist emancipation ideology reflected the 'masculine' bias prevalent in Marxist

analysis. This bias permitted a devaluing of the societal function of women's reproductive labour, considered the reproductive sphere as displaceable and socialisable. Thus, the official ideology of emancipation blocked the re-negotiation and raising into the public sphere, the discussion of the inequalities between the sexes within the private sphere (Asztalos Morell, 1999, p. 353).

As for the reality of women's lives in this era, Susan Zimmermann's research results are instructive:

The redistribution of household duties in favour of a fairer balance of labour occurred at best in homeopathic doses (Zimmermann, 2010, pp. 5–6).

During the era of state socialism, there was an expectation for women to engage in paid work, and tasks arising in the household were planned to be solved by the state. However, this was eventually scarcely implemented, and the burden of household chores just remained on women, without significant discourse developing (or allowed to develop) on this issue—although occasional opinions were expressed in academic or informative publications—, or possibly in public forums, suggesting that it is rightful and logical to expect men participate in household chores (Acsady, 2023). Nevertheless, for women, this frustrating and exhausting situation did not come to an end with the collapse of state socialism.

The **second hypothesis (H2)**, about the logic behind the voting for RWPP (in Hungary's case, the governing party coalition formed by Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party, KDNP), proved mostly irrelevant in the case of Hungary – at least based on what was shared during the focus groups. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize at this point, before discussing H2, that the Focus Group Guidelines did not include an explicit question about voting motivations. It

spontaneously evolved that, in two out of the four focus groups, there was a participant who came forward with a 'confession' on this matter at a certain point. A participant in the female group in Budapest claimed the following:

The fact that, unfortunately, there was no reasonable party to vote for in the recent elections, apart from Fidesz, is very, very disheartening. (F2)

A fellow participant confirmed:

It really was like that in 2022; there simply wasn't a party that one could say, okay. So, it just wasn't, no matter how they tried. (F6).

The above statements were made in the context of a more general question on whether there is room for social action in Hungary. In the male group in Budapest a similar 'confession' was made in relation to a specific topic: Hungary's isolation within the EU concerning its approach to the war between Russia and Ukraine:

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That's precisely why I voted for Fidesz this time, I honestly admit. I'm not a Fidesz fan, but all the other parties advocated such a nonsensical position, urging us to confront the Russians. In which dimension do these people live? Every time we confronted [the Russians], it ended in a massive failure. So, I don't know where the rest of the countries in Europe have been living so far, but it seems like only the Hungarians get it... and I'm sure that if this continues, Fidesz will have about six-thirds majority⁵ [...]. There is practically no opposition; these people are idiots. (M2)

The above statement includes reference to certain controversial statements made by the prime ministerial candidate of the eight-party opposition coalition,

⁵ This is an ironic reference to the fact that the parties of the current government coalition obtained a two-thirds majority in the parliament in the latest elections - for the fourth time in a row - allowing them to practically legislate without compromise.

upon which it became a key message in the finale of the government's 2022 election campaign that if the opposition were to win, they would directly involve Hungary on the side of Ukraine in the war. It is crucial to emphasize that the most recent elections took place in April 2022, just a few weeks after Russia launched a full-scale military invasion against Ukraine – a country bordering Hungary and home to an ethnic Hungarian minority. An essential element of the context is also that Hungary was under Soviet military occupation for almost half of the 20th century.⁶

In any case, the universal social psychological phenomenon that people tend to align themselves with the 'strong' from whom they can expect protection can be observed across geopolitical and societal contexts, especially when people perceive a threat. Another participant from the male group in Budapest voiced a reflection that this human need can also be instrumentalised by politicians:

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This is what the country needs, to have someone with a stern face, who always gets his mandate, and always defends the country from something. Viktor Orbán has been defending the country from someone for 25 years, always. [...] I think it's totally ideal for him now, for the past year and a half,⁷ because there is actually something to defend the country from; now there is no need to invent something (M3).

⁶ In 1944, Soviet troops arrived in Hungary as part of the Second World War frontline combats; the last Soviet soldier left the country's territory in 1991. During this period, in 1956, a revolution broke out, and part of the demands included the removal of Soviet troops, but the uprising was ultimately crushed by the (further) deployment of Soviet military forces. Moreover, for Hungarians, a significant element of historical memory is the 1848–49 Revolution and War of Independence, which was ultimately suppressed with the involvement of Russian armies on behalf of the Habsburg Empire.

⁷ The focus group took place in October 2023, just over a year and a half after Russia launched the invasion against Ukraine, in February 2022.

So, it turned out that several participants simply voted for the RWPP in 2022 due to a lack of better options. But is there anything that they appreciate particularly regarding the policies of the RWPP coalition (that has been in power for the fourteenth year)? In this regard, certain (financial) family support measures were most mentioned, but with reservations: for example, they pointed out the market-distorting effects of housing benefits (soaring real estate and construction material prices). Particularly interesting is that several participants criticized these measures from the aspect of their very goal (namely, increasing the birth rate through strengthening traditional family frameworks), claiming that these measures are ineffective, or unfair in one way or another. A participant of the female group in Budapest made an explicit statement:

They should, let's say, provide such support that it doesn't matter if you have children, a husband [...]. You could take up, let's say, 5 million Forints (F3).

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The above claim implies a particular attitude towards the state, which may have historical reasons, and it recalls what János Kornai critically said about post-socialist Eastern European societies, where the public 'took the state's extreme paternalism and their consequent material security for granted' (Kornai, 1998, p. 273).

Considering the **third hypothesis (H3)** about the difference between the evaluations of the gender status loss between men and women and corresponding motivations to vote for RWPP, a main observation has been unfolded that can be best interpreted through the public/private dichotomy. When they have been asked about gender status and motivations to vote, participants in male groups tended to formulate more abstract and collective answers that involve the evaluation of the roles and opportunities of the two sexes

in the family and the offered (or communicated) policy solutions to these, either directly in the form of family policies or indirectly by referring to broader economic measures by RWPP parties. To the moderator's question about whether there are any parties in Hungary that address family and gender roles in the family, one participant answered that:

Fidesz is practically building on family policy. [...] [Fidesz is] trying to give you a house, but on the other hand, it takes away, because inflation is bad, salaries are not good, but it is really trying to give you, but it takes away, because you have more expenses. (M5)

To further questions about the way RWPP address questions of gender and feminism, focusing on public side of addressing a policy issue rather than personal experiences, another participant highlighted that:

It's difficult to answer the question really, because [...] our current government, almost all of them, have a different outward communication than what they actually follow, it's a sham and we deal with it, yes, but not so much [...]. (M7)

A more striking example of men accessing the public perspective is a male participant who offered a more direct claim to the question:

I think your question may suggest [...], whether any of the political parties will say, yes, I support feminism, that would be suicide, none of them would dare to do that, because then the other 50, if we assume that half of them are women and half are men, they will definitely lose the elections, because then half of them will vote against them. I think that would be bad marketing. (M4)

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The only exception among men where a probably positive argument has been made about a personal experience towards feminism was a male participant who claimed that his partner is 'certainly a feminist' (M3).

Female participants tended to reflect on gender statuses and voting motivations via their own private experiences. The personal dimension of evaluating public policy, especially family policy often involved a first-person evaluation, a good example is a quote from a female participant:

When I was a child, I remember that the family allowance was for up to two children and after that you could deduct it from your taxes. (F2)

However, female groups lacked thematization of gender statuses. There is a tension between the egalitarian ideal of gender roles in the family that has been communicated as the correct model of the relationship between partners and the actual mode of living of the participants. This suggests that acknowledging the actual, non-egalitarian, experience within the family would in itself evoke a loss in gender status. Presumably, it would be embarrassing for the participants to admit that they do not live according to egalitarian norms which is understandable in light of the previously mentioned socialist heritage of the idea of women's emancipation according to specifically masculine norms and the unsuccessful transfer of household chores to the public sphere.

It is important to note that while from the part of female participants, it would be probably a loss in status to admit this personal experience in the differences between gender statuses, from the part of male participants, it would understandably not involve such kind of loss to admit that in their own lives, gender inequality is a key factor in the division of responsibilities and opportunities between the sexes.

Further Findings

Following the hypotheses testing section, this section presents further findings which have not been initially included in the dynamic of gender and voting for Right Wing Political Parties (RWPP). During the coding procedure, certain topics could be identified which resulted in an extension of the codebook used for the four Hungarian focus groups. The following table includes the new codes added:

Table 10: List of new codes added to the original coding guide

New code	Main code group
7.3 SILENCE ABOUT FEMINISM	7. Feminism
8.5 GRANDPARENTHOOD	8. Gender Roles – Stereotypes
9.1.2.7 DISCRIMINATION	9.1. Economy
9.2.4 OUTWARD LABOUR MIGRATION	9.2. Migration
9.3.2.1 GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	9.3 Security
9.3.4 CONSPIRACY THEORIES	9.3 Security
9.3.5 CORRUPTION	9.3 Security
9.4.2.5 HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS	9.4 Welfare
9.5.1.4 CHILDLESSNESS	9.5. Family
9.6.1 SOCIAL WELL-BEING	9.6 Society
9.6.2 EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING	9.6 Society
9.6.3 DIGITALISATION'S SOCIAL IMPACTS	9.6 Society
9.6.4 COVID-19 IMPACTS	9.6 Society
9.6.5 RACISM	9.6 Society

New code	Main code group
9.6.6 SOLIDARITY	9.6 Society
9.6.7 PHYSICAL WELL-BEING	9.6 Society
9.7.1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS	9.7 Politics
9.7.2. INTERNAL-HOME AFFAIRS	9.7 Politics

The reasons and findings for the additional codes are further elaborated through the following topics: Feminism and gender-based violence and (In)equalities within the workforce.

Feminism and gender-based violence

Participants' approaches and viewpoints on feminism are encapsulated in code 7.3 Silence about feminism, classifying their attitudes as unrecognised, unreflected, distancing, avoiding or rejecting the notion of feminism. This code mostly related to the first hypothesis [H1] about status loss and blaming feminism. Feminism as a concept or a movement did not seem to be a topic of discussion. The code did not capture many instance of „silence” due to its nature: participants may tend to avoid to even address the word feminism. One of the moderators expressed the idea that over 100 years ago, the first feminists advocated for women's rights and raised the question to the Budapest Female Group (FG1) whether feminism still holds significance or purpose today. The participants' reaction was dismissive:

I absolutely feel that there is none. (F5)

It's just self-punishment in my opinion. (F3)

Furthermore, issues regarding gender-based violence (GBV) were rarely raised or addressed by the focus group participants – even after direct questions from the moderators. Male participants were more likely to address both gender-based violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). GBV was mentioned mostly in relation to general safety of the society (eg. walking home alone in the dark), while IPV became part of the conversation regarding the perceived changes in society, family formation and dissolution and the dichotomy between “traditional and modern” gender roles.

... so it's not necessarily bad that many people get divorced, everyone should live separately and happily, and the child can still be able to be well-balanced with his mother, his father, or if not, with one of them, but the child will be happier than in a family where there is constant tension and perhaps even abuse. (F11)

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We had a traditional family model where grandfather was a character who, if the soup was cold, would throw it on the floor with the plate and shout, "how dare grandmother do that?" [– serve cold soup to the husband], it was a traditional family model. (M3)

I know of several relationships where the woman hurts the man. [laughter]
And that explains everything about where the world is going in my opinion.
(M16)

Nevertheless, some agreed that proving that someone is a victim of violence and receive support – regardless of gender – can be challenging.

(In)equalities within the workforce

Two sub-codes were added to capture the phenomena of discrimination within the field of employment and the outward labor migration (including “brain drain”) from Hungary to Western countries.

The 9.1.2.7 Discrimination code encompasses various approaches.

Firstly, the formal equality approach is considered. This perspective posits that individuals possessing the necessary qualifications should (be able to) achieve parity in success and remuneration with others holding similar qualifications.

...there's no job that a woman who applies for, wouldn't be hired, wouldn't have the same chance of applying... (M10)

I wouldn't say that they [women] earn less, because there's a specific workplace, a specific salary for a specific job, and there's a from-to, well, that's a matter of negotiation. (M10)

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If it's from-to [salary], then surely a woman earns less than a man. (M9)

Secondly, the code explores the work-life balance issue, delving into the challenges faced by individuals of different genders in maintaining this equilibrium. It also examines the government's and/or employer's role in providing support for achieving a satisfactory work-life balance.

Yes, exactly, we don't have that many options. For example, I work now, and (...) They didn't take me back, they heard that I had a child, and that's not good, and they didn't take me back. But now I took a job that I wouldn't have taken if I hadn't had a child, so I took a job with money, I don't want to say how much, but I had no other option, and I can hardly get to the kindergarten, so I (...) and I'm always rushing to pick it up, because the kindergarten is open until about the time I'm at work... (F5)

The roles are starting to reverse, men are starting to become more feminine, women are starting to become more masculine ... And, as you mentioned, men are slowly losing the ability to tighten a screw, while women are willing and able to do it, and they do it, which is why I think that on some level they still believe that they were discriminated against, and they're still trying to prove themselves, and so we're starting to shift, and that's why there are now all kinds of gender ... (M15)

A new inclusion in the Migration sub-code focuses on addressing the outward labour flow from Central-Eastern-European countries to the West. Due to its geographical specificity and the discussion within the focus groups, this phenomenon seems to be affecting the population of both emigrating and destination countries – regardless of gender. This may affect voting behaviour too.

Discussions reflect on the how people conduct their studies in Hungary yet leave the country to find better opportunities, resulting in less professionals available (e.g. medical professionals, teachers, etc.). Furthermore, the question of vertical generational solidarity is crucial.

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If things go on like this, with the children going abroad, us, parents, getting old and the parents have no one to look after them and then they're stuffed into the nursing home, no one to visit them, well, that's a big problem. (F14)

Families are breaking up, yes. And then it all becomes meaningless when the children are scattered, there's no one, the parents are no longer there/live for anyone. (F11)

Listen, my son called me from abroad today, too, saying that Dad this and that, what could be done, this and that, and he asked me for help again, even

though he lives over a thousand kilometres away from me, because that's how I brought him up. (M14)

But I think more and more people are leaving [to foreign countries], what will the future be? (M7)

Hypotheses Proposals

As we have shown above, all three hypotheses proved to be more or less irrelevant in the Hungarian case. Therefore, we propose three new hypotheses that help us to understand the underlying characteristics and dynamics behind the perception of gender status and gender relations and even provide an indication of the corresponding voting behavior (or lack thereof).

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A preliminary remark on the usefulness of our hypotheses. Our first two proposed hypotheses are related to the particular history of Hungary (and other post-socialist countries in East-Central Europe), which is characterized by state socialism before 1989 and the absence of a liberal democratic political environment after 2010. However, we find that the third hypothesis is also understandable in a broader context, including the other countries participating in the UNTWIST project.

The first proposed hypothesis [H1] is:

In some contexts, gender issues are not direct factors in considerations to vote in favour of the RWPP.

In non-democratic instances such as in Hungary, RWPPs are not only alternatives in opposition, but also, as in the case of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition, the government can be formulated by RWPPs. In such cases, two observations arise. The first is that the main question may be why voters do not vote for parties other than RWPP. The other question relates to the character of the regime. Although a ruling right-wing populist party or a coalition of such parties does not necessarily lead to an undemocratic or illiberal government, in such cases, as in hybrid regimes, the motivations to vote for RWPP are quite different from those in democratic cases. Therefore, issue-based decisions in voting, such as gender issues might be less pronounced compared to other motivations (such as lack of viable alternatives, fear and insecurity, economic reasons and beliefs, biased media influence or overt propaganda). Nevertheless, observed attitudes to reject public adherence to and advocacy for LGBTQ communities, as well as free choice of gender identity indirectly might increase the attractiveness of the governing RWPP promoting traditional gender roles and anti-gender (identity) discourses.

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Furthermore, we suggest that when assessing voter behaviour and the option of RWPP, the specificities of the regime in question – at least in broad strokes – need to be taken into account. This does not mean that a possible link between voting behaviour and gender issues are negligible in such cases, rather, we believe that they still may be important, albeit indirect, reasons for voting for RWPP. Therefore, in the Hungarian case, as the government emphasizes its pronatalist policy, therefore, it is still meaningful to ask how citizens perceive and evaluate those gender related policies of the government, as well as to ask how the opposition parties address particular gender issues.

While the first new hypothesis is directly related to the specificities of the current regime, the second hypothesis is embedded in the post-socialist legacy addressed in the *Hypotheses* section above. The second proposed hypothesis [H2] states that

When the discussion of gender relations is absent from the political agenda, it poses an obstacle to the explicit articulation of gender-based needs.

An illuminating term coined by Éva Fodor is *partial emancipation*, which she uses to evaluate the politics addressing the status/situation of women during state socialism in Hungary (Fodor, 2003). This supplements Ildikó Asztalos Morell's above-mentioned assertion that the emancipation of women during this period was understood as assimilation to the *masculine norm* (Asztalos Morell, 1999). Judit Acsády summarizes the similar statements of scholars who have addressed the question as the following.

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In private life, the patterns of division of responsibility remained more or less unchanged, and the sexist discourse of the subordination and subjugation of women was not questioned in the construction of the female-male relationship system (Acsády, 2016).

The third proposed hypothesis [H3] to which we attach general relevance is as follows.

In case of women, the thematization of the concern that their own situation is not as it should be, in terms of gender relations, would be felt as status deficit in itself.

We claim that women avoid claiming that they are unable to cope with housework implicitly assigned to them, and that they suffer from the lack of work/life balance,

because this claim in itself would imply a deficit in gender status. Behind this is the conviction that femininity involves taking on housework, besides other (paid) duties. The cost of voicing these claims publicly seem to be relatively high for women (e. g., given the challenges of finding partners for heterosexual and monogamous relationships, and the stigma of being perceived as a “nagging” woman).

However, one comment must be added here: The composition of the focus groups (lower middle class) did not represent the entire constituency of Fidesz voters; the interpretation of traditional gender roles may be different in higher and lower social classes, where there are also large numbers of Fidesz voters.

Conclusions

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On the basis of the focus group interviews we found that in Hungary most probably it's not the gender issues that make people vote directly for RWPP. The society shares a general feeling of existential, economic insecurity. There are strong concerns about the living standards, low salaries, high energy prices and housing. In the focus group interviews participants mention gender issues mostly in the context of family issues, this is the lens through which gender is mostly approached or filtered. However, the longing for a stronger social order and uncertainties linked to the changing nature of gender roles indirectly might increase the attractiveness of the governing RWPP promoting traditional gender roles.

The non-expression of gender relations, this inertia that is brought in, these make it difficult to talk about gender based needs. There are unresolved tensions that have been handed down to us from state socialism. Women's emancipation had lot of controversial features. It was just a "partial emancipation." It seems also that there is a conceptual vacuum concerning feminism and gender issues, yet in the public discourse these have very bad connotations.

What was also tangible in the interviews that the women-only and men-only groups were expressing themselves very differently, they were bringing up different issues and they were using rather different discourses. We can even interpret this split as the split of public/private spheres, as men tended to bring in the field of both domestic and foreign politics in the discussion, while women were focusing mostly on family issues or if they mentioned e.g. welfare measures, they did it in estimating its actual effects on families, on everyday life.

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Switzerland

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INTRODUCTION

This document presents an analysis of the two focus groups conducted in Switzerland by the University of Bern in collaboration with gfs.Bern, a political communication and research agency based in Bern, Switzerland. The focus groups were conducted on November 29 and December 7, 2023. In agreement with the coordinator of UNTWIST (UPO), the focus groups were conducted after the Swiss elections on October 22, 2023, as conducting them before this significant electoral event could have influenced and potentially compromised the quality of an already politically sensitive discussion and, consequently, the results of this research effort. The main information about the focus groups metadata is provided in Table 1. In addition to the other sub-deliverables of a) the voter profiles informing the sampling criteria for recruitment submitted by UBERN to UPO in November 2023, b) the general information about the focus groups through the UPO survey submitted by UBERN in December 2023 and c) the coding process of the transcripts conducted by UPO in January 2024, this document provides qualitative background information and summary analysis of the focus group content based on a deep analytical reading of the transcripts (in both German and English).

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Table 1: Focus Groups Metadata

WOMEN's GROUP		MEN's GROUP
DATE	and 29 November 2023	07 December 2023
TIME	18:00 – 20:00	18:15 – 20:15
LOCATION	Vatter Business Center, Bern	Vatter Business Center, Bern
MODERATORS	Leandra Bias (UBERN), Sophie Schäfer (gfs.bern)	Tobias Keller (gfs.bern), Remo Parisi (UBERN)
N* of PARTICIPANTS	10	10
TOPICS RAISED	<p>Positive: Direct democracy, freedom of speech, public transport, holidays/work, treatment of sexual abuse of children has improved, tolerance, women's empowerment and gender equality</p> <p>Negative: asylum system, political communication and bureaucracy, social security: poverty in old age, housing/rents are rising, pension system</p>	<p>Positive: (direct) democracy, parliamentary system, societal cohesion, freedom of expression, wealth and living standard, stability, social security, money politics of the national bank, foreign policy, neutrality, multilingual system,</p> <p>Negative: Political correctness/ideology, Asylum system/migration, pension system, populism, energy supply system</p>

reform, prices for medical insurance, infrastructure: parking spaces, education: school system, family: marriage, social support to families, feminist movement, energy supply system (SVP slogan)	(SVP slogan), health care cost, social media, economic pressures, loss of values, bureaucracy
Ambivalent: migration, sexual education for children, wages between men and women, childcare options, social security system	Ambivalent: digitalization pressures, media, education, relationship with EU, gender equality/women's empowerment, technology and AI

TONE AND NARRATIVE IN THE FOCUS GROUPS

Following the moderator's guide developed by UBERN, which translates the instructions by UPO to the Swiss context, each focus group was started with a 'post-it' exercise, in which participants were asked to come up with topics they consider as positive/working well in the Swiss context and those that they have made negative experiences with. They were asked to base this assessment on their own experiences, to reach the twofold goal of creating an atmosphere of trust and community while also avoiding priming them by offering preconceived themes. As a second step, participants were asked to identify broader themes by grouping the topics that were raised. The topics were stuck onto a board which served the moderators as a resource by referring to a variety of topics, which

emanated from the participants themselves (instead of being brought up by the moderators). Thus, the topics and themes were repeatedly mentioned throughout the following discussion in order to cover different aspects in the three major phases of: 1) Group consolidation, 2) Nostalgia/Utopia/Dystopia and 3) Gender and Social Order. This section is a summary of the narrative and dynamic of each group across the three phases, outlining the main topics, arguments, and general tone for each phase.

Women's group:

General comments (atmosphere): The overall setup worked well. We were happy with the facility, everyone was on time and respectfully engaged, yet was also genuinely interested in each other's point of view. This was despite an unexpected and impressively healthy heterogeneity within the group. As shown by a survey which was conducted by gfs.bern to facilitate the sampling process, while all participants had indicated that they support the right-wing populist party SVP (Swiss People's Party) – as detailed in the focus group protocol – they had also voted for other parties including SP (socialist party) and Green Liberals but also EDU (Christian, right-wing populist party which translates as Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland), demonstrating that they were 'swing voters' with diverse political backgrounds who converged on SVP positions.

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Phase 1: Post-it exercise and group consolidation

After the topic collection (for all topics including those discussed and listed on post-its, see Table 1), participants were asked to look for clusters of agreement and expand on it. What was striking is how the group naturally coalesced around the

topic of education. This was discussed in a manner where the focus was on children's needs and how they are not met because there is too much variety and confusion between different cantonal systems and/or too much pressure to fit and not enough time to allow for individual development. **They agreed** that the current **educational system** is problematic. But interestingly, none of this was about *their* need. The facilitator had to ask twice to make them say explicitly that this affected them *as mothers/care givers*.

What also came up in this part of the discussion was the issue of external childcare and whether or not to use it. There was **disagreement** around the topic of external **childcare** to the extent that one participant with 5 children said she did not want to place them in childcare. Another who is raising 3 children agreed here inasmuch as she wanted to have the freedom to decide to be a stay-at-home mother, but that policies were exclusively focused on women's reinsertion into the labor market. As a result, she found herself between a rock and a hard place: neither was she appreciated for her paid nor unpaid work, nor could she receive any financial support while being a stay-at-home mother. Others mentioned that childcare was too expensive and used up all of the mother's salary, while also lamenting that there was not a lot of support from employers or daycares when children get sick. Yet two single mothers disagreed arguing that they were both very happy with the service offered and that having children in external care was not a negative issue. Interestingly, participants here also intercepted that looking after children should also not only be the mother's responsibility. The mother of 5 explained that in her case this was simply not an option because they ran their own business, but it transpired that they were just aligned with traditional gender roles. This person also issued the statement that families had to be strengthened

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which seemed to be supported by the group. Many participants expressed frustration regarding what they perceived as 'judgment' toward their decision not to re-enter the labor market after becoming mothers, signaled – in their views – by the lack of financial support from the State for stay-at-home mothers as well as the feeling of being judged by society at large for their choice not to work. Overall, in this round, there was **agreement** that both **education and childcare** were on top of women's mind, including of grandmothers who often looked after their grandchildren and could witness both the strain at school and on children's mothers.

Another key topic was the issue of **female poverty at pension age** which was connected to the issue of raising children and working part time. This was specifically raised by the two single mothers in the group, but also by a participant who mainly did voluntary but not paid work. In all these cases they are just above the threshold to request additional financial support (Ergänzungsleistungen) but can barely live off their pension. It was also discussed how, for working women, being married can be penalizing, as individual pensions for co-living partners tend to be higher than for married couples. Interestingly, one participant then argued that she would be in favor of partnered couples getting lower pensions rather than married couples to get higher ones, indicating that it is more about a sense of social envy or injustice rather than need. That same person also argued in favor of rich and poor people receiving the same pensions.

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Phase 2: Nostalgia, Dystopia, Utopia

Past. Even though at this point we did not explicitly ask about the experience of their mothers but of their parents, the discussion predominantly revolved around their mothers or, more generally, women of previous generations. What was an

impressive and particularly sensitive (in a positive way, denoting mutual respect) moment was when the topic of sexual harassment and abuse arose relatively quickly. **The group agreed** that this occurred more frequently in the past, expressing a sense of helplessness because, as one participant put it, *“teacher, doctor, priest – these were men with so much power and zero accountability (unantastbar)”*. Several of them reported about incidents of **sexual harassment/abuse** though it was never clear whether they witnessed or experienced it themselves. At any rate, there was tension and a palpable mutual understanding in the room. These experiences were reported to mainly have taken place at school, and participants agreed that nowadays individuals (including children) have more tools and avenues to report such cases, and they are more likely to have their cases heard than in the past. The experience of abuse was also extended to bullying and physical abuse of teachers, which was unfavorably compared to today's schooling system that, thankfully, nowadays protects children from any kind of abusive behavior from teachers. However, as one participant noted, the current system sometimes goes too far, leading to a reversal of power relations between children and teachers.

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There was also widespread agreement that women's position is better today, thanks to women's **suffrage** (acquired nationally only in 1972!). Participants noted that nowadays they can express their opinions more freely, whereas in the past they were often policed even within their own families. Even when they were allowed to vote, they were expected to follow the father's or husband's preferences. Today, they feel empowered to voice their disagreements. Another topic where participants **agreed** that their situation had generally improved was related to **working conditions**, specifically in terms of working hours and social protection.

Interestingly, it was also noted that some laws (e.g., tax burden for married and cohabiting couples) remain problematic because they are still based on outdated models from the past (such as the rule for cohabiting couples who were required to own and pay for two apartments due to restrictions on unmarried cohabitation, from which the difference in the pension schemes originally arise), prompting a call for more modern and adaptable systems. The only aspects perceived to be better in the past were the cost of living, resulting in a less stressful and time-constrained livelihoods, and a sense of loss regarding certain values of respect (especially for the elderly and authority figures) among young people.

Future. Here the first intervention was from a mother saying she is worried that the pension scheme will be an issue for future generations, who will not live off their pension and have to work longer. **The group disagreed** as to how the **pension** scheme would need to be reformed but **agreed** that there was conflicting information especially around AHV (the public pension) where some media/politicians said there was enough money for it and other said the opposite, thus increasing their sense of **confusion** and raising doubts about what piece of information to trust. At any rate, most of the participants **agreed** that raising women's retirement age without compensating for it was problematic. This was a moment in the discussion where tensions ran high, and one could feel the anger and disappointment, especially from one of the two single mothers who felt she had been played (verarscht). This was also the segment where **migration and asylum** came up. Initially, one participant raised the issue of overpopulation, which was also related to the discussion around funding for pensions due to the strain on resources (just too many people for too little resources). This was a long segment, but the key moment was that the group initially **agreed** that

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overpopulation or an excess of migrants posed a problem due to the perception of (most of these people) as profiteering and not contributing (welfare freeriders). However, some participants also raised the point that migration was essential to address staff shortages and demographic changes. They argued that migrants could contribute to the AHV and that, without them, there would not be enough children to support the pension system. The issue, they contended, lay not in migration itself but the asylum system. One person responded with a comparison of migration in the past, arguing that migrants back then were better at integrating – immediately finding work and learning the language. Two others then attributed the issue to cultural differences, stating that *“these people coming from different cultures”*, and suggesting that for this reason their *“minds are completely different”*. At this point, another participant interjected, stating firmly *“I am sorry, but these are racist prejudices”*. This remark came up very unexpectedly and there was no defensive response from the rest of the group, that would have been the majority. Instead, the woman was given the opportunity to share her story: she was married to a Sudanese refugee who was simply not allowed to work for many years as his case was under examination. He has since founded his own business which has now triggered envy: so, whatever he does, it seems to be wrong. She also emphasized the need to differentiate between migration and refugees, and voiced bitter disappointment about how Ukrainian refugees were treated much better than others. This moment seemed pivotal because from this tangible story others got to understand the reality of refugees and why they *“aren’t working”*. They **agreed** that there should be more possibilities for refugees to work but also to process their cases faster. Finally, another participant made a quite striking remark: *“in reality, most of them are good people. The problem is we only hear about the bad apples”*. This statement went unchallenged, and it marked a

surprising **consensus** among the group, given that more open hostility was initially expected from this group of voters.

Another smaller racist comment occurred when a participant stated that second generation (Muslim) migrants from for ex Kosovo were a problem because these women were less emancipated and therefore demanded less from men in terms of gender equality (e.g. for childcare responsibilities) than (white) Swiss women would.

Another issue that was discussed was the supposed early sexualization of schoolchildren. One participant mentioned the example of news reporting about a sex bag for children that was used for **sexual education**. **The group disagreed** as to whether this was appropriate. While some agreed with this participant – describing such activities as abhorrent, too early, perverse and a matter of the family (one participant explicitly mentioned her son's discomfort upon learning and seeing two men and two women kissing in a book at school) – another participant intervened and reminded the group about the sexual abuse suffered in schools, highlighting the importance of sexual education as a preventive measure. This intervention convinced most of them, or at least did not prompt more objections. Another participant also suggested that this material was likely designed in an age-appropriate manner. In the same segment, some participants also made wild comparisons to Germany and the US, claiming that individuals are apparently allowed to change gender only once per month – suggesting that they had to put this 'one-month limit' otherwise people would have change gender more often. Some participants asserted that overall, issues concerning transgender and homosexual individuals should not be used to brainwash children. However, it's worth noting that not all participants shared this viewpoint.

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Phase 3: Gender and social order

During this phase, no major new topics came up when participants were specifically asked about the difference compared to their *mothers'* experience. The participants **agreed** that they were more empowered today, with some even comparing their current situation to that of the 80s. When specifically asked about the effort made by politics, NGOs etc. in promoting gender equality, the pay gap was mentioned for the first time. However, the group was divided on whether it truly existed, with some arguing that it was not the state's responsibility to deal with that. They suggested the law had been enacted, so now it was up to women to negotiate equal pay. One participant did raise the issue of unequal treatment, however, hinting at different socialization and lingering **patriarchal gender norms**. For example, they noted that despite women enjoying more freedom today, they would still not allow themselves to take the same liberties of men, such as going to a bar alone in the evening. Overall, the participants did not really point to any particular party or governing body that they felt was responsible and accountable for the issues they had discussed all evening. It was as if this was a separate talk. There were some opinions expressing a desire for less polarization and more cooperation between parties. However, there was **agreement** that the political situation and regime were better than in other countries, such as Germany. But at no point did they connect the topics of discussion with (in)action at the political level. Instead, they attributed the loss of cohesion to a problem of communication including due to the **media**. Finally, when asked explicitly about the women's strike (the largest **feminist** event in Switzerland, occurring on June 14 since 2019) there

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was **widespread agreement** that this was too extreme, ridiculous, embarrassing and not representing their needs (*"It is a feminist strike. It's no longer a women's strike. It is feminist"*). When probed further, participants mainly expressed that it focused on non-issues and was directed against men, whereas what they really wanted was to discuss and work together with men (*"...it takes a man and a woman to fight for something. Not just women...it is no longer a togetherness"*).

The question about how they can get active had to be omitted due to time issues.

Men's group:

General notes (atmosphere): Participants were definitely former or future SVP voters, as transpired clearly in their interventions, but the group was still diverse in terms of age and rural-urban background. Moderating such a group, mainly consisting of middle-aged men, posed a challenge as they tended to dominate the discussion. For instance, when asked a question, one person would often start speaking and another would interject with a thought, making it difficult to transcribe the conversation accurately. We expected only 8 people but 10 turned up, leading to more interruptions and over-talking. Time was also tight, as we only had 2 hours and allotting just 10 minutes per question would not allow everyone to intervene. Thus, towards the end, we had to limit the number of participants speaking up. They all said it was a very interesting and pleasant experience, not least because the group was homogenous enough, which facilitated exchange. They were very authentic in their interventions and seemed to speak freely. We noticed differences in education levels among participants, which seemed to be reflected in their level of participation in the discussion (i.e., those with lower education levels intervened less). Compared to the women's group, the discussion

remained on a more abstract level for big parts of the conversation where large issues of societal transformation (AI to transnational politics) were discussed.

Phase 1: Post-it exercise and group consolidation

After the initial topic collection exercise (for all topics, including those discussed and listed on post-its, see Table 1) and a brief disturbance caused by a delayed participant, participants were asked to identify clusters of topics/themes and elaborate on their experiences with them. The first theme that emerged as a major issue of discussion was **digitalization**. The group **agreed** on this being an important issue which is only inadequately addressed by politics in Switzerland. One participant argued that digitalization could be seen as a cross-cutting issue that influenced all other topics and has an impact on the rise of **populism** and what participants referred to as 'ideology'. Most other issues that were discussed were related to the social system, including health insurance law and housing market, which were however quickly connected by participants to larger systemic questions about market and state intervention. **Migration** was here discussed by one participant as part of a supply and demand system, where higher numbers of people would lead to increasing prices, thus justifying a 'Switzerland first' policy, where migration policy is considered as a subordinated charity after the needs of the 'Swiss populace' are fulfilled. Another participant however **disagreed** and argued for a 'Europe first' approach instead, advocating for a clear separation from the US and China, making the point that the American system of "*process optimization and market orientation*" was also to be criticized. The discussion then turned to who was to blame for the current inadequate policies at work, whereby participants **disagreed** on the culprits, mentioning international politics

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(Americans, German TÜV (standard-setting institution), EU politics), print media, economic greed, and **social media**.

The second issue that was discussed in detail was the topic of **education**, with participants bemoaning a decline of education standards for current youth, who was seen as too influenced by social media, which was seen as detrimental to democracy. One participant argued that the problem with social media was that youth did no longer feel 'Swiss' but as "*part of some community on a sub-channel on Instagram*". This was however not taken up, as participants instead turned to the school system to discuss the need for modernization of curricula. **Opinions diverged** on whether the current curricula were too tight ("*tight as a corset*") or too broad, and about the responsibility of the parents and teachers for ensuring the development of critical thinking skills in youth. One participant suggested that a problem was also the increasing number of 'foreigners' in classes, but this was not further explored by the group. Instead, there was **some agreement** on the problem being a lack of opportunities to foster both 'strong' and 'weak' students according to their needs. **Opinions diverged** again on whether this was due to the (lack of) competencies of teachers or lack of resources for schools. Another issue related to education, which led to a lengthy discussion segment, was the problem of declining values and competencies of critical thinking and endurance in youth – this was seen as particularly pronounced in cities such as Bern.

Overall, participants raised a lot of topics but only occasionally discussed one of them in depth. Moreover, in cases where topics were discussed by several participants, there was a tendency to focus on systemic, abstract issues, which were identified as sources of the problems rather than concrete policies. In this context, alongside discussions of influence by **globalized institutions** such as the

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EU or strong states like Germany and the US as well as different types of regimes, one issue that came up across the topics discussed was the problem of populism and ideology, which was not further defined but raised repeatedly by participants as problematic due to an increasing rift between different parties and parts of the population. Gender did not come up in this segment. Differently from the women's group, references to participants' life experiences and struggles were less prominent, and tended to be used to support (i.e., provide evidence for) the larger, abstract argument they aimed to make.

Phase 2: Nostalgia, Dystopia, Utopia

Past. Unexpectedly, the first thing raised by one of the participants when prompted about a positive change from the past was the increasing rights for women, including **suffrage**, which they perceived as a positive change towards a more open society. However, while there was no outright contestation of this, another participant said that while it is good for women to have entered the labor market, the current economy was too focused on consumerism, leading to a system where 'dinks' (double income no kids) are favored by the economy and *"the healthy balance has been completely lost"*. While there was **general agreement** with this sentiment, another participant raised a **contradictory statement**, arguing that actually the main consumers are senior citizens and there was a lack of resources for youth. This was then discussed by one participant who shared an experience from his grandfather to illustrate the declining wealth as an issue of declining values of commitment and responsibility by employers and business owners who prioritize investments elsewhere rather than providing protection for their workers. Other **participants agreed** that this was an issue that was better in the past, raising both supportive comments for a lack of responsible behavior from

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business owners and concerns about an increasing and problematic trend towards overconsumption, both of which were associated to an increasing financial greed. One participant, however, also linked this to a past policy during World War II to close the borders to Jewish people, which can be interpreted as an antisemitic statement.

An older participant explained, based on his own experiences, that in the past there was less pressure on individuals to make their own choices in terms of financial decisions, arguing that there was more support from both the political system and the community. However, another participant raised the issue that this was not solely based on values, but rather that the system and society as a whole have become more complex, extensive, and faster-paced. Participants then discussed the potential reasons for an increasing fatigue to participate actively in politics among young people – whereby **arguments diverged** broadly between the continuous wealth gap and lack of opportunities for social and economic mobility for young people, to having too many options after high school, to an overload with media and entertainment, to an urban/rural divide between different cantons.

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Future. In terms of challenges for the upcoming generations, the discussion once again revolved around **financial and economic trends** for youth, whereby participants argued that youth were too influenced by trends, influencers (Greta Thunberg was mentioned) and fake news, rather than being able to think critically for themselves. There was **broad agreement** on this being connected to the changing media and information landscape, which they link back to earlier points of discussion on technological advances, **digitalization and AI**, and – again – **education**. Participants agreed on a lack of skills of systematic thinking and

problem-solving being taught to students today (implying that this was different in the past). However, when one participant shared his personal experience in the military, it became clear that he was not really referring to a lack of critical thinking as much as merely a lack of clear instructions and guidelines to follow, which he deemed more confusing, impractical, and needlessly complex nowadays – again linking this to the EU as a symbol for bureaucratization. Others echoed this sentiment, **agreeing** that knowledge taught in school nowadays is not practical and tangible enough, with one participant also arguing that the problem lies in the insufficient value placed on the knowledge of older generations (boomers), which is consequently getting lost. However, when one participant **disagreed** and stated that more diverse knowledge is more important today, due to the necessity for youth to switch jobs more frequently, making *“yesterday’s knowledge no longer relevant”*, there was no disagreement from the group. Instead, towards the end of the discussion, the group tended to veer towards an emphasis on individuality and fostering individual talents as a desirable path forward. During this segment, gender did not come up except for implicitly, when one participant described his parenting approach as based on discipline and order but mitigated through his ‘liberal wife’, who focuses more on installing self-confidence in their children.

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Phase 3: Gender and social order

Overall, participants did not place a strong emphasis on issues of gender. It was evident from the group atmosphere that they did not feel very comfortable speaking about gender roles and relations between women and men. In the final segment, when specifically asked about this, one participant said it was easier in earlier days because the roles were clear, while another stated that it is better today because roles are more permeable. Once these two points were made,

there was no further discussion. Similarly, when asked to address fathers, the conversation did not flow very organically. One participant highlighted inter-generational path dependencies, where different generations repeat certain patterns but also try to change aspects of their own upbringing. When prompted to be more concrete, the participant mentioned that his father treated him and his dyslexia more understandingly than his grandfather would have. They then discussed the merits and problems of strictness and punishments, with some arguing that military values were positive due to treating everyone “*equally*” and providing the “*same opportunities*”, while others emphasize the problem with seeing everything in “*black and white*” rather than “*rainbows*”. **Gender** only came up explicitly once in this discussion when the person in favor of more discipline argued that it would be beneficial for society if women also had to serve in the military to learn “*to listen*” and only talk when necessary. However, this view was **contested** by another participant who praised his mothers’ willingness to discuss and consider children’s wishes, as opposed to his fathers’ parenting based on giving orders. Overall, however, the group tended to favor clear and strict orders – a “*pacemaker*” rather than multitude of opinions. The aspect of working women was **raised once**, with one participant advocating for more part-time opportunities for women (also for higher-paid jobs) in order to “*restore the balance*” and “*protect children*” and “*teach children manners and morals, discipline and determination*”.

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Asked about their opinion on NGOs and campaigns for gender equality, one person emphasized that the difference between the sexes should not be erased to avoid “*tak[ing] away an incredible amount of excitement from our culture and the meaning of our lives*”. From there, however, the topic quickly shifted back to

the job market, and gender issues were only revisited when prompted again by the moderator. Then, one participant stated that moving away from a patriarchal model was a positive change yet argued against affirmative action and quotas for marginalized groups – quickly centering on an opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement (thus moving from gender to race) as an argument against ‘populism’. Another participant interjected by sharing that, in his experience, women are often better prepared than men, thus defending the influx of women into the labor market. There was **more agreement** on rejecting the **feminist movement** and the women’s strike in Switzerland, with one participant strongly arguing that equality *“has been realized in Switzerland. For the most part, it has not been properly implemented”*. The participants’ narrative exhibited a certain contradictory line of argument, whereby while acknowledging the existence and the persistence of pay gaps and discrimination, they suggested that the LGBTIQ+ movement is actually bringing discrimination upon themselves by continuing to demand equal treatment because *“they have actually achieved a great deal”*. This line of argument also **aligned** with another populist view suggesting that the queer movement only concerns very limited numbers of people and silences the broader majority. Regarding the women’s movement, the discussion followed a similar trajectory, where the same person argued that the women who participate in the women’s strike have too high expectations (something that is echoed by others – *“lament at a high level”*). The discussion then shifted to the direction of ‘cancel culture’ – which was associated again with the previously raised topics of “ideology” – before one participant brought up the issue of violence against women. Participants then agreed on this remaining a problem in Swiss society – along with some other issues including disability laws and pensions – for which feminism has some justification. However, feminism was accused of being “too

loud" and *"shouting"*, rather than seeking constructive solutions, bringing the discussion quickly back to issues of bureaucracy and selfishness among parliamentarians.

HYPOTHESES TESTING

Based on the findings of the deep reading of the transcripts and the description above, in this section, we assess what the findings mean for the three central hypotheses highlighted by the Coordinator (UPO) including our interpretation and reasons for both positive and negative assessments.

Hypothesis 1: RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening. ☒

Conclusion: negative

This hypothesis was not confirmed (negative) in either group whereby group argumentations exhibited both overlaps and some differences.

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For the **women's group**, there was overwhelming consensus of an increase in gender status compared to the past. The topics that were raised in that regard were a progress in political rights (voting), legal rights in marriage and relationships with their husbands, as well as the social norms allowing for more rights to speak their mind and act independently of their husbands/fathers (or male figures more in general). There was also a perception of an improvement in terms of the danger of (sexual) violence although this was mostly raised in the context of violence against children, where there was a feeling that perpetrators were held more accountable today. In turn, the areas where the past was perceived as better were not particularly gender-related issues as they focused more on income stability and lower cost of living, values of decency, lower stress

levels and less political polarization. As such, we do conclude that the women's group basically unilaterally did **not feel a loss in gender status**. Instead, perceived injustices and grievances were interpreted through **socio-economic issues** and **status loss** and, to some extent – albeit this was not an issue of consensus – in regard to race and ethnic background, where there was some (controversial) discussion on migrants. Regarding the role of feminism, there are some contradictory assessments, where on the one hand, participants described the progress regarding gender equality as not going far enough (with unequal gender norms remaining at least in parts of the population), while at the same time broadly agreeing that feminist activism (the women's strike) was going too far and unnecessary. Overall, however, feminism was not blamed for the problems identified, but the negative assessment attached to it was more related to its 'divisive' approach, that was strongly opposed and seen as counterproductive.

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For the **men's group**, like the women's group, there was consensus around the important gain for women's rights with the introduction of the right to vote (in the 1970s). This was **not interpreted as a status loss** for men. Rather, the issue that was being discussed as most problematic about the new gender roles was an associated change in norms and values towards more selfish behaviors than in the past, which was also mixed with some – more or less overt, depending on the speaker – gender stereotypes about women being less disciplined and 'chattier', as well as largely portrayed as (solely) responsible for childrearing. Even when discussing the controversial issue of the women's quota, where some sense of injustice towards men was being voiced, this was a marginal opinion, where the overall sense seemed to be an agreement that women should indeed have more rights and power. As such, also the men's group did not exhibit a strong sense of

gender status loss, a concern which was surprisingly also not projected when discussing future anxieties about “weak” youth. Similar to the women’s group, feminism was generally assessed as negative thus exposing a postfeminist attitude whereby feminism was only justified in the past. However, the perceived problem with feminism was not so much that it was seen to disadvantage men, but rather that it was considered as a useless and potentially harmful radical ‘ideology’ which contributes to a polarization of society by creating unrealistic standards and expectations and silencing those who disagree with them.

In both groups, thus gender status loss did not play a significant role. Instead gains in gender equality were discussed generally positively, even acknowledging remaining gaps for women’s equality (pension system, work–life balance, violence etc.), which were seen as not sufficiently addressed by politics. As such, participants aligned implicitly with some feminist demands, while however, strongly rejecting the idea of feminism as a helpful movement. Instead, feminism, while not seen as responsible for gender status loss, was considered unnecessary and part of the problem of an impending societal polarization.

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Hypothesis 2: Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies). ☒

Conclusion: not applicable/unclear

Unfortunately, we cannot draw firm conclusions on this hypothesis from our focus groups as participants did not discuss their reasons for their voting choices. This might be because the majority of the two hours of focus group discussion was spent on identifying topics and assessing the perceptions of social and political

change with the goal to identify grievances, fears and hopes (utopia, dystopia, nostalgia). The lively discussion in both groups led to a limited amount of time being left for the final part on discussing *whom* participants perceived as the representative for their needs and *how* they themselves can become active. While we thus have some insights into what participants consider positive or negative changes, as well as how they assess social movement activism, it was not explicitly raised how these insights are connected to their voting rationales. The fact that the topic of political parties did not come up organically – and was also not taken up in the few moments, when participants were explicitly prompted about their assessment of politics – however, also potentially indicates that the topic was not perceived as of immediate importance to participants' needs. In fact, when moderators and participants mentioned 'politics' the discussion in both groups tended to focus on issues of regime (party system, direct democracy) and political discourse (polarization and lack of clear communication), rather than particular party policies and politics. We can think of two reasons for why this topic was not considered relevant in our focus groups despite a successful group consolidation phase. On the one hand, the Swiss party system is much more diverse than is the case in other countries with a less clear system of government and opposition dispute. Together with the large role of direct democratic action through people's votes, this might lead to a perception of politics as generally not assigned to the activities of one particular party. On the other hand, a related reason might be our voter profile decision to focus on 'swing voters', who arguably did not identify strongly with their right-wing populist vote (and associate party of the SVP) due to their past as having voted for a variety of different parties. As such, we assess this hypothesis as invalid or not applicable to our focus group insights.

Hypothesis 3: Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP. ☒ Conclusion: not applicable/unclear

Similar to Hypothesis 2, we cannot draw firm conclusions on this hypothesis. This is because neither gender status loss nor the motivations to vote for RWPP did play a large role in either of the focus group discussions. As such, we would assess this hypothesis as negative or invalid. However, there were some significant differences with which participants in the different groups approached the different topics, which we elaborate on below.

FURTHER FINDINGS and HYPOTHESES PROPOSALS

This section summarizes other relevant findings we have drawn from the deep reading of the focus group transcripts. Due to the lack of data on ‘voting’ motivations that was explicitly discussed (see 2.), we focused on observations regarding dynamics related to gender and the feelings participants expressed about politics, the grievances they hold, as well as the solutions they suggest. We hope that this can be relevant for the analysis of UNTWIST, both in comparison to the grievances and solutions expressed in party manifestos (thus responding to the hypothesis about ‘niche parties’) and for the formulation of policy recommendations for democratic parties to tap into and address underrepresented feminist ideas in policy and unfulfilled grievances of RWPP voters. We specifically focus on five observations and insights that we found particularly striking in the sense that they either confirm existing hypotheses in the

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literature or counteract assumptions that are common in both the literature as well as public discourse on far-right motivations and mobilization.

After detailing each point and providing some relevant evidence from the focus group transcript, we then propose one or several ideas for further investigation (hypotheses) as well as for initial ideas about potential policy implications that relate to this particular observation, thus combining sections 3 and 4 from the protocol into one section.

Finding 0: Gendered socialization in conversation

- H0: Men experience stronger sense of vulnerability due to loss of expertise

Finding 1: Status loss in (socio-)economic terms

- Late-stage capitalism (1.1) has led to declining workers rights, sense of community (1.2), lack of social mobility (1.3) compared to the past
- insufficient support for low-income earners (1.4) and persistent wealth gap (1.3)
- neoliberal pressures causing stress/pressure on family structures (1.5)
- H1: Both democratic (and RWPP) are not offering solutions and acknowledgement for these (felt) challenges

Finding 2: Confusion and complexities (loss of expertise)

- Bureaucratization, technocratization and globalization (2.1)
- Knowledge of a past with clear guidance (2.2) is outdated (2.3)
- EU as representative of bureaucratization/globalization (2.4)
- Migrants as economized 'outsiders' (culprits) (2.5)
- H2: Fear of dystopian future mobilizes for RWPP
- H3: Wish to restore expertise/feeling of control over life
- H4: Migration restriction as 'twisted' solution for complexity reduction

Finding 3: Youth as (subtly gendered) victims and culprits

- *Youth under pressure (3.1), unable to think critically (3.2) and passive (3.4)*
- *Better equipped for challenges in the past (3.3)*
- **H5: Patriarchy is alive and well in CH**
- **H6: Restoring superiority through increased masculinity/inferiority of others**

Finding 4: Loss of trust due to polarization/"populism"

- *Current political actors are 'ideologically' driven/opportunistic (4.1)*
- *Youth is manipulated into ideology (4.2) presenting threat to democracy (4.3)*
- **H7: Political polarization is associated with lack of policy options and decline of democracy**
- **H8: Democracy is seen as in danger but trust in polity is still present (just not politics/policy).**

Finding 5: Equality incomplete, feminism divisive

- *Gender equality is seen as positive change (5.1), yet incomplete (5.5) and confusing (5.2)*
- *Feminism and queerness is rejected based on antifeminist narratives (5.3, 5.4)*
- *Patriarchy is 'outsourced' to Muslims (5.6)*
- **H9: Antifeminism is disconnected from lived grievances thus 'twisted' import**

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Finding 0 (atmosphere): Participants in the men's and women's group differ on the ways in which they assess societal problems in line with gender socialization expectations

The women's and men's group differ significantly in terms of both the tone of the interactions and the preferred type of arguments. In the men's group, most of the statements are left in a vacuum, whereby there is limited or no reaction from other participants to the previous statement. Instead, participants often seem to react to a fragment of the statement or specific term to then offer their own opinion on

it without however clearly indicating how this in their mind relates to the previous argument. In the women's group in turn there is more active interaction, whereby participants spend more time on discussing and debating a particular issue.

Women's reactions also tend to be more focused on their personal experiences. They often emphasize their own confusion at the state of things "I simply don't understand it" (Women's Group), while men's statements are generally more confident claims about broader structures, large-scale changes, and causal relations. This observation is generally in line with expected gender socialization about active listening among women and dominant speech acts among men.

Hypothesis 0: This pattern relates to men's need to convey expertise instead of share vulnerability, which in turn might be connected to a stronger sense of loss of control (see Finding 2). This sense of (epistemic) loss could potentially be related to an increased susceptibility to far-right narratives and grievances.

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Finding 1: Rather than gender status loss, participants discuss status loss in socio-economic financial and educational terms – especially for future generations.

Finding 1.1: They (especially the male participants) explicitly reference **(late-stage) capitalism** as a problem (and as something that is distinct from the (more positive) way in which they grew up. This is true even for those participants who praise Trump and call for "Switzerland first". This established dichotomy between the past and present has the interesting implication that youth are perceived as unable to critically engage with capitalism and identify the problem correctly (because they grew up within it), which presents a challenge to pathways towards solutions (connected to Finding 3).

It's [...] the issue of capitalism that young people can't or don't yet differentiate between. Social injustice, the rich getting richer, the poor remaining poor or being fleeced. This no longer has anything to do with democracy, it is the capitalist system that is slowly coming to an end, because there is not much more credit that can be created. (Men's Group)

...My point was not that we have to listen to the Americans...we have gone along with process optimization and market orientation, and so on. We realize we are reaching a limit" (Men's Group)

Finding 1.2: Part of this problem is the **loss of values of community but also labor protection and good treatment of workers** which was better in the past, while today's business landscape is portrayed as a depersonalized financial market. However, this is not ascribed to unions but to personal value systems of employers.

...my grandfather had a rust bucket of a vehicle, but he had a factory. He never changed the car. He never changed the boot. He had it sewn. He gave everything for the place. For his employees, for his development, for the business to grow. So that my father could take it over, etc., etc. That was the corporate culture back then. When I look at my cousin today, who took over the company, it's totally different. This investment across the entire planet, without any connections to it, i.e. personalisation or personal commitment of his money, has simply been lost. It's all done through banks and things like that. And that used to be different. (Men's Group)

Old entrepreneurs...may have invested in their employees' housing, in sewerage system...They do not do that anymore. They take the money, invest it in a property company somewhere in China and we don't see any of that money here (Men's Group)

And the patron might have built flats or houses. I remember my hometown. Someone there built several houses to house his people. And today nobody looks after accommodation anymore (Men's Group)

Finding 1.3: Participants are criticizing **economic inequality and unequal wealth distribution** and rising prices, which lead to **precarity and a lack of socio-economic mobility** for young people.

The young, that's the first generation to be born into a higher level of prosperity than they will leave. So, they basically, most of them, only have a downward trend. And something else that has actually remained the same compared to the past is that while we now have more consumer power to buy all kinds of gadgets, for 70% of people who suddenly have to make an emergency payment of CHF 5,000 more, the budget for the year is not enough. And it is also interesting to note that in Switzerland we have a wealth distribution similar to that after the Second World War. Our wealth distribution today corresponds to the percentage wealth distribution after the Second World War. And globally, we still have the same structure as at the time of the Congress of Vienna. In other words, the development, now in terms of finances and wealth, is very clear, i.e. it is very one-sided and has actually remained with those who had it 200 years ago. (Men's Group)

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No, the rents, the rents have gone up, because that's, er, my parents still paid 150 francs, right. [INDISTINCT 52:07-52:10], but it's crazy how it's going up. And if the pensions and the pension fund don't keep up, then it will slowly become difficult with the health insurance and the increasingly rising rents. Then you won't have any more affordable flats. (Women's Group)

So, I'm afraid for our children as far as the Pension Fund and the AHV are concerned. At the moment, everything is going down instead of up. And they have to make extreme savings. They have to make sure that they can afford a little something in old age. Or not even be able to afford to simply maintain their living situation, their existence. (Women's Group)

Finding 1.4: There is also a critique of **insufficient support for lower-income workers** (especially in the women's group where the average income of participants is comparatively lower, as captured by the post-discussion questionnaire), who have been paying into the system but do not receive enough benefits. This is particularly criticized with regards to the pension system.

... someone who comes here, works here, maybe works for 4 or 5 years, then stops and then receives supplementary benefits because their income isn't enough. And I, who have paid in for 45 years or 40 years, can simply have to [INDISTINCT 39:39-39:42] because of maybe 150 francs that I have too much. And I never got a childcare voucher, I was never able to deduct health insurance premiums because I was always just above. (Women's Group)

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Importantly, in the women's group (different from the men's group) the anger at this is directed more towards other recipients of social benefits (unemployed, non-married couples, migrants, etc.) than at the system itself, thus creating resonance for 'twisting'.

Yes, or that those who slip into retirement age in cohabitation have the same pension as married couples. I don't care where the

equality is, but simply that there is equality in this area (Women's Group)

Finding 1.5: Gender comes up in this context as connected to **neoliberal pressures on children**. While gender equality is generally perceived as better than in the past (progress), there is a sense of working moms experiencing a 'social stress'. The demand is for caretakers to have the opportunity to work less and spend more time with the family. This is, on the one hand, in line with expectations of – to some extent – valorizing a traditional model of single-income family. However, the loss of this model is clearly connected to the 'social stress' and **not to a critique of women's empowerment as such**. In that sense, this is surprisingly in line with a feminist critique of neoliberal pressures on families and women in particular.

So the fact that the children have to go to school so early is also the reason that the parents, and especially the mothers, are back on the labour market as quickly as possible ... One would actually like to be in business, which is a good thing. On the other hand, who is there for these children? (Women's Group)

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Well, I also think that everything is organised in such a way that the mothers, I'll say now, can get back into the workforce as quickly as we can, pay into the overall system again. And the parents who don't want to do that, or women, if they can, ... get a funny look. At first they say, what are you doing for a living? And when you say housewife and mum. I see. So, it's like nothing, right? And it's not even paid. So, even there, as a mum, you are screwed. You're neither on one side nor on the other and actually do a lot more on balance. And afterwards, how should I put it, you're not even appreciated. And there should be a little more support for those who want to stay home. (Women's Group)

My father was still very much an entrepreneur. He worked a lot. I rarely saw him. ... If I talk or think from his point of view now, then of course I can see that he's retired now, over 70, and needs to catch up with the family. Now the family is busy, everyone has to work. That's a pickle. That's why the current system isn't so fundamentally wrong. But the fact that everyone has to be 100% busy, mum, dad and the child has day school and the school is completely absorbed and you do your homework somewhere with tutoring and so on, that's too much, it can't work. So this balance needs to be redressed to some extent so that a mother has the opportunity to work part-time, even in higher-paid jobs. Not just as a dental assistant or in a secretarial role. Or even equal opportunities, that somewhere, yes job sharing is a keyword today, which tends exactly in this direction. That should be promoted politically so that a healthy relationship can be re-established somewhere, in order to protect children, to take responsibility, to teach children manners and morals, discipline and determination. (Men's Group)

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Well, just from me. I have children because I wanted to enjoy them too. And no matter how you divide it up with your partner or whatever, I also want time with the children and don't want to train them to be ready at 4 and that stresses me out. (Women's Group)

I think people feel guilty these days. That's why you give the children everything or do everything. Because you don't have enough time, because you're stressed. Because you actually want more time but can't, for various reasons (Women's Group)

Hypothesis 1: Participants feel increasing economic pressures (especially on younger generations), which they (to some extent) identify as effects of the neoliberal economic system. They also identify as privileged (rather than

marginalized) vis-a-vis future generations and are worried about this privilege disappearing for their descendants. The fact that they are 'seeing' this, but are not providing solutions/mentioning solutions provided to them could mean that there is no party that offers solutions outside of this discourse.

Policy implications: there could be a potential to mobilize RWPP-voters around a (democratic) opposition to the negative impacts of neoliberalism on a) family (as in women's group on childcare and the pressure for women to work) and b) wellbeing (social stress as raised in both groups).

Finding 2: Participants express a sense of confusion, unease, and disorientation at the current 'complexities' of social and political life as overarching feeling in current society.

Finding 2.1: A lot of the discussion revolves around changes and complexities of modern life, which are expressed in a combination of **bureaucratization, technocratization, digitalization and globalization**, all of which are associated with a loss of clarity in terms of knowledge and identity, and with a lot of energy and resources that need to be invested in daily life.

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So going from having very few options, not even being allowed to leave the country and actually being regularly threatened with death, suddenly getting out and then at some point the next generation suddenly having so many options that they are no longer able to make decisions. That's the big change. (Men's Group)

"I have called it social stress now, but there are other keywords that tend into that direction" (Men's Group)

That's what I mean by too much paperworks. Because in all places, if you want something, you actually have everything, but then when you want something or need something, the doors always close or they say: "Well, that's the law, we can't do anything". But if you fight and do things, then everything gets through. But it takes so much energy (Women's Group)

Finding 2.2: This increasing complexity is juxtaposed with **a simpler image of the past**, which is based on a dual image of more physical hardship (and to some extent also social pressures, e.g., to be 'Christian'/obey (Women's Group)) paired with a more clear-cut identity and role in life. In the Men's Group, a similar dichotomy is painted of the (simpler, more value-oriented) countryside and the (fast-paced, more technologically advanced, indecent) cities, signaling that the divide between these (social) spaces is perceived by citizens and associated with an advance in technologization and urbanization.

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I can talk about my youth. I lived through a bit of the Second World War. But today you have more personal responsibility than you had back then. I'm just thinking of the simple example of health insurance. You didn't have to think about anything. You just went to a health insurance company and that was that. Today, if I were working, I could no longer do the maths, where is the best option? Do I have to change here now, do I have to go there? I couldn't do that anymore (Men's Group)

"... I am not saying we have it better in the countryside. We have other problems. We sometimes don't know how to deal with each other, out of respect and discipline. The problem is a bit of a mixture here in Switzerland. (Men's Group)

What I also think, in the past, I don't know now, but today you have individualism, don't you? I have so many things I could do after

work. Or sport or reading or painting or something completely abstract. In the past, you just had your things, got up in the morning, went to bed in the evening because you couldn't stand it anymore and were done. (Women's Group)

Finding 2.3: At the same time, there is also an emphasis on the **past knowledge as insufficient** to counter the challenges of today, including for challenges of digitalization, technology and social welfare systems, where there is a feeling that Switzerland is lagging behind. Thus, there is frustration at the lack of available solutions, as politicians are themselves **confused and thus making opportunistic choices** and refusing to bear the responsibility to reduce such complexity, by taking decisions and define clear rules that can inform citizens' behavior. This is heightened by a feeling of their own (old) knowledge as somewhat powerless, both due to being somewhat outdated but also due to being overlooked and undervalued, contributing to a growing frustration and confusion.

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Simply also with the daycare centre and everything, that you don't somehow take 20, 30, 40-year-old rules and think that the rules still have to be the same now. We should be able to adapt much more to the way things are at the moment. (Women's Group)

But the problem is that things are moving so fast that the experience you had 20 years ago is no longer relevant today (Men's Group).

...I think you have to say that the sheer mass of tasks that politicians are faced with today is of course much greater. Everything happens faster, everything is much, much more extensive...[and for this reason] today we have a system that everyone relies on somebody else...politicians have lost the depth of the subject

matter they have to deal with. And that is why there are so many decisions that follow the mainstream". (Men's Group)

...and everything is non-binding, it is no longer correct, it is constantly being revised and with digitalization, new ideas are constantly being introduced ... there are thousands of names (Men's Group)

everyone has an idea, but nobody wants to take responsibility. And that starts when you cross the road, when the traffic light is red. You have to stop. And this is what I teach my children and it is getting more and more difficult (Men's Group)

Finding 2.4: The rising complexity and related feeling of **confusion, disorientation and frustration** it produces, is also related to the **opening of the (local/national) identity to the outside (globalization)**. This 'opening' is twofold, encompassing both **macro issues** – related to the power dynamics at the institutional level – and **micro issues** – related to the influx of different groups. Both aspects appear to cause a **loss of control over matters that are key to the Swiss identity**, but in two different ways.

On the **macro, institutional issues, emphasized mostly in the Men's Group**, concerns are directed toward other (mostly Western) powers, e.g., the US, the EU, Germany, perceived as imposing on Switzerland **hyper-complex, hyper-bureaucratic** systems. In line with a long-standing history of anti-EU rhetoric and policy driven by SVP, the EU especially is portrayed as the ultimate oppressor of a (powerless) Switzerland – despite Switzerland not being part of the EU. The institution is given a certain personality as participants seem to construct an (almost anticolonial) image of an all-powerful dominating entity (empire)

disrespectful of culture, tradition, and local knowledge. While participants praise Swiss independence (as not a member state), they blame the Swiss Parliament (“those people in Bern”) as passive and not sufficiently resistant, just tacitly accepting and copy-pasting the regulations provided by the EU into the Swiss system, without clearly communicating this to the people.

...there are ready-made European laws that are simply presented [ratified?] one-to-one. But, at the same time, back here in Bern, every last person [politicians?] is saying <<Ahhh, I am against Europe>> (Men’s Group)

The concept of a *political Europe* (embodied by the EU) is contrasted by a more favorable and supported concept of *ethno-geographical Europe*, united by a set of values deemed vital for Swiss people (e.g., democracy). In this latter vision, Switzerland stands **equal** to other countries and groups which share (undefined) common goals.

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If people in Switzerland think they can solve it on their own, I’m very much of the opinion that that’s wrong. We should certainly prioritize, I agree with that, but we should finally look beyond our own backyard. I am in favour of Europe, not in a political sense but in a geographical sense. As long as Europe does not organize itself properly now, we will have many problems. And that includes Switzerland. (Men’s Group)

On the **micro, individual issues**, emphasized in both groups the problematic ‘outside’ influence is associated with groups of people coming from outside Europe – or, even when originally from within European borders, perceived as far from Swiss values and ethnic identity. This narrative is clearly **supremacist**,

nativist and racist, as it is against the fundamental right of equality between all people and maintains a **moral superiority of Swiss values and lifestyle** that need to be “protected” from such outsiders. The need for protection is explained through the use of technical and economic language, that tries to make these stances look more legitimate, while heightening their dehumanizing nature.

if we have more people, we need more space. That's a burden again, ...it will be more expensive ...That's simply a connection. You can take a lot of people in, but then you also have to pay the price (Men's Group)

And on the other hand, migration. We have so many people who only cost us money. You can't underestimate that, migration costs a lot. You never hear how much it costs. (Women's Group)

Although the views toward migration and migrants seem to be shared (i.e., it is a problematic phenomenon, and these people are more of a burden than a resource for Switzerland), the underlying reasoning for this conclusion appears slightly different between the two groups. Indeed, while the Men's group depict the issue as a problem of insubordination toward and disrespect of the rules established and shared by Swiss people – therefore, a ‘matter of principles’ – in the Women's group the sentiment seems to be rather oriented toward the repercussion that migrants' alleged behavior has on other individuals – making it a matter of security.

Hypothesis 2: Participants see the system changing for the worse and in decline. This (rather than concrete policies) is why they vote for populist parties because they mirror that affective **fear of a dystopian future**. However, in line with previous research on affective functions of populist and far-right discourses (e.g. Wodak

2015) these parties also do not provide any solutions which keeps the feeling of fear of the future in place (or even heightens it) but allows it to turn into anger.

Hypothesis 3: The discourse about the **past and present knowledge systems** (especially) exposes a sense of both superiority (especially men's group) and unease (both) with their own inability to understand/assess or solve current challenges. There is a dominant association of this unease with unknown 'outside forces' (migration, regulation, technocratization). In the absence of solutions/ a clear national narrative about these processes, the appropriate reaction to this fear of the unknown (outside) for participants is a **return to a more closed, controllable, familiar environment/community and value system.**

Hypothesis 4: The issue of **migration** (regardless of its actual effect on individual experiences) serves as an outlet for a combination of these grievances, as migrants are easily identified as 'outsiders'. RWPP present migration regulation as a solution to 'turn back the tide' on the changing times and promise a reduced complexity. The problem thus becomes **twisted into an issue of migration to provide a false solution** (represented in the economistic technical rhetoric already adopted by participants).

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Policy implication: Participants are lost in the complexities and feel that they cannot keep up. Their knowledge feels disconnected from politics (and the political expertise and decision-making process). Policymakers should more clearly communicate their rationales including the benefits of regulations. Decision-making should be more clearly accessible to laymen. Given research insights into the role of affective politics (as more mobilizing than rational explanations), what is needed is a clearly accessible 'national' narrative that emphasizes positive affects such as e.g. hope, trust and community for how

Switzerland navigates the complexities in collaboration with/rather than against other actors. The prerequisite for this is a clearly communicated understanding that complexities of a globalized world in combination with neoliberal pressures and a decreasing socio-economy mobility do/can indeed present challenges in everyday life.

Finding 3: Participants have a double imagery of younger generations who are somehow perceived as victims (because of what the 'new' systems impose on them) and culprit (because of their lack / wrong type of response to the problems created by the system) at the same time. **Participants use gendered language regarding the values of the past (masculinized, rational, strict, disciplined) and present (feminized, weak, irrational, easily manipulated, passive) but do not conceive of them in gendered terms.**

Finding 3.1. Young people are perceived as under a lot of pressure, which is connected to the increasingly complex drive for standardization and bureaucratization of the education system under modernity, which puts a lot of competitive pressures and requirements on young people to fit a certain model which does not apply to all and disregards their individuality (see also Finding 2).

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I think because of the children, they are put into the system far too early. So, I think that all of us who are in here could still be children. We could still play and let off steam. And today, children are put into a grid. If they can't do that, then it's no good, it will be medically checked. Do they go to speech therapy, or do they go to social therapy? I think that's crazy. I feel very sorry for today's children. (Women's Group)

But that's the other thing again. If you look at the children, they also have too much on their plate. Not only because of what they get from outside,

but also because of what they are challenged with. With school, with all the pressure. (Women's Group)

Finding 3.2: In both groups, participants discuss the role of the school system, whereby the discussion revolves around two aspects of critical thinking skills as well as individuality. In the men's group this is portrayed as a problem for the market economy and competitiveness, while in the women's group there is more focus on supporting children and helping them feel less stressed as well as alleviating pressures for families.

"...we hold back the elites instead of promoting them...and our market is not the neighboring village or those who they go to school with. The competition today is for some super jobs [which are] advertised internationally...we need to promote and retain competencies (Men's Group)

So either it's stressful when you realise that it's too much for certain things, when you don't have enough support, but only selectively, and yes, for the other children, depending on the situation, you send them a year ahead. Maybe from year one to year two. But I don't really think that's good either (Women's Group)

Finding 3.2: There is a **positive image** of the past as both more decent and rewarding of certain hard-working values. This is coupled with a stance whereby young people are perceived as less disciplined, less respectful. It is here unclear if **this is perceived as an effect of or reason for the problems they are facing.**

On the one hand, this freedom [enjoyed by younger generations if compared to the older ones] is wonderful and gives them lots of opportunities to develop. But on the other hand, as a father who

grew up in Switzerland, where, let me just say, there was more discipline and fewer opportunities, you learnt that you had to struggle your way through it, you had to achieve something, whether you were dyslexic or not, and you had to have the same career, whether you were a loser at school or not, you also found a way through an apprenticeship, and you also found your way, you learnt to deal with weakness, because there were certain orders and certain rules. (Men's Group)

That's why I think today's young people are simply spoilt. Even if it's not work. Sometimes they don't have the necessary decency. So I mean, my boy says to the teacher in fourth grade: "Hello". And if you say, no, you don't say "hello", you say "Grüezi", then he says: "everyone says "hello"". That's also something like that. Anyway. Just a bit of common decency. (Women's Group)

And last time I discussed the disrespect of today's children with my daughter. That's sometimes worrying. And it would be nice if people had a little more respect for their elders. (Women's Group)

Finding 3.3: Young people are perceived as too apolitical and passive, which is connected to them being oriented too much to international communities rather than local democratic activism. The 'new' media (i.e., social media) are seen as at least partially responsible for this as they present an obstacle for new generations to engage actively in the life and politics of the country, as they are a form of distraction from reality and the actual potential for change an individual can have there (connected to Finding 5). Thus, social media gets perceived as a danger to

democracy which is in turn understood to be a particular Swiss (or at least European) value and achievement.

...Young people no longer feel Swiss, they no longer feel European, they feel part of some community on a sub-channel, on Instagram. And they defend this community. They are members of this community. They start to define themselves by that and ignore the bigger picture" (Men's Group)

"...And by the time they are as old as we are today, I can see that they're not to be envied...and it amazes me all the more that they are no longer interested in politics when they are at the municipal level...There is nothing better, more direct, more democratic to understand than a municipality assembly, a physical one (Men's Group)

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"...so, that is the biggest danger for me...70% of under-30s no longer believe in democratic structures. And if this opinion continues, in 20 years' time, around 2050...we can pack up our things all over Europe" (Men's Group)

Young people today are constantly bombarded by the new media ...There is certainly a great deal of potential distraction there, so perhaps people are simply no longer bored and want to take part in community events...and realize that reality and my voice count for something. I can contribute and help shape it" (Men's Group)

Finding 3.4: While these attributes clearly mirror gendered stereotypes and binaries (public-private, passive-active, weak-strong, irrational-rational,

disciplined-undisciplined), remarkably they are not interpreted in explicitly gendered ways by participants. The only exception being one participant in the men's group referring to military service as a positive potential option for women to make them more disciplined. Yet this is not further discussed and is not connected to the discussion about youth and changes in educational systems.

Hypothesis 5: Participants identify with masculine-stereotyped values (hard-working, tough, disciplined) as positive imagery of the past while rejecting attributes typically associated with femininity (passive, weak, irrational, naive) as part of the current society **but do not think about those in clearly gendered terms, indicating that gender stereotypes in Switzerland are still so ingrained** that they present a natural avenue for participants to view generations and social relations through them. This could potentially present a challenge to far-right narratives about the destructive nature of feminism as it makes it harder to make the case that feminism has destroyed the stereotypical gender order.

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Hypothesis 6: At the same time, the dynamic of reacting to a perceived inferiority and decline in one's own epistemic status (in the sense of one's own knowledge becoming less valued) with a persistent feeling of superiority over others (young, women, minorities) has been described in the feminist literature on male entitlement and misogyny (Manne 2018; Connell/Messerschmidt 2005). While thus this narrative is not (yet) openly/explicitly gendered, it is where there is potential for (far-right) discourses to 'twist' (in particular male) voters through gendered narratives exists.

Policy Implication: What is needed is more early feminist education on positive modern masculinity, gender equality and gender identity and self-worth.

Finding 4: Participants confirm the 'loss of trust' thesis mentioned in the literature as they describe political actors (politicians, media, activists) per se as problematic (on all sides), polarizing and dangerous to democracy. They clearly position themselves against both populism and ideology, which are seen as tools deployed by "...various parties to achieve their goals". Ideology is seen as something that does not let you go to the core of the issues, to discuss the actual (complex) causes of phenomena (connection to Finding 2).

Finding 4.1: The mistrust is directed at different types of actors including **activists**, the **media**, **international institutions (EU)**, but also **politicians** in general, which are seen as 'ideologically' driven and 'populist'.

"That the political parties are stuck in their positions and we have forgotten how to find a consensus. And what also plays a role in this, if I may make a very brief comment, is of course the press. And the press is constantly looking for people to attack, we haven't really moved beyond the Middle Ages, when we also burned witches. And today they simply try to expose, erh or denigrate politicians. And I think that's one of the main reasons why people today no longer have the guts or the courage to take a stand." (Men's group)

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That's what I want from politics, from the left and the right. And not always, not always, this left versus right, right? But more consensus-oriented. There are both sides. There's a left side and there's a right side. That's what I find very, very difficult about our politics in Switzerland. Always the left versus the right. And also, the pushing.
(Women's Group)

But what the media make of it afterwards is quite (...) No, it's what destroys our cohesion afterwards. (Women's Group)

Finding 4.2: This **divisive** influence of political actors is perceived as a generational issue whereby especially young people aren't able to tell who can be trusted (connects to Finding 3). Ideology is seen as something detaching young people from reality, as it does not portrait and deal with the real world, but only an idealized version of it, where extreme changes are achievable without consequences. This is often discussed in a paternalistic manner, alluding to the fact that young people are still immature and so are easily manipulated (as opposed to the more mature participants).

"...the ideological madness...the young, who are not yet stabilized or have not yet experienced the stabilization, are now being influenced by Greta Thunberg and so on...but the fact that...the public will have to bear the costs [of the ecological transition] ...is something nobody is telling you yet" (Men's Group)

Social media in this context plays a big role and is immediately connected to youngsters, who are used to this nowadays because they are always on social media, where there is "pure populism" and "there is no normal language ... anymore" (Men's Group). Moreover, media are particularly pernicious because "the influencers aren't [teenagers], but the customers are", establishing a link to a capitalist logic of profit-orientation of media (Finding 1), which leads to a brainwashing of people.

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"... the newspaper has to sell. So I want something that interests people. And the more headlines, the better it sells" (Men's Group)

At the same time, participants also acknowledge that they themselves find it difficult to assess their options given that there is no authority figure/institution that is considered trustworthy. Thus connecting this problem to the issue of an increasingly confusing society (see Finding 2).

“Where I see a particular problem is with all the fake news we have today. Even for those of us who have learnt history, some of whom have also studied it, we can still reference back, look at it today, over our thumbs, we can then take it, then the influence and the speed, because time has just got faster, the information that comes in, is extremely difficult even for us to see what is what”. (Men’s Group)

But you keep hearing both. You hear that you can save on it, that it won’t last as long. And then a politician says the exact opposite. I can’t get wrap my head around it. Which is true. Exactly the opposite. There’s enough money in the AHV and who knows what. Or you hear that you have to save money and it won’t last for so many decades. (Women’s Group)

Finding 4.3: Different from other far-right discourses this understanding of ideological polarization is considered foremost as an issue at the level of politics and as a threat to democracy rather than to ones’ own identity/way of life/status (connects to Finding 6 and Finding 1). This challenges thus the idea of ‘affective polarization’ whereby people feel more connected to members of the political party they vote for rather than those of the opposing party, as participants express a general mistrust towards ‘politicians’ and see their peers more at the local, communal level, which they fear is shrinking.

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The party system we have here is fantastic. I would never give that away. I think there can be a 40 per cent share of the vote. And yet you can never have a majority on your own and govern alone. That’s the big advantage here in Switzerland. And also the fact that we can vote on what we don’t like. (Women’s Group)

Hypothesis 7: Instead of affective polarization, participants see a political polarization (of parties and other actors) based on estrangement from the

population (and an orientation towards abroad, internet, media (see Finding 2, 3)), which they make responsible for the lack of available solutions for crucial issues from political actors (e.g., migration, energy, limited resources). Their grievance is thus a sense of a lack of actual policy options and a perception of politics as stuck in political struggles (and media coverage) rather than out to seek political compromise and working policies.

Hypothesis 8: The strong identification with the Swiss democracy as part of the national identity is related to the Swiss system rooted in more direct democracy and the strong national discourse that emphasizes this as a special aspect of superiority to other countries.

Policy implication: Democratic parties should work on clearly communicating positive solutions for political issues rather than engaging in the populist blame-game. This could potentially help to disengage voters from RWPP by actively challenging the populist political discourse rather than engaging in it and focusing more on emphasizing democratic processes.

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Finding 5: Feminism is considered as part of a turn towards divisive and polarizing politics. However, this is not reflected in the discussion of problems and perpetrators at all but only comes up when prompted.

Finding 5.1: On the one hand, participants in both groups highlight the positive societal changes occurring in the last century and specifically highlight equal rights for women and women's suffrage as an essential move towards a more open and pluralistic society.

One of the main reasons [of improvement] in the last 50 years has certainly been equal rights for women and women's

suffrage...Women and their way of looking at things have clearly entered society. It has become more pluralistic and more open. Before we had patriarchal solutions, and we went through them...there was all the army and military spending (Men's Group)

Unlike in the past. We didn't have that for a long time. When I became an adult, I got the right to vote. That was just around that time, shortly before (Women's Group)

Finding 5.2: On the other hand, these changes are also connected to the increasing confusion and disorientation based on the increasing choices of ways of life in modern society (see Finding 2) as people break out from their previously assigned pathways. As such, gender equality is perceived as part of the general duality of increasingly complex chaos (future) and simple clear-cut (binary) past.

... Today we have the luxurious option of being able to change jobs every three years to have a bit more money and a bit more Gucci bags...That certainly wasn't the case in the past. Ergo, someone had to go to work, and someone had to watch at home. And this division has also completely broken down, because with women's suffrage and equal rights ... women wanted to work more and more. And that's right, they should also have these market opportunities so that they can gain a foothold in a job somewhere or stay on the ball. But the healthy balance has been completely lost (Men's Group)

Today. And yet sometimes you get the feeling that she's doing this, he's doing that, they're doing that. And me? I just do my family things and then I don't feel like going to bed in the evening. And

then you start thinking again. Hm, maybe I should have someone to look after the children. Yes, but how would that work? And financially? Does that make me selfish? Yes, no. Aren't you? You have to do something for yourself sometimes. I want to do something for myself sometimes. Sometimes you just have too much. (Women's Group)

"..the hierarchical order, as I understood my father, was sometimes easier for him than the freedom we have today" (Men's Group)

A nursery school teacher in Switzerland, who (...) I actually overheard yesterday, said: "Look, you're a girl today, but if you want to be a boy tomorrow, that's okay too." The children are completely overwhelmed. I thought I'd tell them that too. But simply with sensitivity and not with a hammer. And again, we're back to the topic of family. I think the current issue is how you can provide even more protection for the family when the child simply doesn't want it. (Women's Group)

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Finding 5.3: While this comes up only rarely, there is a strong rejection by several participants of queerness in regard to both the LGBTQIA+ movement, as they seem to keep on demanding rights even though they have obtained already so much (and by doing so they actually cause more discrimination toward them, in a sort of 'reverse causality' twist) (Men's Group), as well as the perceived sexualization of children through sexuality and gender identity education (Women's Group).

"... now I have to say that there are of course certain movements, such as the LGBTQI plus, which in the end just really upset me because they have actually achieved a great deal. And instead of

being satisfied, they always demand more and more. And that actually leads back to the fresh discrimination that they themselves trigger.” (Men’s Group)

Finding 5.4: There is a strong rejection of feminism (as a movement). This is based on a combination of a variety of very typical antifeminist narratives whereby feminism is at once too naive and idealistic, no longer needed (postfeminism) as well as immensely powerful as it threatens to erase the difference between men and women (a misunderstood postmodern feminism) and/or leads to a polarization between men and women because of its perceived ‘radical’ communication style (a vilification of feminism).

Equality in the sense of equal opportunities, equal earning potential, equal social recognition...very much so. But if we try to erase the difference between the sexes and do things like that, would all be the same. Then we take away an incredible amount of excitement from our culture and the meaning of our lives and create a completely boring society. We need to love people for their differences. We have to love women because they are different. We have to love black people because they have a different culture. We have to love the Chinese because they are Chinese and they have their own culture and not because we are all the same (Men’s Group)

... these women [i.e., feminists] sometimes have very strange ideas about how things are... That’s just going too far. It has nothing to do with feminism, nothing to do with equality, and nothing to do with anything. It also has nothing to do with discrimination. It simply has

to do with the fact that expectations and realities are so far apart... And nobody brings them down. I'm no longer allowed to tell anyone that that is rubbish" (Men's Group)

"... if you shout out <<feminism, feminism>>... Then we have the problem that we no longer listen to each other and ... we won't find the solution if we do it that way... my tip for feminism in this case would be for feminists to communicate these points properly and not just shout out that they are doing badly. Because as a less educated person, I sometimes have the feeling when I open the newspaper <<oh no, not again, next page>>. Because I don't want to deal with it at all, because it annoys me so much.... but the point is that you should perhaps shout out a little less about everything in life and maybe listen to the other person and then look for solutions" (Men's Group)

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It's no longer a togetherness. It's no longer at eye level with male-female. It's just feminine and taking off somewhere. For me. I can't give you a specific example right now, but. (Women's Group)

It's like a counter-effect. The men ruled us. We weren't allowed to go to work because they were the boss, as fully unhealthy. And now it's just swinging to the other side. Where men are the last and the worst and it would be best if they didn't exist at all. I just don't think that's right. (Women's Group)

I think in the past it would have been much more common for women to go on strike than it is now. Then they would have had more reason to fight back or something. But now that we can talk

to each other, I don't think that would be necessary. So now the women come here with their things, with their posters and so on. That's (...) theatre. (Women's Group)

Finding 5.5: At the same time, there is acknowledgement that there is still gender **inequality** that needs to be addressed. Participants can easily come up with a variety of topics, including violence against women, socialized pressures, family labor distribution, etc.

But the other thing is that we, too, are still a long way from being able to take for granted what a man takes for granted. So the man is more likely to say, "I'm leaving, I'll be back. Ah, what have you got? Ah yes, exactly that. And we women, we plan it far in advance and then we say, I'll be back later. I'll be back here then. Right? (Women's Group)

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Finding 5.6: To square this, some participants (especially in the Women's group) emphasize that these are more pronounced in migrant communities, which serves to assert Swiss superiority in terms of gender equality, which is in line with previous research.

but it's the Muslims who, in God's name, are very focused on men. And who can't assert their rights as women because of the man (Women's Group)

That's another step back, exactly. Many are simply still at home, end of story, cut off from the outside world. (Women's Group)

Hypothesis 9: The fact that the rejection of feminism is rather an afterthought while there is also generally support for women's empowerment and gender

equality changes, could mean that the understanding of feminism as ideology is likely an 'import' of US/German 'twisted' antifeminist narratives/coverage rather than actual engagement and experiences of feminism and gender status loss.

Summary Suggestion: Overall, the findings indicate that there is a discrepancy between problem awareness and available (valid) solutions in regard to both gender and economic pressures:

- Participants are aware of remaining oppressive gender norms and challenges but do not see feminism as a solution (see Finding 5).
- Participants are aware of neoliberal pressures (capitalism, standardization, stress) but do not see socialist/anticapitalist/left-wing politics as a solution (see Finding 1).
- Participants are aware of polarization/populism as a problem for societal cohesion but do not consider democratic parties' politics or civil society activism as a solution (see Finding 4)
- Participants are aware of their own privilege vis-à-vis younger people but do not feel like they are in a position to change this situation – instead they see the responsibility for this with the younger generations (see Finding 1 and 3)
- Participants are aware of the rising complexity, bureaucratization and administration but do not see the standard-setting of the EU as a solution (but rather as part of the problem) (see Finding 2)

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Due to the lack of solutions, they fall back into systemic explanations or the other way round: because they are unable to picture a vision outside of the system, they are incapable of visualizing solutions. Therefore, they fall back into

neoliberal arguments (demand/supply), patriarchal values and stereotypes (respect, women talk etc.), and democratic local politics and values.

Denmark

Untwist Deliverable 2.3. – National Paper Denmark

Colm Flaherty, Katrine Ploug Pedersen, and Laura Horn, February 2024

TONE AND NARRATIVE IN THE GROUPS

In Denmark, we conducted four different focus groups at different locations throughout the country. Each focus group consisted of either three or four individuals, as late cancellations due to sickness and no-shows meant that we had fewer participants than we had planned for. In general, the tone in our focus groups was friendly, supportive, and open. The participants appeared to enjoy the chance to discuss societal and political topics with others bearing similar political understandings, and there were few conflicts or arguments during our discussions.

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Our first focus group took place in a small town, located within commuting distance of Copenhagen. This focus group consisted of three female participants, two of whom were in their mid- 50s while the third was a retiree in her late 70s. The tone in the group was open and friendly, although the participants noted at the end of the group that they would also have enjoyed the chance to discuss these issues with individuals who had different political opinions as well. Initially, the participants focused on welfare services in Denmark, arguing that the healthcare system in Denmark was in poor shape, and suggesting that Denmark is not doing enough to take care of Danish people, particularly regarding homelessness

and elder care. The participants believed that there is a loneliness epidemic in Denmark and suggested that technological developments in society such as mobile phones and social media have made individuals less socially competent and unable to handle conflict or interact face-to-face. In addition to loneliness, the participants also discussed stress, suggesting that something has happened in Danish society that has created more stress for the younger generations, although they did also suspect that some people might be using stress as an excuse to avoid having to work.

A general theme throughout the group was a focus on generational differences. The participants believed that the younger generations in Danish society had different approaches to family, the labor market, and education. Another overarching theme in the group dealt with the participants' views on immigration and immigrants. The participants believe that Denmark is receiving too many immigrants who have different approaches to life than Danes, particularly in terms of religion, and suggested that Denmark should have stricter immigration laws and harsher criminal punishments. Finally, the participants also contrasted the views of immigrants on families with the common Danish view, suggesting that immigrants tend to have bigger, more extended families than

the traditional Danish nuclear family. The participants also felt that the nuclear family in Denmark was perhaps not strong enough today to hold things together for individuals and noted that men and women have at least slightly different gender roles than they have had in the past. The participants however did not view this as problematic, and neither wished to nor believed it was possible to return to the past in terms of gender

dynamics.

Our second focus group took place in a medium-sized Danish city, located in the south of Denmark. This focus group contained three male participants, two of whom were in their late 40s while the third was in his early 30s. Again, initial discussions in this group centered on the welfare state and welfare services, with the participants agreeing that the healthcare system in Denmark had worsened and that the cost and provision of dental care were outrageous. The participants also discussed the difficulties in obtaining assistance from the local authorities and the unemployment agency, suggesting that while increased control may be necessary because many individuals attempt to cheat the system, it also meant that those deserving of assistance had far more difficulty receiving aid.

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The participants also focused on the economic situation in Denmark, suggesting that many companies had left Denmark to move to countries with lower labor costs and discussing what the state could or should do to regulate the economy, noting that the state was at the mercy of large firms and corporations. The participants also noted that on the individual level, workers must be willing to move in order to improve their chances of finding a job and that the conditions for public employees had also dramatically worsened. A third theme in the group revolved around schooling and children. The participants argued that recent schooling reforms in Denmark have led to an unsustainable situation where children, and particularly children in need of extra help, cannot receive the help they need. The participants also noted that technological developments have changed

childhood and that they did not see this as a positive development. When the participants turned to the future, they suggested a need for stricter immigration laws and suggested that Denmark needed to focus more on itself and taking care of Danes. Finally, the participants discussed how men and women are inherently different, their disapproval of more than two genders, and suggested that the situation for men had worsened, particularly in terms of dating.

Moving to the third focus group, this group took place in a small city in southwestern Denmark and had four male participants. In this focus group, two participants were in their mid-40s, one in his early 50s, and one in his late 60s. The participants in the group were open and friendly, and specifically mentioned how they enjoyed the opportunity to meet and discuss with others who thought similarly. Initially, the participants focused on various aspects of the welfare state, with a primary focus on problems with healthcare, dental care, and elderly care. In these initial discussions, the participants also debated the Danish economic situation, arguing that it had worsened due to the availability of cheaper labor costs in other EU countries and suggesting that EU climate regulation had harmed the Danish economy and worsened its competitiveness. As the focus group continued, a clear theme surrounding a dislike of supra-national organizations emerged, with a particular focus on the EU. A second clear theme regarded the participants' dislike and mistrust of politicians, who they argued primarily were in politics to improve their own situations and obtain power.

A generational theme also emerged in this focus group, with the participants suggesting that younger generations had less respect for hard

work, were more consumption-oriented, and spent too much time in the digital world rather than the real world. There was also a clear nationalistic consensus in this focus group, against immigration, and against multiculturalism, with the participants going so far as to suggest that the climate problems could be solved through the occurrence of a new plague in Africa. A patriarchal consensus also developed in this focus group, as the participants suggested that women were poor workers who struggled with difficult situations and that women have many advantages in today's society, often, for example, receiving job offers because they are women rather than the most qualified candidates. A further theme in the group surrounded parenthood, with the participants discussing the difficulties they had connecting with their children and how they wished they had more time with their families. Finally, the participants discussed individuals with different genders and sexual orientations, and while they were keen to highlight that they didn't necessarily dislike or hate non-heterosexual or non-cisgender identities, they did not believe that there were more than two genders and think that individuals should keep such identities to themselves.

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Finally, our final focus group took place in a large city in the north of Denmark. This was the only group with mixed genders, consisting of two women and one man. All of the participants were in their 60s or 70s, and two of them were retirees. Again, the initial themes of the group revolved around healthcare and elderly care. It also quickly emerged that the participants believed that Danish politicians and policies were moving too quickly regarding climate change, and that politicians seldom evaluated their

actions, instead implementing reforms to gain credit, press, and prestige without thinking about the long-term effects of the reforms. Like the group in Esbjerg, the participants also discussed how they saw the role of overpopulation in climate change and suggested that plagues and epidemics may be needed. Another central focus in this group surrounded parenthood, child-rearing, and childhood. The participants did not think that parents today spent enough time with their children and also believed that there was no respect for teachers or schools. This theme also had clear gender elements, with the participants suggesting that particularly mothers did not focus on or prioritize their role as mothers enough and arguing that the parental leave system in Denmark was disadvantaging mothers, as fathers now have the right to take more parental leave.

A further theme in this discussion focused on digitalization. The participants were united in their distrust of developments in the digital world and viewed their effects as mainly negative, in terms of working life, family life, childhood, and welfare services. The participants also discussed how they believed that more needed to be done to control immigration and immigrants, arguing that Danes are being forced into giving up their traditions and culture, while immigrants make no effort to integrate or assimilate into Danish culture. Finally, the participants discussed their lack of understanding of the existence of more genders than just male and female, although they were also quick to highlight that they had no issues with individuals living in non-traditional family forms, and in fact, thought that Danes should be proud of how tolerant Danish society is.

Throughout the different groups, a number of common themes

emerged. First, all groups discussed problems with healthcare and elderly care, suggesting that the state was failing to provide adequate service in these areas. The participants in the group mainly attributed these failings to Danish politicians failing to prioritize Danes, although other explanations did exist, relating to technology, selfish politicians, and an aging population. Second, the groups all discussed the perils of technology, and viewed technological developments as primarily creating difficulties for individuals in today's society, particularly in childhood. Third, there were clear nationalistic themes in all groups, with the participants arguing for stricter immigration laws and suggesting that immigrants were creating many of the problems in Danish society. Fourth, the participants in all groups viewed men and women as inherently different, although there was less consensus on what this might mean for Danish society, or whether this meant that men and women should have different roles.

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In the all-male focus groups, there was resentment towards changes in gender relations. In the mixed and female focus groups, this did not appear in the same way, and there were more discussions on motherhood, although there was not necessarily a consensus on what motherhood should look like or be. In terms of the overall themes of the focus group, while gender was a theme, it is difficult to suggest or argue that it was the most important theme, and in imaginations of the future, there was little evidence that individuals wanted to return to a traditional past. Rather, when discussing the future, participants tended to focus on issues such as immigration, climate change, and the welfare state. In some of the groups, gender relations only began to be discussed when we asked about them,


and it is, therefore, difficult to know their relative importance for the participants, but they were not among the initial topics that participants considered or discussed.

1. CODING RESULTS

In the following section, we briefly review and discuss the results of applying the UNTWIST coding protocol to our data. All four focus group transcripts were coded in accordance with the coding protocol in the program NVivo and all figures below were similarly created in NVivo. We begin with a brief overview of the results from all the focus groups. As we can see in Figure 1, the most frequently occurring codes in our transcripts belonged to the Domains area (Code 9). Particularly, the statements of our participants most often touched upon either the welfare state or the economy, although our participants also frequently discussed family and security. Statements that dealt with either gender roles or stereotypes (Code 8) were the next most frequent occurrence, followed by statements coded as belonging to the feminism code (Code 7), utterances expressing the needs of the participants (Code 3), and remarks advocating for external solutions to gender needs and problems (Code 5). The figure also clearly demonstrates that the participants seldom discussed or attempted to define gender problems (Code 1) or categorize their gender problems or needs (Code 2). In general, the frequency of codes appears in line with what we suggested in our summaries above, namely that participants primarily discussed and focused on issues related to the welfare state and that while issues, needs, and problems relating to gender were discussed, gender was not the main

theme of the groups.

Figure 1: Hierarchy Chart—Code Occurrence in all Focus Groups



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Let us now turn to a brief examination of the differences between the focus groups. In Figure 2, we have summarized how often the different codes were used to categorize statements in each focus group. Of the statements that we coded, the figure again clearly shows that statements falling under the Domain code occurred most frequently in each focus group, with for example, over 66% of the coded statements in FG4 belonging to this area. There are, however, some slight differences between the groups. For example, when we examine the second most frequent code in the focus groups, we

see that while the Aggrievance- Entitlement and Injustice code (Code 4) was used for 10% of the coded statements in FG3, it hardly occurred in FG1 or FG4. Similarly, we can also observe that the use of the Feminism code was slightly more frequent in FG1 and FG2. However, since the usage of the Domain code dominates so significantly in the data, any other differences are extremely slight between the groups, and it is difficult to draw any significant conclusions. When we explore the Domain code in further depth, however, we can notice some important differences between the groups.

Figure 2: Code Usage per Group (Parent Codes)

	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4
1. Focus	2,38%	1,63%	4,78%	1,44%
2. Location (Self and Belonging)	3,78%	4,05%	3,63%	0,83%
3. Needs - Type	6,07%	8,51%	8,54%	6,73%
4. Aggrievance - Entitlement and Injustice	1,34%	5,17%	10,07%	3,44%
5. External Solutions	9,22%	4,54%	5,6%	4,67%
6. Internal - Mobilising Strategies	6,91%	5,25%	4,63%	4,67%

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7. Feminism	8,43%	9,54%	5,84%	3,37%
8. Gender Roles/Stereotypes	8,98%	6,03%	10%	8,08%
9. Domains	52,88%	55,27%	46,9%	66,76%

Figure 3: Code Frequency—Domains Descendent Codes

	FG1	FG2	FG3	FG4
9.1. Economy	22,04%	23,9%	38,11%	21,07%
9.2. Migration	6,46%	0%	9,7%	8,23%
9.3. Security	5,42%	13,18%	9,32%	2,2%
9.4 Welfare	32,37%	45,82%	31,91%	35,28%
9.5 Family	33,71%	17,1%	10,96%	33,21%

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Figure 3 displays how frequently the different subcodes of the Domain code occurred in the different groups. Here, it is important to remember that the percentages in the figure do not represent how often the code was used in the entire transcript, but rather how statements coded as belonging to the parent code (Code 9) are distributed within the different descendent codes. While the welfare subcode contains the most or second-most statements in all groups, we see that discussions surrounding the economy occurred far more frequently in FG3 (an all-male focus group) than in the other groups, and that discussions surrounding family gained prominence in FG1 (an all-female focus group) and FG4 (a mixed focus group). Similarly, discussions regarding

security occurred more often in FG2 and FG3 (both all-male focus groups) than they did in FG1 or FG4. The most prominent outlier in the table regards the complete lack of discussion belonging to the migration category in FG2 while it is similarly notable that the welfare code in this group is the single largest category amongst the different focus groups. Thus, while the groups remain broadly similar when we explore the Domains code in further depth, some relevant differences do appear, and these differences do potentially appear to have a link to gender.

Having reviewed how often the different codes occurred in the different focus groups, we now shift to examining how the codes vary between participants rather than between groups. Here, we have again chosen to present the domains code broken down into the different descendent codes to enable a more careful comparison between the different groups of participants. As we can observe in Figure 4, there are some slight differences between the male and female participants in our groups, in line with the initial observations made in the preceding paragraph. For example, while the female participants spent substantially more time discussing family, the male participants were more prone to discussions surrounding the economy, security, and collective aggrievances (Code 4). Differences similarly appear when we examine the distribution of our codes between the different age groups. Here, we note that while the oldest participants seldom discussed collective aggrievances, they spent more time proportionally on the economy and welfare than the other two groups. Amongst the different groups, the mature participant age group used the highest proportion of their statements to discuss gender roles and stereotypes (Code 8) and

family (Code 9.5), while statements locating the self were more likely to come from participants in either the mature or adult age groups. Nonetheless, while there are differences between the age groups, the majority of the differences are fairly small. Since the different age groups contain so few participants, it is therefore difficult to know the conclusiveness of these differences. While the two gender categories also contain few numbers of participants, making it again difficult to draw firm conclusions, we can still suggest that the men and women in our focus groups tended to express themselves slightly differently, particularly surrounding family and collective aggrievances.

Figure 4: Code Usage per Gender and Age Group

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	Women	Men	65+ (Old)	50-64 (Mature)	<50 (Adults)
1. Focus	2,09%	2,56%	2,08%	1,4%	3,31%
2. Location (Self and Belonging)	2,8%	3,13%	0,74%	3,15%	3,42%
3. Needs - Type	5,33%	7,49%	3,95%	6,97%	7,18%
4. Aggrievance Entitlement and Injustice	1,2%	6,61%	0,33%	5,09%	5,4%

5. External Solutions	7,66%	4,16%	6,45%	6,44%	4,25%
6. Internal - Mobilising Strategies	5,41%	4,46%	7,01%	4,24%	4,75%
7. Feminism	6,34%	6,53%	2,67%	6,93%	6,93%
8. Gender Roles/Stereotypes	8,77%	6,47%	6,29%	9,09%	5,97%
9.1. Economy	13,5%	16,81%	20,91%	12,62%	17%
9.2. Migration	3,71%	2,77%	4,17%	4,6%	1,59%
9.3. Security	2,63%	6,41%	5,11%	3,63%	6,31%
9.4 Welfare	20,54%	23,15%	24,38%	19,21%	24,29%
9.5 Family	20,02%	9,46%	15,93%	16,61%	9,61%

After this brief review of the most frequently occurring codes, the differences between the groups, and the differences between different groups of participants, we conclude this section with some final statements regarding other interesting tendencies that appeared after applying the coding protocol to our data. Let us begin with a quick look at the grievance code, which we noted above was more commonly used when categorizing the statements of the male participants. Here, we can note that over 90% of the statements coded to this category belonged to the injustice subcode (code 4.2), where the participants suggested that conditions in Danish society were unfair. Similarly, when we look deeper into the family code (code 9.5), used more often when categorizing the statements of female participants, we see that the vast majority of statements belong to the reproductive work category (code 9.5.1) and primarily center around childcare (code 9.5.1.2).

Similarly, in our single biggest category, regarding welfare (9.4), almost 95% of statements in this category belonged to the welfare sector subcode (code 9.4.2) rather than the welfare chauvinism subcode (code 9.4.1). When we look further into the economy code (code 9.1), we can also note that only two groups even discussed the economic crisis (code 9.1.1), with most of the statements instead categorized as dealing with the labor market (code 9.1.2). It is also interesting to note statements belonging to the gender roles and stereotypes category (code 8) were almost equally distributed between the different subcodes, although discussions surrounding femininity (code 8.1) occurred slightly more frequently than discussions of masculinity (code 8.2), motherhood (code 8.3), or fatherhood (code 8.4).

2. HYPOTHESES TESTING

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Based on the preceding discussions, in this section, we now engage with the hypotheses of gender positional deprivation as put forward in the UNTWIST project. We engage with each hypothesis in turn, where relevant differentiated for male and female participants.

2.1. RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening.

In general, gender status loss as motivation to vote for RWPP was not a very prominent focus in the focus groups.

We could not discern a clear tendency of the *female participants* to point towards gender status loss. One explanation for this might be that our focus group participants have grown up, and been socialized into the far-reaching integration of women in the Danish labour market, and the sustained narrative of the welfare state model. The ‘losers of feminism’ hypothesis focusing on potential groups of women with a perceived gender status loss due to choosing childcare and housework over labour market participation does not seem to apply to the Danish focus groups. Female participants did highlight the tensions of reconciling paid work and reproductive labour, and pointed towards the need for better welfare state policies and more focus on deserving elderly, and Danish citizens in general rather than e.g. development assistance. With regard to the *male participants*, gender status loss has been discussed in the two male-only groups. In one group, it was mainly one male participant bringing up status loss linked to ‘feminism’ and ‘gender ideology’ which he identified as imported through social media from the US. The other participants in the group however did not actively join in in his identification of status loss. He was the youngest in the group (adult bracket) and the one with the lowest socio-economic status. In the other focus group, gender status loss was articulated vis-à-vis what was perceived as unfair bias and equality policies geared at women in the work environment. Here, status loss was a result of other men (although there was also reference towards gender-unspecified actors) giving women preferential treatment. These instances were clearly articulated as *relational* comparisons. Perhaps particularly notable is that even when prompted for *temporal* comparison, focus group participants did not envisage gender status loss as a possible future development, even in the all-male groups.

As the coding analysis has shown, in our four focus groups it was the male participants who tended to bring up issues coded as collective aggrievance. However the causal blame linked to these aggrievances did not point to a confirmation of the hypothesis: Feminism as such did not feature explicitly in the subjective and relational understanding of the participants. Only one participant out of all four groups identified 'feminists' and 'gender ideology' as theoretical and political focus, as mentioned above. Rather, relational deprivation was expressed strongly, and across all focus groups, vis-à-vis immigrants, in articulations of resentful anger of resources being used on an outgroup rather than 'Danes'.

It should be noted here that none of the focus groups brought up a 'sexist retropia' frame either. Even when prompted repeatedly about the role of the family in the future, participants did not articulate strategies and/or ideas on how a perceived gender status loss could be compensated by a return to pre-or pseudo-emancipatory ideals. Where the division of labour has come up in discussions, it was usually female participants who commented on their childrens' lives and challenges for work-life balance, formulating a diffuse need for a less accelerated pace and more time for children. However, this was generally not formulated in terms of gender status, but rather with reference to economic and societal developments, in particular with regard to technology and the role of (smart)screens interrupting family relations.

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2.2. Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream

parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies).

With regard to this dimension, the Danish focus groups do not offer much ground on which the hypothesis could be discussed in the first place. Despite being prompted for responses, participants mostly did not reflect on their own electoral choices. Nor did they spend much focus on the question of where external solutions and/or strategies for mobilizing could be located.

Regarding the *expressive* logic, there appears to be a general skepticism of politicians and political actors, as is often the case with RWPP voters. Fringe RWPP actors were mentioned in conjunction with distrust, disagreement, or disdain for mainstream political parties; however, this was not explicitly connected with sex/gender. Only in one exception, a direct link between political parties and sex/gender policies was made, as criticism and ridicule towards two left/progressive parties' positions on gender identity diversity. However these are not seen as mainstream parties, and there was no reference to RWPP alternative positions.

A formulation of an *instrumental* logic was absent from all focus groups – participants did not articulate an understanding of, or affective relation with the perception that their electoral choice and decisions could have an impact on developments within their preferred direction for sex/gender-related policies. Neither did they point towards alternative social groups for mobilizing strategies. This lack of engagement with political attitudes and choices might be, again, partially be explained by the strong entrenchment of, and socialization into the Danish welfare state model, where e.g. female labour market participation is an embedded norm that is not questioned.

2.3. Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP.

As the coding analysis above has shown, there were some differences regarding which *domains* the male and female participants highlighted. Gendered needs, moreover, were generally expressed as injustices rather than as entitlements, and predominantly by men. Based on this, there might be cautious ground for stating that across the focus group, there were some differences in the rationales male and female participants had regarding an evaluation of their gender status and/or voting for RWPP. However, this should come with the caveat of the preceding sections, i.e. that neither gender status loss nor electoral choices were really prominent in the focus groups.

One participant stated that she voted for a female RWPP politician as she saw herself represented in this politician's position and practices. This appears to be a link between perceived gendered needs and subjective/affective relation and motivation for voting for RWPP; however as this politician's platform runs on a gendered discourse of presenting herself as a tough and 'entrepreneurial' woman it cannot be seen as confirmation of the assumption that this voting decision should be motivated by perceptions of gender status loss, quite the contrary.

Overall, it has become clear that the findings from the focus groups do not fully confirm the hypotheses. An explanatory dimension for this might lie in the specific Danish context; see also our reflections in the section below. In addition to that, the composition of, and dynamic in the focus groups might have had an impact on participants' engagement with the specific parts of the protocol that have been designed to delve particularly into testing the hypotheses.

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3. FURTHER FINDINGS

In the focus groups we conducted in Denmark, it is difficult to disentangle or isolate gender-based motivations from other potential or actual motivations voters may have when voting for right-wing populist parties. At least in our groups, it is difficult to

suggest that the most important motivations for individuals who voted for RWPPs arose from gender needs or demands. However, almost all of the motivations and reasons that individuals discussed when addressing their choice of party to support had gendered elements, and we can potentially identify certain differences between men and women. Similarly, at the discursive level, we can identify broad gendered themes, and clear tendencies to promote values usually coded as masculine at the expense of those usually coded as feminine.

Considering our context, with Denmark traditionally classed as a social-democratic or universal welfare state with care work often, at least formally, the responsibility of the state, the impact of welfare state retrenchment may be particularly important to consider when we discuss the gendered elements of voter motivations. In our focus groups, the participants continuously returned to what they saw as the failing and falling standards of social care, with a particular focus on the areas of elder care and healthcare. Furthermore, there are some indications in our data that the impact of cutbacks in state care may lead to women bearing an increasing share of the care burden, particularly when caring for elderly parents or elderly relatives. While our participants often blamed immigration or immigrants for cutbacks in the welfare state, they also subsequently espoused sentiments arguing that Denmark was not doing enough to take care of Danes, or that Denmark needed to focus on its own problems

rather than attempting to solve humanitarian issues occurring elsewhere. Here, there were some indications or signs that women may be slightly more likely to adopt this line of reasoning. Yet, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this was a clear finding arising from our focus groups, and concerns surrounding care were apparent from both men and women. Nonetheless, while concerns about welfare state retrenchment leading to a re-familiarization or re-commodification were not necessarily gendered, we suggest that it would be possible that the consequences of increased care work and a larger care burden may have different relevance for men and women.

Second, in our focus groups, concerns about children, childhood, and schooling were clear themes in the discussions. Again, while these concerns were apparent from both men and women, we may suggest that there were gendered elements to the way individuals discussed parenthood and their concerns about childhood. However, in discussing the way these concerns were expressed, it is important to point out that the men in our focus groups tended to be younger, and were therefore discussing their own children, while the women tended to be older and discuss these issues in reference to grandchildren. In the all-male focus groups, the participants tended to focus on problems that they believe exist in schools today, such as a lack of help available to the students or disciplinary problems in the classroom. They similarly argued against what they saw as a politicization of

childhood, discussing the role of social media in exposing children to political ideas, themes, and figures. Conversely, the women in our focus groups focused more on the role of technology in changing childhood, how parents seem to have lost respect for teachers, and how parents do not seem to focus enough on their roles as parents today. Again, here, it is difficult to suggest that there were extremely clear differences between men and women, and again difficult to draw a direct line to voting behavior. Nonetheless, concerns about childhood did seem slightly different between men and women, with men more likely to view what they saw as a politicization of childhood as a negative development, and women perhaps more likely to discuss changes in parenthood as negative developments. All participants, however, tended to locate the source of problems in schools as either immigration or changes to the Danish school system intended to promote inclusion. Yet, while they may locate similar causes for problems in schools and childhood, it is possible that men and women view the consequences of these problems differently and that they therefore may vote for or against different policies that address different aspects of the consequences of changes in Danish society.

We can also identify interesting discursive trends in our focus groups. For example, in the all- male focus groups, participants were more likely to discuss issues like the economy and the labor market, focusing on what they saw as the consequences of

European integration for the Danish labor market and similarly what these consequences might mean for the individual worker. Conversely, in the sole all-female focus group, these issues were afforded less space, and the participants focused more on issues like stress, loneliness, and systems of care in Denmark. Again, while it is difficult to suggest that this is a clear finding, this may suggest that there are differences between voter motivations according to gender. Remaining at the discursive level, we also saw a clear tendency to disparage values relating to caring, softness, and openness while promoting values relating to harshness, realism, and punishment. Politicians and policies that sought to integrate or include immigrants were classed as naïve while the participants advocated for even harsher immigration laws and criminal punishments, even arguing for the use of collective punishments for immigrants and their families. While these logics are clearly gendered and patriarchal in terms of the types of figures and policies they promote, it nonetheless is difficult to know their weight in voter motivations, and it would be hard (if not impossible) to isolate the influence of broader societal discourses in an individual choice to vote. Similarly, in Denmark at least, it appears possible for female politicians to adopt these values and actualize these discourses, so it again becomes difficult to isolate how these gendered discourses influence voters. While far more work would be needed to suggest any clear findings, we nonetheless believe that these gendered discourses were an interesting feature of the focus groups.

4. REFLECTIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The four Danish focus groups in the UNTWIST process have been successful and relevant from a project perspective, even if the results do not indicate a strong support for the hypothesis that has motivated the focus group protocol. It has become clear that some of the male participants articulate perceptions that can be identified as based on relational deprivation with regard to gender/sex; however these are not highly pronounced, and there are very limited references to resentful anger to feminism and/or gender equality as motivation for political behavior.

While these are tentative findings and would require further work and additional focus groups for substantiation, they indicate one particularly relevant avenue that might open up new hypotheses on how gender needs or demands affect a gender vote for right-wing populist parties: the question of the *generational* dimensions of findings. This would possibly also be a relevant dimension to consider for the design of the coming survey. The composition of our focus groups, for a variety of reasons, did not include participants in the young adult age range (i.e. 18–32). It would be interesting for instance to add an additional focus group to see whether the findings might change the overall assessment put forward in this report. In Denmark, recent analyses of the 2022 General Election Survey, which has been published only in early 2024, after the focus group and the overview of existing surveys, suggest that there is an increasing gap between young voters:

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almost one in five Danish men aged 18 – 34 believes that gender equality has 'gone too far'. This only applies to just over 2 per cent of Danish women in the same age range, and only one in ten men between the ages of 50 and 64, and less than 5 percent of men aged 65 and over.¹ This appears to resonate with the general trend, observed in a number of countries, that there are growing disagreements among young men and women, not only reflected in their attitudes to individual issues, but also in their broader ideological choices. The divide between 'progressive women' and 'conservative men' appears to have become more pronounced than in previous generations. In Denmark, one of the core questions is which party political decision these attitudes manifest in with regard to electoral contexts. It appears that young men do not necessarily choose right-wing populist parties, but increasingly find their attitudes reflected in the right-libertarian discourses of Liberal Alliance. This development poses a challenge to the assumption that gender positional deprivation is linked to RWPP gains by conventional, typical right-wing populist parties.

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Germany

USAAR National Paper

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Tone and narrative in the groups

The German focus groups, one composed by 7 male and the other by 7 female participants, were conducted online on the 12th December 2023, and they were moderated by same-sex researchers. They lasted for approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes in the female group, and 3 hours and 20 minutes in the male group.

In the overall assessment of the focus groups, it is noteworthy that there were no substantial issues encountered. The participants engaged with each other in a courteous manner, demonstrating a commendable adherence to respecting speaking turns. The prevailing tone throughout the discussions remained moderate, devoid of any evident discomfort or problems.

Overall, the level of participation in the discourse exhibited a considerable degree of homogeneity within both groups. All participants actively took part in the discussions. However, important

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variations in participants' involvement can be noticed when comparing the two groups, and according to different segments of the discussion. In the male group participation was rather balanced. Mostly, the differences in participation were related to the topic discussed. On the contrary, in the female group, during the first half of the discussion, one of the participants appeared constantly engaged, not rarely framing portions of the discussion in the group. In this case the moderator demonstrated a skillful ability to address participation imbalances by actively involving other participants, yet without biasing the ongoing discussion. The moderator mostly included other participants when others completed their own arguments, without interrupting the discussion – unless because of time issues, as explained below. According to socio-demographic information concerning the participants, the most active ones appear to be individuals' showing a higher propensity to get engaged in political activities, such as voicing discontent with news media, or protest. Clearly, caution is needed given the low number of observations and the lack of a proper sampling for testing the external validity of this apparent pattern.

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Generally, moderators exercised a judicious approach, and demonstrated adeptness in leading the discussion smoothly. They intervened only when deemed necessary to facilitate the progression of the discussion through the three specific phases outlined in the related protocol. While there were occasional instances where they needed to interrupt the participants' discourse, mostly because of time issues and

the need to step into the following phase of the discussion, moderators rarely intervened for redirecting the discussion to the designated topic.

Despite a shared structure and progression outlined in the related protocol, narrative development diverged to some extent between the two focus groups. In the initial phase of the discussion concerning the current state of the country, the female focus group centred on immigration, physical security, social order, and challenges associated with cohabiting with individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds. A notable overarching theme was the perceived lack of responsiveness from the political class in addressing prevalent issues, leading to a pervasive sense of injustice. Moderator intervention prompted a shift towards personal economic concerns, such as unemployment, working conditions, and economic security, occasionally sparking debates favouring chauvinistic views of the welfare system. This segment underscored widespread dissatisfaction with the economic crisis affecting the country and its impact on individual circumstances.

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Similarly, participants in the male focus group exhibited a predominantly negative evaluation of the current national situation. In this group, sociotropic economic concerns initially dominated the discourse. However, akin to the female group, the discussion swiftly expanded to encompass diverse topics, including immigration, chauvinistic conceptions of the welfare system, and profound discontent with the present government. When evaluating the impact of the current situation on their lives, male participants underscored

how these economic conditions affected their livelihood, with particular reference to rising inflation and other costs shrinking purchasing power.

In the subsequent phase, participants were tasked with comparing the current state of the country with the past and examining implications for their individual or familial situations. Overall, participants shared a consensus that the past was perceived as superior to the present, with discussions consistently focusing on a downward economic trajectory. In the female focus group, concerns were voiced about Germany's diminishing attractiveness amidst globalisation challenges, including production moving to countries with lower salaries, rising inflation, and perceived erroneous policies. Participants also provided negative evaluations of the current state of the education system, to a lesser extent.

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In the male focus group, the discussion started with economic concerns but steered toward a discussion concerning language and a sense of injustice deriving from a perceived discrimination of political ideas like those shared by the participants. At this point, the moderator took advantage of the topic for introducing the gender-neutral language topic, which male participants felt was useless, wrong, and excessive. In this section, moreover, participants clearly shared views concerning other gender-related topics — sexual orientations, binary gender conceptions. They shared a feeling of injustice related to the perceived impossibility to express positions considered legitimate in the midst of a politicisation of gender-related issues, perceived as excessive — namely, gender fatigue.

When assessing future prospects, participants expressed a negative outlook in economic and cultural terms. In the female group, the discussion in this section centred on participants' perceptions of the political class, predominantly criticising governing and mainstream parties for their perceived unwillingness or inability to address Germany's current challenges. This narrative persisted when participants were asked to evaluate how the future perspectives of the country might impact individuals' livelihoods. Government and mainstream parties were considered key factors affecting the current and prospective situation of the country, with blame assigned to them for inaction in alleviating economic burdens on families and individuals.

In this segment, female participants explicitly engaged with the topic of voting for RWPP parties. Some framed *Alternative für Deutschland* (hereinafter, AfD) as a viable alternative to mainstream parties, while others expressed support for RWPP as a form of protest and signalling, without considering AfD in power as a desirable outcome. This narrative continued until the end of the phase when the moderator inquired about possible solutions for the situation. All participants pointed to the importance of political responsiveness to citizens' needs and demands, emphasising a desire for a welfare system primarily focused on the needs of the "German people" over those of other residents, indicating a sentiment of welfare chauvinism.

In the male group, the discussion also included an evaluation of existing parties — in particular positive evaluations of the AfD — and related discussion concerning nationalist political views — considered as

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legitimate. The discussion included mentions of systemic transformations — e.g., direct/participatory democracy — in order to make the political system eventually more responsive to citizens' needs.

In the third phase, when the moderators explicitly introduced gender-related topics, the female focus participants shared their views about working conditions, economic situation, household, childcare, and eldercare. They discussed the difficulties to balance household and working conditions, emphasising that women should work, share their household and childcare education with their partners, and that welfare provisions and public policies are not in line with such needs. Female participants also touched upon the use of gender-neutral language while discussing how parent-children relationships changed over time and shared a moderately sceptical view on the said topic. They appeared less inclined to explore topics such as gender inequalities, deeming them somewhat less pertinent compared to other forms of inequality purportedly affecting German society, such as economic disparities between East and West Germany.

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In the male group, participants addressed the issue of family gender relations and role models, partially intersecting with the themes explored by the female group. Regarding family dynamics, they shared a mutual acceptance of the transformed role of women and their emancipation, acknowledging their right to work and the necessity for shared responsibilities in housework and childcare among parents. They also highlighted difficulties in raising children due to economic insecurities or reduced purchasing power. However, participants also

expressed their gender fatigue. They contended that women's emancipation in the past was positive, and that nowadays we have reached a good level of emancipation or, at least, are moving in the right direction. Yet, participants also agreed in arguing that contemporary feminism has evolved into a movement against men rather than simply advocating for women's rights. Additionally, they shared the belief in an increasing political influence of a too politicised feminist movement and proposed alternative versions or understandings of feminism.

Finally, when turning to possible solutions for changing societal evolution — not only on gender-related issues — female participants showed a moderate scepticism in their ability to affect the most pressing issues, such as economic insecurities, inequalities, and migration, through political activism or voting. In the male group, there was more consensus on the usefulness and duty to vote. Participants also shared their views concerning political activism and the need to financially support individuals or groups they might deem worthy of support.

In short, both groups shared similar underlying narratives. Participants expressed a pervasive sense of pessimism regarding the current and prospective state of their country at the economic, cultural, and political levels. The past was often nostalgically framed as a positive period, perceived to have been lost in the preceding decades. The discourse predominantly revolved around economic concerns, including both egocentric and sociotropic perspectives, migration, physical security,

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social order, and discontent towards the political elite, specifically government parties and leaders. Compared to topics listed earlier, gender-related issues were mostly discussed in the third phase, when explicitly brought into the discussion by moderators. Female and male groups addressed these topics somewhat differently. In both groups, there was a seemingly honest acceptance of women's emancipation, and a rather explicit scepticism or refusal of some specific gender-related policies — e.g., those concerning the use of gender-neutral language. Yet, as highlighted above, the female group appeared only marginally interested in the topic of gender equality, and the male group showed, in some passages, rather clear gender fatigue and anti-feminist attitudes.

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Coding results

The implementation of the coding protocol was marked by fluctuations. It demonstrated resilience in coding paragraphs explicitly tied to gender-related issues, yet encountered challenges when applied to other topics. The application largely adhered to the guidelines provided by the UPO team. Initially, the “Domains” dimension was employed, followed — when feasible — by the application of the “Feminism” and “Gender roles/stereotypes” dimensions. Subsequently, the codes “Aggrievance,” “External solutions,” and “Internal-mobilising strategies” were applied, and ultimately, the “Focus,” “Needs,” and “Location” were considered and eventually incorporated.

Nevertheless, the USAAR team deviated from this approach in several instances, particularly when applying the "Aggrievance," "Needs," "Focus," and "Location" dimensions. Notably, despite being framed in the protocol as dimensions related to gender, the USAAR team chose to apply these dimensions to topics unrelated to gender needs. This decision was motivated by various interconnected reasons. As previously emphasised, gender-related issues played a secondary role in the broader discussion of the focus groups. Consequently, a restrictive application of these dimensions would impact only a limited number of paragraphs, leaving the majority of the discussion confined to specific domains with limited additional insights. We deemed this an unreasonable loss of information, considering the substantial efforts invested in conducting the focus groups and the presence of lively and informative discussions among participants.

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Moreover, we considered this approach relatively inconsequential, even in instances where these codes might be subsequently disregarded by the WP2 responsible team. Indeed, if necessary, it would be straightforward to identify paragraphs unrelated to gender issues and eliminate the coding of such dimensions.

Turning to the results, among all the dimensions, the "Domains" one and the deductive categories composing it proved to be the most robust and straightforward dimension of the protocol. Most deductive categories were applied to the discussion of both groups, and only a few did not find any application — e.g., 9.4.1.1. Due to the very setup of the discussion, categories related to the economy and labour market

have been extensively applied. Migration- and security-related codes, then, likely represent the second most applied categories among the deductive ones. Differences in the applications of said codes between the two groups can be easily identified. In the female group, security concerns, migration, and family-related codes were applied more often as compared to the male group.

In addition to the deductive codes, the USAAR team opted to introduce additional inductive codes to cope with recurrent topics that could not be identified using the deductive ones. In particular, the team deemed it necessary to introduce a category aiming to capture participants' references to politics and political actors as objects of the discussion, rather than a solution for solving existing needs or demands. These new categories aimed to capture arguments concerning (1) whether or not political actors represent voters' preferences and priorities (2) the perceived level of responsiveness of political elites to citizens' needs and demands (3) political participation and (4) other comments referring to political actors, such as comments concerning policy proposals, or leader evaluations. In both groups, these domains were often applied. Yet, in the male focus group, the topic of political participation was more discussed as compared to the female group, in which references to the substantive representation of individuals' preferences were more frequent. A few other inductive categories were introduced — e.g., one aiming to capture references to inequalities between East and West Germany in terms of economic conditions, and one aiming to capture references to environmental policies — which

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proved to be useful in covering the remaining topics of the focus groups, in particular the female one.

The “Feminism” and “Gender roles” dimensions were mostly applied without any difficulty, and no inductive code was considered necessary. These codes, in both groups, were mostly applied in the third phase of the discussion, with a few exceptions – female participants mentioned these categories outside of the third phase, whereas in the male group, these codes were applied exclusively in the last phase of the focus group. Between the two groups, some differences can be identified. In the female group, most of the “Gender roles” categories were applied to the “motherhood” and “fatherhood” categories, whereas in the male group, most of the codes were dedicated to the broader concepts of “femininity” and “masculinity.” Nevertheless, the dimension that showed greater differences was the “Feminism” one. The categories were seldomly applied in the female group, whereas they have been extensively applied to the male group discussion, where the category “gender fatigue” dominates among the remaining ones.

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The “Internal mobilising strategies” was applied at several points of the discussion, especially when participants’ were prompted by the moderators to evaluate possible solutions for changing societal evolution or expressly asked to evaluate their political engagement. In most cases referred to political parties as mobilising strategies. In the female group, however, the “civil society”, “family education” and “protest” were applied more often than in the male group, in which the latter two categories were never applied. Nevertheless, these categories

were never applied in relation with gender-needs. In other terms, political parties were considered as solutions for other societal issues than gender-related ones, in particular those dominating the discussion in both groups – immigration, social order, and economic matters.

As in the preceding case, the categories associated with the “External solutions” dimension were primarily applied to non-gender-related issues. The sole solution discussed, albeit negatively evaluated, that was related to gender needs is the “gender language/awareness”. Distinctions between the two groups are also evident in this dimension. In the female group, the categories of “legislation” and “relief/resources” assumed a relatively more substantial role than in the male group. However, in the latter, transformation categories, such as the “systemic” category, were more frequently applied than in the female group. Notably, the “inclusion” category found no application in either group.

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The “Aggrievance” dimension found extensive application in both groups but, as in previous cases, mostly when referred to paragraphs not touching upon gender-related issues, such as migration, social order, welfare provisions, politics related categories. Mostly, this dimension was applied using the category “injustice”, with the “entitlement” category being seldom applied. Interestingly, female participants’ discussion appeared more prone to the application of such a category as compared to the males’ one.

The use of the "Location" and "Needs" dimensions has been limited to a few categories. Regarding "Location", participants mostly made implicit or explicit reference to a collective identity. They rarely referred to their personal experiences, and even when they did, they used them as rhetorical instruments to discuss societal issues affecting their collective identity. However, the belongings mentioned were rarely categorised as gender or sex-based collective entities. Instead, they were mostly referred to as the larger group of "Germans" or "German citizens". Therefore, an inductive code was introduced to capture such instances. Regarding "Needs", participants from both groups mostly identified their needs in structural terms. In the female focus group, mentions were primarily related to temporal comparisons, partially due to prompts from the moderators during earlier phases of the discussion. However, relational comparisons were also frequently discussed. These two dimensions were mostly, but not exclusively, applied to non-gender-related topics.

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The application of the "Focus" dimension appeared rather straightforward. Individuals in both groups fundamentally focused on three of the four categories composing this dimension: "Discourse-centered", "Policy-centered", and "Actor-centered". Interestingly, the participants of the two groups differed in their focus. Female participants devoted most of their attention to the latter two categories, whereas the male group discussion focus was mostly "discourse-centered", particularly when addressing gender-related issues. The "theory-centered" category was never applied.

In conclusion, the application of the coding protocol exhibited both strengths and challenges. While its application was mostly effective when coding paragraphs related to gender issues, variations arose when applied to broader topics. The adherence to the UPO team's guidelines was evident. Despite this, the USAAR team opted for deviating in applying certain dimensions to non-gender-related topics. This approach was justified by the secondary role of gender-related issues in the focus group discussions, avoiding an undue loss of valuable information.

The results highlighted the robustness of the "Domains" dimension, with deductive categories proving applicable to both groups, particularly in economic and migration-related discussions. Additional inductive codes introduced by the USAAR team effectively captured reference to politics, politicians, and related topics, contributing to a comprehensive analysis. Differences between the female and male groups surfaced in the application of "Feminism" and "Gender roles," with varied emphasis on specific categories. Notably, "Internal mobilising strategies" discussions centred on political parties in both groups, yet the female group introduced a broader spectrum, encompassing civil society, family education, and protest. The dimensions associated with "External solutions" revealed distinctions between groups, notably in the prevalence of "legislation" and "relief/resources" in the female group, while the male group leaned towards transformational categories. The "Aggrievance" dimension found extensive application, often extending beyond gender-related issues. Limited use of the "Location" and "Needs"

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dimensions reflected a collective identity focus, predominantly categorised as Germans or German citizens.

Hypothesis testing

In the assessment of focus groups and the application of coding categories, the three hypotheses rooted in the Gender Positional Deprivation theory were scrutinised. Unfortunately, we found scant support for these hypotheses, as detailed in the forthcoming paragraphs.

The initial hypothesis posits that voters of right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) feel they have lost or fear losing their gender status due to feminism. This hypothesis finds limited support in the discussions within the male group but receives no backing in the female group discussions.

In the female focus group, participants, both individually and collectively based on gender, did not portray themselves as individuals losing their gender status. Firstly, female participants predominantly viewed traditional roles — for instance, that of a mother, housewife, dependent on a partner's income, primarily dedicated to caregiving — as undesirable. Secondly, participants perceived themselves as individuals who lost their economic status due to societal changes compelling individuals to exert more effort to maintain economic stability and work-life balance, which was achieved more effortlessly in the past. Notably, this narrative was not framed as affecting female

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individuals more than their male counterparts, but rather as a societal issue irrespective of gender relations.

As described earlier, male participants in the group expressed the belief that women's emancipation has already been achieved. They viewed modern or contemporary feminism as a politically influential movement that is partially or fully against men, rather than simply advocating for women's emancipation. Despite the evident victimisation of their collective superordinate group due to these political dynamics, males did not seem to perceive themselves as losing their gender status. As previously mentioned, there was a widespread acceptance of women's emancipation in the labour market and in family relations, coupled with comments on specific dynamics that were described as overly politicised or extreme. Even in the discussion of gender-neutral language, arguably one of the most participated discussions concerning gender-related issues, male participants did not express any perceivable fear or concern about a potential loss of status, either presently or in the future. The closest argument to the gender status loss is the narrative concerning the perceived impossibility for male participants to express opinions in contrast with those of a supposedly overly politicised rhetoric coming from contemporary feminist movements. Yet, this can hardly be reconnected to the concept of gender status loss as presented in the Gender Positional Deprivation theory. Similar to the female group, discussions related to status were primarily linked to dominant topics such as immigration, the economy, and the welfare system. It is unclear

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whether some arguments presented by male participants were used to conceal dissatisfaction with new gender roles perceived as negative. In a few instances, for example, some participants contended that the traditional social structure was more straightforward to interpret, with better-defined gender roles. However, in the very same arguments, these participants reiterated their conviction that women's emancipation – namely, women being free to make their own choices concerning family, career, and other relevant aspects of their lives – is a positive development. While it is undeniable that male participants did not engage in a discussion about the extent to which contemporary societies actually provide sufficient conditions for achieving these freedoms and substantial gender equality, we scarcely found evidence in these arguments of a perceived loss of the structural status of men.

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The second hypothesis being tested proposes that participants may have two distinct logics for voting for RWPPs based on sex and gender: an expressive logic, which involves protest voting due to dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, and an instrumental logic, which involves expectations about the ability of political actors to bring about changes in the direction of preferred policies. Both expressive and instrumental logics were present in the focus groups, but their connection to gender issues was weak, and if any connection existed at all this was in contradiction with the logic presented in the second hypothesis.

In terms of protest voting, both male and female participants justified voting for AfD as a form of protest toward mainstream parties positions, policies or behaviour in general. Yet, none of the participants explicitly

or implicitly labelled their vote choice as a behaviour for voicing dissatisfaction toward mainstream parties' positions and policies concerning gender-related needs or issues. The link, in this case, might be drawn following a sequence of inferences. As highlighted earlier, participants' in both groups stated their dissatisfaction toward mainstream parties because of their lack of substantive representation of German citizens' "real" needs. Participants in both groups labelled some gender-related policies – in particular, gender-neutral language – as wrong or useless ones. Therefore, one might argue that dissatisfaction toward said policy might partially inform participants' decision to support RWPPs at the ballot box. Yet, this arguably represents a post-hoc reasoning which at best can provide a thin linkage between protest voting and dissatisfaction with gender-related issues or policies promoted by mainstream parties.

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From an instrumental perspective, there was either no link or a negative relationship between gender issues and voting for RWPPs. In the female group, when the topic of voting for AfD was addressed, this behaviour was considered a viable option despite the party's stance on gender-related policies. Some participants in this group explicitly stated that they would not view the arrival of AfD in power as a favourable outcome due to their gender-related positions or policy proposals. In other words, the gender-related positions of AfD were considered as reasons for not voting for the party in this group. In the male group, voting for AfD was weakly linked to instrumental reasoning. Only one participant evaluated the party positively, not because of its positions on gender-related

issues, which were deemed too conservative, but rather as a counterbalance to what they considered extreme tendencies, such as women solely dedicated to their careers or policies eliminating a binary conception of gender. However, this was an isolated case, and instrumental voting reasoning was implicit. Mostly, instrumental voting was linked to other topics already addressed in previous passages. In the context of the German focus groups, we found little support for the second hypothesis.

Finally, the third hypothesis posits that men and women have different rationales for evaluating their loss of gender status and for voting for RWPP. However, the arguments provided in the previous paragraphs offer little support for this claim. As previously stated, neither group made any clear reference to a loss of gender status. Neither women nor men considered societal developments as phenomena that threatened their gender status or roles. Additionally, as previously mentioned, female and male participants' shared rather similar evaluations of the underlying logics of voting for RWPPs. The main difference was found when considering the weak link between gender-related issues and voting for RWPPs, with some female participants claiming that gender-related positions of RWPPs should be considered as reasons for avoiding their success, and one male participant claiming that RWPPs — excessively conservative — positions would at least balance tendencies considered as too radical.

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Further findings

There are several, interrelated gender-related findings that require further discussion. Firstly, participants seldom engaged in discussions on gender-related issues unless prompted by moderators, and when this happened they rarely considered them as standalone topics. Secondly, female participants attributed relatively low salience or priority to certain gender-related issues. Thirdly, there was a discernible higher level of politicisation concerning a specific issue – gender-neutral language – compared to other topics addressed by participants in both groups. All of these seem to suggest that much more focus should be dedicated to the role of party agency in shaping gender-related priorities and positions of individuals.

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As highlighted above, the first finding is that participants' attention to gender-related needs was mostly a reaction to external stimuli. These topics appeared in the discussion only when triggered by moderators interventions or questions. In most cases the moderator inputs developed proper discussions, with participants' sharing opinions and interacting with each other. In a few cases, the discussion did not produce much feedback even in face of moderators' prompts. While this mechanism does not exclude those highlighted in the Gender Positional Deprivation theory, it suggests that gender-related needs might not be perceived as structural issues but rather as collateral issues of an overall nationalist, socially conservative discourse which seems to align with priorities and positions of political actors, although not perfectly overlapping.

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The second finding highlights the low priority that female participants gave to gender-related issues, particularly inequalities. As previously mentioned, gender-related issues were not the main focus of the discussions in the focus groups. It was expected that RWPP voters in Europe and Germany would prioritise issues such as immigration, economic and physical security, welfare chauvinism, and other nationalist-communitarian positions. However, the USAAR team expected gender-related topics to appear more frequently in the female group due to assumptions about the weaker structural position of women in contemporary societies, especially in relation to labour-related inequalities between women and men. This expectation was only partially met, and some dynamics somewhat frustrated it. As previously discussed, female participants engaged in discussions related to their rights, opportunities, and material difficulties. They also shared opinions on femininity, motherhood, masculinity, and fatherhood. However, when prompted to comment on gender-related *inequalities*, the dynamic was dismissive. The following statement, prompted by the moderator, provides a clear example of this dynamic:

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F4: So, of course, there are inequalities between men and women. Of course, it sucks if women earn less than men for the same work, of course, but because I'm now saying female doctors [Ärztinnen] and not doctors [Ärzte], that doesn't change this situation at all. So I think that's a completely wrong

*approach. (German Female Focus Group
Transcription, Pos. 508)*

The discussion quickly shifted to the inequalities between East and West Germany, which were deemed the “real” inequality to address. We do not have additional evidence concerning this dismissive mechanism. However, if one considers how the discussion easily turned to other topics, and the dynamics mentioned above, these suggest that female participants did not consider these inequalities as priorities. They *acknowledged* explicitly and implicitly the *existence* of such inequalities, and mostly supported women emancipation in several regards. Yet, they clearly considered *other* issues as their main political priorities. Overall, female participants did not consider their perceived deprivation as gender-related, and did not locate their arguments in a relational, comparative fashion with men’s perceived conditions – even when addressing gender-related issues entailing structural inequalities between women and men.

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The third noteworthy finding is that, in both groups, the topic of gender-neutral language elicited more pronounced reactions compared to other gender-related subjects. It seems that the issue resonated more strongly in the male group than in the female one. Nonetheless, in both groups, the discussion followed a similar pattern, with participants expressing clearly negative attitudes about such a policy. In the male group, which appeared somewhat more ideological and politicised than the female one in various respects, reactions to gender-neutral language were partially linked to broader discourses, such as the

rejection of non-binary gender conceptions. On the other hand, in the female group, the discussion seemed more dismissive than assertive. In both groups, moreover, this topic was connected to a general narrative concerning the lack of substantive representation and/or lack of responsiveness of governing or mainstream parties — i.e., parties that, instead of addressing the "real" needs of people, are engaged in producing useless or uselessly harmful policies.

When considering these further findings all together, and their linkages with lines of argument which are common in far-right populist propaganda, the overall impression is that the structural anchorage of gender politics in far-right voters' discourse is thinner than what we would expect when considering socio-structural explanations of far-right support. In other words, the dynamics of the group — on gender-related and not gender-related topics — suggest a politicisation process which arguably is only partially rooted in structural features, and highly mediated or moderated — if not produced — by political actors' agency, at least on some relevant topics.

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Hypotheses proposals

The aforementioned findings, typical of those derived from a constrained set of observations that were not systematically sampled and primarily aimed at elucidating narratives and dynamics, provide insufficient grounds for making robust generalisations applicable to the wider reference population. Put differently, these findings are evidently

context-specific, contingent upon the profiles of the participants engaged in the discussions, and subject to the particular dynamics of the discourse.

Nevertheless, as previously emphasised, the insights garnered from the progression and narratives within the German focus groups underscore the pivotal role of party agency in shaping the priorities and, consequently, stances of voters on various subjects, beyond merely gender-related issues. In light of this, the USAAR team advocates for the assessment of hypotheses and measurement items—such as survey items—that can capture (a) the dynamics of politicisation surrounding topics that may not have any direct link to structural conditions, and (b) the influence of party agency in de-politicising structural inequalities.

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The first aspect, (a), is clearly exemplified by the shifts observed when the focus group discussions turned to matters of gendering or gender-neutral language. This political issue is scarcely connected to the positional deprivation experienced by the participants of the focus groups; however, it is intertwined with the populist nature of the discourse within Germany's far-right. The second aspect, (b), pertains to the unexpectedly subdued politicisation of the gender pay-gap in the female focus group, as well as the general absence of grievances centred on gender inequalities.

Based on these two points, the USAAR proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: The impact of non-structural gender-related issues on voting behaviour for right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) is crucially mediated by the framing of gender politics in far-right populist discourse. This framing can enhance the salience or weaken the contestation potential of gender-related issues.

A note of caution is essential when conceptualising these mechanisms before delving into potential operationalisations. As previously mentioned, participants in both focus groups exhibited sincere and deeply ingrained beliefs regarding fundamental aspects of women's emancipation, along with relatively tolerant – albeit conservative – perspectives on individuals' freedom concerning sexual orientations and lifestyles. These findings underscore the existence of constraints on the capacity of political actors or other politically relevant entities to strengthen or weaken gender-related issues.

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Hence, while emphasising the importance of further exploring and elaborating on the role of agency in terms of issue politicisation, we recognise that this may not be universally applicable to every gender-related concern. Right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) might present a political offering that is not entirely embraced and internalised by their supporters due to societal structural changes, which have, to some extent, become a constituent part of the belief system of a majority of far-right parties' followers.

In conclusion, our findings advocate for an understanding of far-right gender politics that considers a nuanced interplay between societal structural factors, voters' ideology and attitudes, and political

entrepreneurs' salience and positional strategies. Furthermore, it calls for an assessment of how the framing of gender-based needs is contingent upon the politicisation of other, non-gender-related issues that constitute the political priorities of far-right parties, in Germany and beyond.

Spain

UNTWIST – Deliverable 2.3: Summary of findings (WP2)

National paper for Spanish focus groups

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TITLE	National paper analysing focus groups from Spain
PURPOSE	National contribution to deliverable 2.3 (Spain)
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S E V I L L A

TONE AND NARRATIVE IN THE GROUPS

This section summarizes the narrative and dynamic of each focus group conducted in Spain within the UNTWIST project (WP2). Three focus groups were held with RWPP's voters who had previously supported mainstream parties (two men's groups and one women's group). The focus groups were held in Seville and moderated by UPO team researchers. To avoid potential methodological problems related to this technique, the moderators were of the same gender as the participants.

Tone

Overall, the atmosphere of the groups was friendly, relaxed and cordial. The participants were polite and friendly to one another, and there was no relevant argumentation. The discursive dynamics were fluid as the groups progressed and developed. In general, all group members participated actively in the dialogue (except for one participant from the working-class men's group, who was mostly inhibited and silent. Probably due to a mistake in the contacting process). In addition, there is another important detail regarding the working-class group. Specifically, another of the participants showed quite a lot of cultural capital in his discourse, had higher education, and probably was not correctly included in the group. The prominent role of this participant made other group members speak less and feel somewhat inhibited.

Beyond the argumentative lines (which will be developed in detail in the following sub-section), the general tone of the three groups was

marked by profound pessimism, disillusionment, and negativity. This negativity about both the present and the future (especially pronounced in the case of the women's group), cuts across several thematic axes: the political situation in Spain, the economic situation and pauperisation, the perception of the weakening of certain identities (Spanish national identity, traditional family, etc.), the difficulty of balancing work and family (in the case of women) or the passivity of people to get politically involved and protest.

In this sense, the overall discourse of pessimism goes hand in hand with an idealised image of the past. Thus, the past is presented by group participants as a scenario where harmony reigned (politically, socially, and also about gender relations) and where there was the possibility of economic prosperity. This idealised image of the past is linked to the idea of predictability: while in the past life courses were predictable, neither the present nor the future now seem to give any clues as to what might happen in people's lives. Participants emphasised the material dimension by discussing how, decades ago, a normal family could live with only one salary. Now, this is impossible. Moreover, they generally had a negative image of the future, as they expected all these dynamics to be accentuated (pauperisation, individualism, passivity, the gap between elites and people, etc.). In conclusion, all three groups have a general discourse marked by nostalgia and a deep pessimism about the present and the future.

As mentioned above, the general tone of the focus groups was quite calm and not particularly exalted. The few interventions that

deviated from social conventions by explicitly referring to the use of violence as a way to change the situation or to the superiority of some cultures over others (particularly in the working-class men's group), were not followed by the rest of the participants and were implicitly or explicitly censored by the rest of the group. In this sense, structural censorship and desirability on certain more sensitive issues were noticeable.

Finally, there was a strong sense of shared identity, especially in the case of the women's group. This kind of connection allowed the participants to share their experiences in a sincere and close way. In this regard, some of them shared aspects of their personal lives and intimacy.

Argumentative lines

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- a) Criticism towards State intervention, social benefits and subsidies

One of the themes that appeared transversally in all three groups was the criticism of State intervention, social benefits, and subsidies. Participants stressed the negative role of subsidies ("paguitas" in the Andalusian slang), as they consider that these policies do not contribute to the development of the economy and reward laziness. Moreover, immigration appeared related to this topic since some participants mentioned that immigrants received more subsidies than natives. There was agreement in the strongly negative vision of immigration about how immigrants disrupt participants' lives with their cultural practices and about how they consume resources. The debate

regarding subsidies had a threefold dimension. Some thought that was not a solution, and these participants rejected subsidies as "charity". Other participants did not reject them as clearly but thought that they were insufficient. Third, all participants agreed to criticise how many undeserving people were getting those subsidies, mentioning amorality among the people who received them and corruption when allocating those subsidies. In essence, all participants demanded that authorities should audit subsidies better.

b) Anti-elitism and conspiracy theories

Participants commonly attributed most of the problems of Spanish society to selfish, evil politicians. It should be noted that anti-elitism is one of the main pillars of populism according to the literature (alongside Manichaeism and people-centrism). This anti-elitist discourse is mainly focused on leftist politicians (but not only, as mainstream centre-right, Partido Popular, is also criticised and framed as a "soft right"). Participants expressed their distrust of politicians and the perception that they do not care about ordinary people. In essence, they perceived a lack of political efficacy. In addition, some criticisms of the two major parties in the Spanish political system –centre-left PSOE and centre-right PP – appeared, posing that the major parties could not be distinguished from one another and that supporting them has not any impact on ordinary people's lives.

During the fierce criticism of elites and mainstream parties, quite a few participants (in all three groups) openly declared that they had recently supported VOX. In this sense, desperation was a strong feeling

that explained mobilisation in favour of the radical right party: wanting a change, any change to something different.

Furthermore, and linked to anti-elitism, the participants developed the idea of the existence of a secret plan which aims to pauperise the people (the ordinary people). There are many mentions of the so-called “2030 Agenda” throughout the groups, particularly in the men’s groups. Lobbies, political elites, and other groups such as feminists, environmental activists, LGTBI+ groups, etc, are supposed to be involved in this global plan. In some of the male participants (especially in the working-class group), it is possible to identify slogans or ideas related to VOX’s political offer.

c) Erosion of traditional identities

A central theme throughout the groups was the perception of the erosion of traditional identities. The participants identified several threats undermining national identity, culture, social cohesion, and traditions. Based on this central identitarian theme, they developed different themes.

First, the participants argued that factors such as elites, lobbies, the 2030 Agenda, State intervention, immigration, and other cultures’ influence (the Anglophone culture, for example), amongst others, are threatening Spanish national identity and contributing to the degradation of society. In their discourses, there is a strong feeling of loss of identity, which is linked to the general pessimist tone.

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Second, they perceived a lack of respect for authority and elders. Furthermore, participants denounced the loss of social ties and the fact that today's society is much more individualistic and selfish than in the past. This is due, among other things, to the role of the elites who seek to divide people. In this sense, they criticised low levels of mobilisation in Spain: people do not protest and accept what elites say. Also, comparisons with other countries in which mobilisation is supposed to be high (France, for example) recurrently appear in the groups. In this regard, technology and social media are perceived as negative and demobilising tools. Paradoxically, many participants (see the women's group) denounce the lack of mobilisation, although they accept they do not participate.

Finally, in the context of this pessimistic and critical discourse on identity, the following is mentioned: the decline of the traditional concept of family (conceived as the union of man, woman and children). In general, participants (particularly men) defended to some extent explicitly a traditional, Catholic, hetero-patriarchal family model.

d) Pauperisation, economic insecurity, and labour market

A central theme in all three groups was the rising cost of living and economic insecurity in Spain. In this respect, participants criticised the current situation and the difficulty of living and having a family and discussed how, decades ago, a standard family could live with only one salary, whilst now this seems to be impossible. The discussion about material conditions and demands for better working conditions and better salaries appear very clearly in the women's group.

The debate on economic insecurity is much more pronounced both qualitatively and quantitatively in the women's group than in the men's groups. They mentioned how their mothers' lives differed in the sense that they could take care of their family and were not "forced" to work. They regret that they cannot for the family (participants referred basically to children) as they like. Still, concerning older generations, they never argue in favour of returning to being only housewives, as their mothers were. Participants did not make a clear argument regarding their mothers' lives being better, nor did they aspire to have the same life. As for the future, participants mainly demanded better jobs, conceived as those that could allow them to care for their families.

Regarding the above, participants in both men's groups evaluated the incorporation of women into the labour market to be very positive. In this way, they mentioned their wives as examples of working, independent women. This idea is strongly linked to the debate around family transformations and economic pauperisation. Basically, the role of working women as economic providers in a context of economic pauperisation is highlighted.

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e) Critical views on mainstream feminism and gender quotas

In overall terms, participants in all three groups hold a very critical view of mainstream feminism, showing a typical anti-gender discourse and declaring that mainstream feminism had gone too far. Only a woman declared herself a feminist and defended some of women's advancement thanks to feminism. This participant was probably not a VOX supporter but a centre-right mainstream PP. The label "feminazis"

(which encapsulates the concept of feminists and nazis) appears in the groups. It should be noted that this label is usually used by the RWPP universe in Spain.

In the case of the men's groups, the criticism of feminism is much stronger than in the case of women, stating that feminism is a toxic, harmful and dangerous ideology that only seeks the superiority of women over men. Because of feminism, they perceive that men are at a disadvantage. They feel that men suffer a grievance and that they may be accused of sexism or rape without proof. In a similar way, some women participants are worried about the future of their sons and the potential negative consequences when interacting with the other sex.

The idea that the current feminist mainstream "does not represent us or the real women" is found in the discourse of both women and men. Thus, it is argued that mainstream feminism is a paternalistic ideology created by some crazy, radical women to obtain economic benefit.

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All participants pointed out that equality between men and women is needed and denounced that mainstream feminism is undermining real equality. At the same time, the differences between men and women are also pointed out, mainly by referring to biology (in particular, women refer to their reproductive capacity to give birth, which is, for them, an identitarian source of pride).

However, there are some notable differences in this respect. On the one hand, men argue that equality has already been achieved and that there is considerable "gender fatigue". On the other hand, women

argue that equality with men has yet to be reached and demand more equality measures (referring mainly to the right to achieve a good job, understood as a job that allows them to care for their families). However, these demands are not necessarily conceptualised as feminist.

Regarding the above, the participants —especially men— vehemently criticised the implementation of gender quotas, which they understood as an imposed mechanism that only created inequality. They stated that women can succeed on their own, without any legal support. There is a strong (neo)liberal discourse in the groups, in the sense that participants argue that success is achieved through hard work and without any State intervention.

Importance of gender in the global dynamic

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The importance of gender in the global discursive dynamic was different across the three groups. First, we can examine the appearance in discourses of gender as an identity element for men and women. In this sense, women's group formed a clear collective identity through the dialogue. Thus, women participants shared their experiences and discursively built an intersectional identity as middle-aged women. The central element that shapes this identity is the difficulty in finding jobs with good conditions that allow them to both provide economically and take care of their families. Regarding group dynamics, the presence of a powerful "we" is very clear in the women's group. A clear example of this is the general affirmation that it is easier to be a man than a woman (although they declare that would never change to be a man). Second,

men seem less inclined to speak a gender in-group than women, although this does not imply that they do not. When men participants construct their gendered “we”, they do so around the idea of comparative grievance. That is, they argue that men are currently at a disadvantage compared to women because of gender policies and mainstream feminism.

In relative terms, when compared to other themes, it is difficult to claim that gender has been a prominent theme in the Spanish focus groups. Rather, gender has been a theme embedded in the general narrative of pessimism and negative evaluation of the economic and social situation. In the case of women, their discourse is linked to demands for better working conditions and the possibility of reconciling work and family life. In addition, men talk about gender in the broad discussion of the transformations that have taken place and led to the deterioration of certain identities (national identity, culture, traditional family, etc.). In global terms, both men and women claim that progress in equality made in recent decades has been positive (referring mainly to the incorporation of women into the labour sphere). However, they show clear signs of gender fatigue and a very critical view of mainstream feminism.

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CODING RESULTS

In the following section, we briefly present and discuss the results of applying the UNTWIST coding protocol. With the available data, it is

possible to examine the salience of the different themes in the different groups. In this sense, the logic to be arrived at in this section is to compare the two men’s groups with the women's group and to compare the men’s groups with each other (high-class and working-class). That is, addressing cross-gender and within-gender differences.

Table 1: Absolute and relative frequencies for each main codes of the protocol in Spain.


		COUNTRY_SPAIN
		3 1296
01_FOCUS	1100	129 9,77%
02_LOCATION (SELF AND BELONGING)	946	213 16,14%
03_NEEDS-TYPE	1482	226 17,12%
04_AGGRIEVANCE-ENTITLEMENT AND INJUSTICE	370	88 6,67%
05_EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS	643	122 9,24%
06_INTERNAL - MOBILISING STRATEGIES	333	33 2,50%
07_FEMINISM	427	146 11,06%
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES	499	29 2,20%
09_DOMAINS	4168	334 25,30%
Totals		1320 100,00%

Notes: Own elaboration.

First, Table 1 and Figure 1 show the global salience for the main codes in the three Spanish focus groups. “Domains” is the coding area that received the most mentions (25.3%), followed by “needs and location” (17.1 and 16.1 %, respectively). These descriptive findings show that the Spanish participants seldom discussed “gender roles or stereotypes” (category 8). This is in line with what was suggested in the

section regarding argumentative lines. Basically, gender does not seem to be a central theme in the discussions.

Figure 1: Sankey graph representing frequencies for each main codes of the protocol in Spain.



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Notes: Own elaboration.

When analysing the code “Domains” in detail (see Table 2), we observe that “Unemployment and pensions” and “Social order” are the most frequent sub-codes in the focus groups. This is consistent with the explanations given above. Criticism of social benefits and reflections on the need for more law and order measures are qualitatively and quantitatively significant for the Spanish participants.

Table 2: Relative frequencies for each sub-code of “Domains” in the Spanish focus groups. Percentages by column.

		COUNTRY_SPAIN 3 1296
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.01_Economic crisis	129	3,06%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.01_Motivation for paid work	112	0,87%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.02_Working conditions: salaries, promotion, time, stability	252	5,68%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.03_Family/work balance	130	6,55%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.04_Employability and competence	105	9,83%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.05_Working legislation: quotas, harassment	45	6,55%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.06_Working relations: employers and colleagues	22	1,31%
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.01_Cultural	91	7,21%
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.02_Economic	77	3,93%
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.03_Other	22	0,44%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.01_Economic security	159	6,77%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.02_Physical security	131	1,53%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.03_Social order	400	10,04%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.01.02_Exclusiveness	80	2,40%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.01_Health	183	1,53%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.02_Care work	88	0,87%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.03_Unemployment and pensions	165	12,88%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.04_Education	318	8,52%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01_Reproductive work	29	0,22%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.01_Household/housework	70	2,40%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.02_Childcare	289	5,46%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.03_Adults dependent and elder care	44	0,22%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.02_Marriage and new families	72	1,75%
Totals		100,00%

Notes: Own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class). To facilitate the interpretation of findings, only sub-codes with empirical data in at least one group are shown.

Turning to the differences between groups (see Table 3), among all the dimensions, “Domains” is the category with the most prominence in all the three groups. Also, we observe a significant homogeneous salience for the categories Needs and Location for men and women, while the Gender roles code remains low in the three groups. However, Gender Roles are discussed more by women than men in relative terms. In addition, mentions of External solutions are more frequent than those of Internal Solutions across the three groups. Also, Feminism is more pronounced in the groups of working-class men and women compared to the group of high-class men.

Table 3: Relative frequencies of main categories for each of the three focus groups in Spain. Percentages by column.

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		1: SPAIN_M_WC 371	2: SPAIN_M_HC 353	3: SPAIN_F_WC 572
01_FOCUS	1100	10,91%	8,97%	9,47%
02_LOCATION (SELF AND BELONGING)	946	13,25%	14,42%	18,78%
03_NEEDS-TYPE	1482	16,88%	17,63%	17,01%
04_AGGRIEVANCE-ENTITLEMENT AND IN...	370	5,71%	4,49%	8,35%
05_EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS	643	11,69%	13,78%	5,46%
06_INTERNAL - MOBILISING STRATEGIES	333	1,30%	5,77%	1,61%
07_FEMINISM	427	11,43%	7,05%	12,84%
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES	499	0,26%	1,92%	3,53%
09_DOMAINS	4168	28,57%	25,96%	22,95%

Notes: Own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class).

Table 4 displays the frequency of each of the different sub-codes of the Domain category for the three focus groups. Some interesting differences and similarities emerge here. For example, women discuss topics such as family-work balance, unemployment and pensions, employability and competence, and working conditions to a greater extent than men in relative terms. As already explained in the qualitative assessment, the women participants demand specific measures, mainly concerning the right to get a job with good conditions that allows them to take care of their families.

Also, although the salience of sub-code on Unemployment and pensions is relevant for all three groups, females show higher levels. This seems to make sense insofar as demands for decent work are associated with the perception that many social benefits are unfairly adjudicated. In addition, in the female group, we can find some mention regarding the motivation for paid work (although few), which is absent in the men's groups.

Focusing on male groups, themes associated with the erosion of certain traditional identities (sub-codes: social order, education or migration understood as a cultural threat) have considerable significance, although with some differences between working-class and high-class men. An interesting finding concerns the sub-code "Working legislation: quotas, harassment" since both male groups discuss this topic more than females in relative terms. The presence of this topic is especially noticeable in the high-class men's group. This makes sense because this group of men with liberal professions are the

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ones who have seen the incorporation of women in their work environments the most. They, therefore, compete with women and may consider gender quotas to be unfair.

Table 4: Relative frequencies of sub-codes of “Domains” for each of the three focus groups in Spain. Percentages by column

		1: SPAIN_M_WC n= 371	2: SPAIN_M_HC n= 353	3: SPAIN_F_WC n= 572
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.01_Economic crisis	n= 129	1,41%		5,56%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.01_Motivation for paid work	n= 112			1,85%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.02_Working conditions: salaries, promotion, time, stability	n= 252	3,52%	3,00%	8,33%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.03_Family/work balance	n= 130	1,41%	1,00%	12,50%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.04_Employability and competence	n= 105	4,23%	15,00%	11,11%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.05_Working legislation: quotas, harassment	n= 45	7,75%	18,00%	0,46%
09_DOMAINS: 09.01.02.06_Working relations: employers and colleagues	n= 22	0,70%	5,00%	
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.01_Cultural	n= 91	16,20%	1,00%	4,17%
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.02_Economic	n= 77	2,11%	2,00%	6,02%
09_DOMAINS: 09.02.03_Other	n= 22			0,93%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.01_Economic security	n= 159	5,63%	10,00%	6,02%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.02_Physical security	n= 131		2,00%	2,31%
09_DOMAINS: 09.03.03_Social order	n= 400	14,08%	18,00%	3,70%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.01.02_Exclusiveness	n= 80		2,00%	4,17%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.01_Health	n= 183	0,70%		2,78%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.02_Care work	n= 88			1,85%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.03_Unemployment and pensions	n= 165	6,34%	13,00%	17,13%
09_DOMAINS: 09.04.02.04_Education	n= 318	20,42%	3,00%	3,24%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01_Reproductive work	n= 29	0,70%		
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.01_Household/housework	n= 70	2,11%	5,00%	1,39%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.02_Childcare	n= 289	9,15%		5,56%
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.01.03_Adults dependent and elder care	n= 44		1,00%	
09_DOMAINS: 09.05.02_Marriage and new families	n= 72	3,52%	1,00%	0,93%

Notes: own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class). To facilitate the interpretation of findings, only sub-codes with empirical data in at least one group are shown.

In summary, regarding the category “Domains,” women are more likely to talk about material-related topics (social benefits, working conditions or work-life balance), while men discuss themes related to the decline of certain identities (the feeling that the younger

generations have no respect, the idea that more authority is needed, the deterioration of traditions and culture, etc.) and the idea that gender quotas are unfair.

Table 5: Standardised relative frequencies of sub-codes of Needs for each of the three focus groups in Spain. Percentages by column.

		1: SPAIN_M_WC 371	2: SPAIN_M_HC 353	3: SPAIN_F_WC 572
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.01_Practical needs (conjunctural)	303	2,67%	5,19%	14,29%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.01.01_Past comparison	112	28,00%	16,88%	9,52%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.01.02_Future comparison	16	5,33%	2,60%	0,68%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.01.03_Present comparison	135	22,67%	23,38%	29,25%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.01_Males - men	23	1,33%	2,60%	8,84%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.02_Females -women	57	18,67%	25,97%	4,08%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.03_Elites	11	2,67%	9,09%	0,68%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.04_Immigrants	22	1,33%	2,60%	8,84%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.05_Beneficiaries of social benefits	36	8,00%	11,69%	14,29%
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.06_LGTBI collective	9	9,33%		
03_NEEDS-TYPE: 03.02.01.02.07_Young people	35			9,52%

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Notes: Own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class). To facilitate the interpretation of findings, only sub-codes with empirical data in at least one group are shown.

Concerning category 3 (see Table 5), it is noteworthy that female participants discuss practical needs more than men in relative terms. In addition, another relevant difference is that men locate their comparison of needs more in the past than women. Also, the comparisons at present show the same level of salience for male and female groups but with slightly higher levels for women.

More interestingly, men argue that they are in a disadvantaged position compared to women (sub-code "Female-women"). This

finding is linked to the general criticism of mainstream feminism and gender equality policies. On the other hand, women feel disadvantaged in comparison with immigrants, beneficiaries of benefits and young people. Again, we find that the concerns of the female participants lie in material issues. In this regard, middle-aged women perceive that certain social groups (immigrants, young people, etc.) are benefiting more from the State support and social benefits than they are.

Table 6: Relative frequencies of sub-codes of “Gender roles” for each of the three focus groups in Spain. Percentages by column.

		1: SPAIN_M_WC 371	2: SPAIN_M_HC 353	3: SPAIN_F_WC 572
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES: 08.01_Femininity	180	25,00%	11,11%	45,83%
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES: 08.02_Masculinity	98	25,00%	44,44%	16,67%
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES: 08.03_Motherhood	135	25,00%	22,22%	25,00%
08_GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES: 08.04_Fatherhood	85	25,00%	22,22%	12,50%

Notes: Own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class). To facilitate the interpretation of findings, only sub-codes with empirical data in at least one group are shown.

Discussions about femininity are found typically in the women’s groups, while high-class men dedicated more time to defining the concept of masculinity than those from the working-class. As we can observe in Table 7, there are some interesting findings regarding the code “Feminism”. In the discourses of all participants, a similar, strong rejection of mainstream feminism is identified (sub-code “Negative feminist feminism”). Nevertheless, the salience for this topic is more

pronounced in the case of the male groups compared to the female group. Furthermore, contrary to what one might think at first, it is the group of women that has the highest salience of the sub-code “Gender fatigue” in relative terms. Additionally, women are the only ones suggesting alternative ways of thinking about feminism (see sub-code “alternative feminism”). Finally, a significant finding is that topics related to sexual orientation and gender and the notion of gender supremacy only appear in male groups.

Table 7: Relative frequencies of sub-codes of “Feminism” for each of the three focus groups in Spain. Percentages by column.

		1: SPAIN_M_WC 371	2: SPAIN_M_HC 353	3: SPAIN_F_WC 572
07_FEMINISM: 07.01.01_Negative feminist feminism	116	52,83%	54,17%	30,59%
07_FEMINISM: 07.01.02_Gender fatigue (feminist femini...	118	16,98%	12,50%	58,82%
07_FEMINISM: 07.01.04_Binary gender based on biologi...	59	3,77%	8,33%	
07_FEMINISM: 07.01.05_Gender supremacy	41	3,77%	12,50%	
07_FEMINISM: 07.01.06_Sexual identity orientation inter...	66	22,64%	12,50%	
07_FEMINISM: 07.02_Alternative feminism	15			10,59%

Notes: Own elaboration. Acronyms: SPAIN_M_WC (male working-class), SPAIN_M_HC (male high-class), and SPAIN_F_WC (female working-class). To facilitate the interpretation of findings, only sub-codes with empirical data in at least one group are shown.

In sum, the quantitative examination of the focus groups yields similar findings to those of the qualitative analysis presented in Section 1 of this report. We observe a cross-cutting anti-gender and anti-feminist discourse among men and women. In particular, gender

quotas are strongly criticised as unfair and unnecessary. Regarding differences, men discuss more identity issues related to national identity, culture, values, and traditions, while women mainly demand concrete measures regarding the labour sphere and the possibility of reconciling family and work.

HYPOTHESES TESTING

*HYPOTHESIS 1: RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening. → **Partial support***

Firstly, it is noteworthy that both women and men recognise that there have been advances in gender equality in recent decades and emphasise that these changes have been positive. They refer, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, mainly to the incorporation of women into the labour market. Hence, women staying at home was no longer a choice but a matter of economic necessity due to socio-economic transformations. In this sense, it should be noted that none of the participants brought up a “sexist retropia”. That said, not a single participant suggested that it would be desirable to return to a past scenario in which men did the work, and women did the caring. Despite general agreement on the changes in equality between women and men, we observe notable differences in opinions about their own gender status between women and men.

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For the men's groups, feminism is conceived as a harmful ideology that seeks the superiority of women over men. Thus, participants show a critical discourse with a Manichean and moralistic nature in which feminism is understood as one of the evils that are corroding society. Men state that their status has worsened and will worsen in the future, among other things, because of feminism. In particular, high-class men, the ones who suffer the most from the incorporation of women into the labour market, strongly criticise gender quotas.

For the women's group, feminism is, in general, understood as a radical ideology that disadvantages men and is counterproductive to achieving gender equality. However, the tone of the criticism is not as strong as in the case of men. More interestingly, when reflecting on their own gender position, women do not blame feminism. Rather than feminism, the common argument is that economic system and societal changes forced women to work and care for their families simultaneously. The participants demand specific measures to help women conciliate work and family care and express frustration and complain that being a man is easier than being a woman.

In general, the men's groups did show a sense of loss of gender status and connected this to feminism, while the women reflected on their own gender position and their frustration with work-family balance, but without blaming feminism.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logics for voting RWPP: an

*expressive logic (voting RWPP to express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies) → **Partial support***

Spanish focus groups yield mixed findings regarding hypothesis 2, which deals with the rationale behind supporting the RWPP. On the one hand, the men's and women's groups clearly outlined an expressive logic for voting RWPP. Thus, a central theme in the three groups was frustration and disengagement with political elites and mainstream parties. Overall, participants were very pessimistic regarding the political situation and felt their opinions did not matter to political actors. In fact, several participants openly admitted that they voted for VOX since the party was something different, and they wanted a change.

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However, the idea of change can be interpreted here more as a rejection of mainstream parties than as an ideological conviction that VOX can carry out the policies. Consequently, it is less clear from the Spanish focus groups whether participants held an instrumental logic in supporting RWPP. In fact, there is no opinion or affirmation in the groups regarding VOX's ability to carry out these measures, nor is there any justification of the voting decision as a consequence of such competence. Therefore, it seems that there is insufficient empirical evidence to infer that participants' voting decisions are guided substantially by programmatic concerns (party positions, specific policies and issues, etc.).

*HYPOTHESIS 3: Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP. → **Unclear / no support***

As explained before, men and women showed different reflections regarding their own gender status. Men argue that their own situation has worsened as a consequence of feminism, while women complain about the difficulty of balancing work and the private sphere but without directly blaming feminism. Therefore, the evaluation of gender status is both negative, but the nature of the causes attributed is different. Moreover, regarding voting decisions, an expressive logic prevails in Spanish groups, which is based on rejection and frustration with mainstream politics.

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Notwithstanding, it is unclear whether a causal link between gender status evaluation and voting decision-making could be derived from the discourses. That said, gender status loss was not prominent in any of the focus groups when participants discussed the motivations of their electoral choices. While gender status changes could have influenced or be influenced by many of the participant's concerns (erosion of traditional identities, political disaffection, changes in societal values and norms, transformation of the labour market, etc.), there is no explicit or implicit connection between perceptions of gender relations and voting. In sum, in line with the findings of previous hypotheses, Spanish focus groups offer little support for the claim that

men and women hold different rationales when evaluating their gender status position and voting.

FURTHER FINDINGS

This section summarizes other relevant findings we have drawn from the deep exam of the Spanish focus groups.

An issue that has been mentioned before but is worth discussing, especially given the policy transference of knowledge of our project, is the rejection of gender quotas. In particular, the rejection is driven, among other things, by the perception that it is a paternalistic, ineffective, and imposed policy. Participants emphasised the "imposed" nature of the quotas, presenting it as a measure taken unilaterally and even with the rejection of many women. With this in mind, the UNTWIST project's policy recommendations should consider how these equality policies are communicated to citizens to try to reduce their refusal.

Another finding that requires some attention is the strong rejection of social benefits. Most participants argue that social benefits are not distributed correctly and that undeserving groups receive them (for example, immigrants, lazy people or young people). The central role of this theme in the discourse probably has to do with the idiosyncrasy of the Andalusian context, where social benefits historically play an important role in the social imaginary.

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A third interesting finding is the presence of populist elements in the participants' discourse. In particular, we clearly find anti-elitist overtones, which is one of the main pillars of populism according to the ideational perspective on populism (alongside Manichaeism and people-centrism). Exploring the role of populism on the RWPP in Spain and its relationship with gender politics, from both the demand and supply side, is a promising avenue for future investigation.

Finally, it is remarkable that immigration does not play a central role, either qualitatively or quantitatively, in the participants' discourses. The issue seems to have resonated more strongly in the female group than in the male ones since working-class women see immigrants as direct competitors for social benefits.

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HYPOTHESES PROPOSALS

On the basis of the findings described above, this final section presents a set of points to be considered as hypotheses or included in the survey of the UNTWIST project:

Intergroup relations

- How do RWPP's voters construct the in-groups and out-groups? Examine differences and similarities between men and women.
- Explore the ethical and moral components of perceived grievance. What elements fuel the sense of grievance? Under what conditions is the perception of grievance triggered?

Populist attitudes and gender issues

- In consideration that populist elements have been found in the focus groups, it would be interesting also to explore the presence of populist attitudes through the survey. In particular, to examine the potential interaction between populist attitudes and anti-gender orientations. Does populism correlate with anti-gender orientations? Does the sense of gender status loss correlate with populism?

Alternative feminist imaginaries of RWPP's voters

- Given that a categorical rejection of mainstream feminism has been found, it would be interesting to explore how voters of RWPPs construct their alternative vision of feminism or equality. What do they understand by equality? In which dimensions do they focus on the concept of gender equality? (e.g., we could hypothesise from groups' findings that RWPP's voters primarily understand equality in terms of economic and labour markets).

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UNTWIST – Deliverable 2.3

Appendix B: Coding protocol for focus groups

DOCUMENT INFORMATION	
DOCUMENT TITLE	Coding protocol for focus groups
PURPOSE	Guiding the segmentation and codification of paragraphs in UNTWIST focus groups
AUTHOR	Antonia María Ruiz Jimenez and Pablo Ortiz Barquero
CONTRIBUTORS	UNTWIST Consortium partners
USABLE VERSION	V.01 (2023.11.14)

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PURPOSE

This protocol will guide the segmenting and coding of paragraphs in the UNTWIST focus groups, provided they have been transcribed and anonymised as instructed in the respective protocols.

THEORY, RATIONAL, HYPOTHESIS

This protocol is developed from several sources: The Gender Positional Deprivation theory and the Typology developed in WP1.

Both the focus group guide and part of this coding protocol follow the theory that Antonia Ruiz is developing on "losers of feminism", which is attached as an Annex to this protocol. The theory is labelled as **Gender Positional Deprivation**. This theory is still evolving, but it captures some of the ideas in the UNTWIST proposal. The paper is attached here to facilitate the understanding of some of the coding, not for the discussion of the theory itself, which still needs to be developed further. However, comments are welcome. We hope to discuss it at the next GA or any other congress or conference.

The typology is used as a reference to create as many standard or close codes as possible in order to facilitate comparisons across WP1-WP4 later on. However, this protocol does not directly translate the Typology into the focus groups. First, the Typology was developed, partly inductively, from a type of data quite different from the discourse that lay citizens may have. Due to the nature of the data (steaming from

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academic and scientific elites), there will be some mismatching between the typology and focus group coding protocol. Attempting to force the Typology into the focus group's data will be misleading and will produce artificial results.

Nevertheless, where we can see parallelism, we have tried to develop codes as close as possible to Typology. Therefore, our codes here will locate where participants agree or discuss other codes collected in the Typology, allowing for the comparison of different points of view. Except when noted, our codes are not intended to capture the content in the same sense defined in the Typology, given the different nature of the data.

Also, consider how topics in the focus group discourses might not be captured in the Typology and vice versa. Furthermore, connecting lay citizens' discourse to concepts in the Typology will also happen and maybe more accessible at a later stage after the analytical phases. Our codes allow us to segment the information for further qualitative analysis, comparing what the feminist literature says and what our participants express.

As a reminder, the general hypothesis for the focus groups were:

- 1) RWPP voters feel they have lost gender status, or they fear losing gender status in the future, and they blame feminism for that worsening.
- 2) Concerning sex and gender, participants might share at least two different logic for voting RWPP: an expressive logic (voting RWPP to

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express disagreement or anger with mainstream parties) and an instrumental logic (being able to bring about some change concerning their preferred policies).

- 3) Men and women hold different rationales regarding how they evaluate their gender status loss and regarding the motivations to vote for RWPP.

Beyond single groups' codification, to test the hypotheses, the narrative in the focus groups and serendipity allowing for unexpected findings should also interest us, both in the coding and analytical stages.

HOW TO USE THIS PROTOCOL

APPLYING AND CREATING NEW CODES, SUB-CODES, NOTES AND MEMOS

This protocol facilitates several DEDUCTIVE CODES (based on Gender Positional Deprivation and the Typology) that should be created (keeping their English label and definition) and applied the same way in all cases. Each partner can create INDUCTIVE SUB-CODES / NOTES / MEMOS within each deductive code to capture local idiosyncrasies or finer details in their data. Partners may also create new INDUCTIVE CODES, but in this case, make sure not to repeat any of the existing deductive code we provide in the protocol: **read the code description before creating a new inductive code to avoid repetition**. If you want to perfect a deductive code, create an inductive sub-code instead.

When creating an inductive code or sub-code, you shall always include a definition for the other partners to understand what the code or sub-code captures (make the definition refer to what the participants have to say for you to decide to apply the sub-code). Including these definitions will be necessary when we pool data into a single database, in which we may add codes with the same meaning from different partners. Otherwise, **use notes or memos** to indicate particularities for your analysis case within the content the deductive code is capturing. Give the note or memo a name that refers to the

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deductive code it refers to, and include the name of the country of analysis so we can track that when the data from different countries is pooled. You may include particular quotations within the note or memo for the illustration or your points or arguments.

Creating notes or memos is preferred to avoid creating too many codes or sub-codes containing only a few quotations. You can create a note or memo with your comments, plus the indications of the text passages that qualify to receive a potential inductive code or sub-code. When you realise that the note or memo has enough to become an inductive code or sub-code, you can go back and create and apply the new inductive code or sub-code to those passages you marked in the note or memo. If you do this, delete the memo or note to clean the common pooled database as clean as possible.

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DEDUCTIVE CODES have a **number and a name in English** and should be created as such across countries to facilitate the pooling of a shared database, including the coding carried out in each country. Please, be careful.

INDUCTIVE CODES AND SUBCODES. **Name new inductive codes** following this convention: 99.00_EPS_Descriptive.Name [number 99 to indicate it was created anew, and any sub-numbering from 01 to 99 for the different codes you may create, three letters indicating the national team creating the code -use the name in English-, and then a short descriptive name of the content of the code). **Name new sub-codes** following this convention: Keep the numbering of the higher code or sub-code within which you are developing yours, then add the suffix

900 to 999, three letters to identify your country, and a short descriptive name of the content of the new sub-code. For example, if developing a new sub-code within 4.1_ENTITLEMENT, you may name it as: 4.1.900ESP_Earnings.

ANALYTICAL UNITS (TEXT UNITS THAT NEED TO BE CODED)

Codes are applied to single paragraphs, as defined in the transcription protocol (whole intervention of every single participant until interrupted by another participant or moderator). Each paragraph that relates at least to one of the codes in the protocol (or reflects other content deemed relevant by a partner and deserves a new code or subcode not foreseen in the protocol) should be coded. Repetitions of the same idea in different paragraphs get coded. Only paragraphs unrelated to any topic of interest do not receive any code (for example, the introduction of participants, which gives only personal information).

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The paragraphs are treated as a completed unit of communication. However, short paragraphs must be interpreted in a broader context, dialogue or conversation. In this case, deepen the necessary interpretations into that broader context but still apply the codes to the single paragraph. Add a note explaining the broader local context leading to the attached codes in these cases.

Apply all relevant codes to each paragraph. This will allow us to explore cooccurrences later on in the analytical phase.

USING CAQDA SOFTWARE

Use any CAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software) that implements the QDPX data format. That will allow for full project exchange with other packages among ourselves and open our data in a non-proprietary format as required by the EC. Using this format should allow us to pool the data from each country into a single database for deeper international comparisons.

QDPX is an XML-based structured data format that permits long-term product storage and product-independent archival of qualitative research projects and aims to exchange projects between different software products. The Rotterdam Exchange Format Initiative (REFI) is the consortium that designs and governs the interoperability standard QDPX (the format is also known as REFI-QDA project or QDPX project).

Software such as ATLAS.ti, NVIVO, MAXQDA, Dedoose, implement it (but see: <https://www.qdasoftware.org/>).

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TRANSLATIONS OF THE TRANSCRIPTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUPS

The protocol can be implemented either in the local language transcription of the group or in the English translation. Local language is preferred for a better understanding of the meaning intended by participants, but if it is deemed necessary, working on the translated

transcription is fine. It is essential only to translate texts after they have been fully anonymised, particularly when using AI.

PERFECTING THE PROTOCOL

Please keep an annotated version of this protocol to include examples of when you decide to apply a code and when you decide not to apply a code or sub-code. We ask you to include: 1) a couple of examples where it was evident to you that the code or sub-code applied; 2) a couple of examples where you had some doubts but it was easy for you to decide that the code or sub-code applied; 3) a couple of examples where you had some doubts but it was easy for you to decide that the code or sub-code did not apply; 4) a couple of examples where you have doubts and it was challenging to you to decide that the code or sub-code applied (and the reasons for the final decision that you made); 5) a couple of examples where you have doubts and it was tough for you to decide that the code or sub-code did not apply (and the reasons for the final decision that you made).

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It is very important to note cases 4) and 5) for internal consistency in applying the protocol within each national case.

Once you start annotating, you will also become more familiar with the protocol, and the application should become smoother.

Annotating will enrich and perfect the protocol. It will also ensure that it is applied consistently across countries. Otherwise, those notes will help

us make the necessary adjustments to ensure consistency in the final pooled database.

CLASSIFICATORY CODES

These codes capture the level of homogeneity–heterogeneity within the groups. They will allow us to understand the dynamics within the groups better and discover possible international dynamics (if they exist).

These codes are based on the information collected through the questionnaires filled in by participants at the end of the groups, plus the theoretical design of the composition of the groups. These codes connect the rich information in the focus groups with survey questions, allowing us to deepen their meaning for our RWPP voters.

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C.1_Country

COUNTRY OR NATIONALITY OF PARTICIPANT

All the participants in national focus groups will share this variable; however, code it for comparison between countries. If a participant has another nationality (which might happen due to contacting shortcomings), put a note on that.

C.2_Sex

SEX OF PARTICIPANT

In most cases, all the participants are same-sex. Still, apply this code for comparison across focus groups, within and between countries. If a participant indicates a different sex/gender identity, code it inductively.

C.2.1_Male

C.2.2_Female

1.

C.3_Age

AGE OF PARTICIPANT

We propose to group age and apply the following codes:

C.3.1_Young adults (< 25)

C.3.2_Adults (26 to 50)

C.3.3_Mature participants (51 to 65)

C.3.4_Old participants (66 <)

1.

2.

3.

C.4_Class

SOCIAL CLASS OF PARTICIPANTS

Some groups control this variable; however, reflect the participant's subjective perception of social class as reflected in questionnaires.

C.4.1_Lower/working class

C.4.2_Middle class

C.4.3_Upper class

C.5_Education

EDUCATION OF PARTICIPANT

Regardless of the name of the education level in each country, try to harmonise with these values. Please take note of the different courses you include within each category.

C.5.1_Less than primary education

C.5.2_Primary education or equivalent

C.5.3_Secondary education or equivalent

C.5.4_Superior education

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C.6_PIncome

PERSONAL INCOME OF THE PARTICIPANT

You may ask about the income in different formats in each country. However, to compare, try to harmonise with these values.

C.6.1_In the lower tercile of national distribution

C.6.2_In the middle tercile of national distribution

C.6.3_In the upper tercile of national distribution

C.7_HIncome

HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF THE PARTICIPANT

You may ask about the income in different formats in each country.
However, to compare, try to harmonise with these values.

C.7.1_In the lower tercile of national distribution

C.7.2_In the middle tercile of national distribution

C.7.3_In the upper tercile of national distribution

SUBSTANTIVE CODES

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1. FOCUS

(This is connected to FOCUS in the Typology. Same sense).

This code tries to identify where the participants locate gender problems (in their view) and how they make sense or understand gender grievance or injustices in general terms from their subjective point of view. In a broad sense, the code tries to capture how the participants define or see "the gender problem" or "their gender problem".

1.1. DISCOURSE-CENTERED

In general terms, the participant refers to broader societal discourses on/affecting gender and gender relations. These could be the discourses voiced by mainstream media or parties, governments or social movements – but the focus is on discourses in general, not on the role of the particular actor voicing the discourse. Do not apply this code if the reference is particularly linked to a policy (policy-centred subcode) or the discourses and strategies of a particular movement, party, etc. (actor-centred subcode).

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1.2. THEORY-CENTERED

The participant engages in defining, discussing or criticising theoretical concepts concerning gender and gender relations. While examples of the theory or its consequences' in real life' might appear, the main focus is on the theory, not the particular occurrences mentioned.

1.3. POLICY-CENTERED

The participants refer to existing policies, legislation or norms concerning gender and gender relations.

1.4. ACTOR-CENTERED

The participants refer to particular actor or actors influencing gender and gender relations. The focus is on the role of the specific actor, probably in a particular context (a party, a government, a policy maker, a national institution, a movement, a particular media, etc.).

2.LOCATION (SELF AND BELONGING)

(This is related to the Gender Positional Deprivation theory. However, it connects with the Typology--GENDER CONCEPTS--Intersectionality).

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This code tries to identify how the participants categorise their perceived "gender problems" or "gender needs" as individual/particular or as collective shared. While the personal perception of the problem might be based on their immediate context (short term), those collective shared might entail a perception of cultural transformations or common threats.

2.1.INDIVIDUAL – SELF

The participant refers to themselves, in particular terms, to talk about their specific needs, grievances or perception of injustice. The contribution is based on their specific experiences, motivations, preferences, contexts, etc. Particular references to other individuals (as individuals: a friend, a relative, etc.) also receive this code. Contributions use I, me, my, mine.

2.2. COLLECTIVE – BELONGING

The participant refers to a superordinate group they belong to whose members share the exact needs or problems. Contributions use we, us, our, ours.

When this code is applied, try to identify the gender superordinate group of belonging and any intersection between gender and other collective identities. The use of 'US' or an equivalent will entail using the group sex as the superordinate group. Apply all the relevant subcodes from each of the following:

2.2.1. GENDER SUPERORDINATE GROUPS

2.2.1.1. MALE

2.2.1.2. FEMALE

2.2.1.3. OTHER

2.2.1.4. NONE

2.2.2. INTERSECTIONS

2.2.2.1. NATIONALITY/REGION

2.2.2.2. RELIGION

2.2.2.3. SEXUALITY

2.2.2.4. AGE

2.2.2.5. RACE/ETHNICITY

2.2.2.6. CLASS

2.2.2.7. OTHER

2.2.2.8. NONE

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3. NEEDS – TYPE

(This is connected to INTEREST in the Typology. It is simplified to include only two extremes, practical vs. structural needs, in the same sense as the Typology. However, the sub-code STRATEGIC is further developed in connection with the Gender Positional Deprivation theory).

This code tries to capture how the participants see their needs as embedded, caused by their particular circumstances, or perceived as part of broader societal and structural processes that ask for strategic changes. The problems referred to by participants do not need to be explicitly framed as gender-related. All the needs or issues contributed by participants receive the code (assuming they are implicitly "gendered"; in that sense, those will differ for male and female groups - and we need to code for later comparative analysis).

3.1. PRACTICAL NEEDS (CONJUNCTURAL)

The participants connect their needs or problems (self or collective) to current circumstances, discussing particular problems framed in immediate, practical, and usually material conditions. The contributions that receive this code lack further or deeper reflection regarding the structural causes of the problem.

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3.2. STRATEGIC (STRUCTURAL)

The participants connect their needs or problems (self or collective) to longer-term and broader social comparisons. They might feel they have a need or problem compared to what other groups have or what their superordinate group had in the past (or might lose in the future). This code goes beyond immediate/ contextual/ conjunctural circumstances; it captures a broader and deeper understanding (never mind how wrong we think it is) of the transformations that caused the participants' perceived needs, problems or threats.

The application of this code entails comparing the self or superordinate group with other groups (relational comparison) or with other time

(temporal comparison). The following subcodes should be applied (they may not be mutually exclusive).

3.2.1. STRUCTURAL POSITION EVALUATION

This subcode tries to capture the relevant temporal and relational comparison with which the participant feels that themselves, or the superordinate groups they belong to, are worse off. These codes are not mutually exclusive.

3.2.1.1. TEMPORAL COMPARISON

The subcode applies when the participants express the idea that "before", people like themselves had better lives or life, in general, was better. They think that "before", the problems or needs they are experiencing did not exist or were lighter. It also applies when the participants express that "in the future", people like themselves will have worse or worse lives. These temporal comparisons may include the relative comparison with other groups' position in the past or the future, in which case the contributions must also receive a "relational comparison" subcode. When applying this code, try to explicit the reference the participants make (several codes may apply). If past or present is not evident, then use "present".

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PAST COMPARISON

FUTURE COMPARISON

PRESENT COMPARISON

3.2.1.2. RELATIONAL_COMPARISON

The code applies when the participants express the idea that they, or the superordinate group they belong to ("people like them"), are worse off than other groups and their members. This code captures those groups they compare with. The comparison can be made in the present time or imagined in the future or the past, in which case any of the subcodes for temporal comparison should be applied. The relevant group participants compare with start with this list, to be completed as codification advances. These codes are not mutually exclusive (to capture intersectionality).

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MALES-MEN

FEMALES-WOMEN

ELITES (Economic, political, intellectual, etc.)

IMMIGRANTS

4. AGGRIEVANCE – ENTITLEMENT AND INJUSTICE

(This is connected to the Gender Positional Deprivation theory. However, there is a connection with the Typology--GENDER CONCEPTS--Gender (in)equality).

This code tries to capture when a need or problem expressed by participants becomes a collective grievance, with potential for mobilisation (in our case, voting for RWPP). This code only applies to those paragraphs in which a need code that entails a comparison (temporal or relational) has been applied. For the perception of need or problem to become a collective grievance, the participants feel entitled and, therefore, the situation they perceive is unjust or unfair. The idea of the type of gender inequality is completed by applying a theme/issue in which the injustice is perceived to happen. That is, the idea of gender inequality captured in the Typology is composed in this protocol by the application of three types of codes: NEEDS-TYPE *PLUS AGGRIEVANCE *PLUS THEMES/ISSUES

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4.1. ENTITLEMENT

The participants express that they (self or superordinate group) have a legitimate right to enjoy specific material or immaterial conditions or goods.

4.2. INJUSTICE

The participants express the idea that it is unfair or unjustified that they (self or superordinate group) do not enjoy certain material or immaterial conditions or goods. These material or immaterial conditions or goods are

something they had in the past, or the fear of losing in the future, and/or is something other outgroups have (implying it has been unfairly obtained, maybe).

5. EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS

(This is connected to SOLUTIONS in the Typology. Adapted)

This code tries to capture participants' demands and evaluation of possible solutions for gender needs and problems. These are solutions located outside the control of the participants. It is for institutions, society, and culture at large to bring those solutions. Aspirational wishes for structural, cultural and societal changes are coded here. Concrete demands or criticism of specific measures, such as subsidies, legislation, social normativity, etc., are also coded here. This code tries to locate where participants agree or discuss solutions pointed out by feminist scholars or scientists (collected in the Typology). Given the different nature of the data, it is not intended to capture the content in the same way that is defined in the Typology.

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5.1. RELIEF/RESOURCES

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) the provision of economic subsidies or in-kind support for some persons or groups.

5.2. LEGISLATION

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) legal rights/measures in relation to gender.

5.3. INCLUSION

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) the inclusion or participation of a particular gender group in decision-making bodies and institutions with power (political, economic, etc.). The demand/evaluation can be made for an entire gender group or refer to an individual as a symbolic representation of the group.

5.4. ALLIANCE/NETWORK/ACTIVISM

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) alliances, networking between social groups, or activism as solutions.

5.5. GENDER LANGUAGE/AWARENESS

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) the use of gender-neutral language. 315

5.6. TRANSFORMATION

5.6.1. SYSTEMIC

Participants demand broader structural, systemic and institutional changes to transform society. Participants evaluate (positively or negatively) broad structural, systemic and institutional changes that have transformed society.

5.6.2. ATTITUDINAL/CULTURAL

Participants demand or evaluate (positively or negatively) changes in people's mindsets related to accepted behaviours, attitudes and expression of opinions in relation to gender.

6. INTERNAL – MOBILISING STRATEGIES

(This is connected to Gender Positional Deprivation theory. However, your version of the GPD theory still needs to be developed in this regard: the translation of collective aggrievance into behaviours. Manuel Jiménez is working to develop it further).

***There might be some overlapping with the code EXTERNAL STRATEGIES; however, use both where deemed relevant or when you are unsure. Nevertheless, please read carefully the definitions of both codes.*

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This code tries to capture the different mobilising strategies that participant may use to adjust society (particularly gender status and gender relations) to their liking. We are mainly interested in political strategies, but their relative importance to others is also captured here. Therefore, apply as many codes as necessary.

6.1. CIVIL SOCIETY

The participants refer to the strategy of participating in civil society organisations, social or religious organisations, through which they can push for changes (in different orders, from micro changes to lobbying). The reference can describe

either the participant's personal strategy or action or their opinion on the utility of these activities.

6.1.1. CIVIL

6.1.2. RELIGIOUS

6.2. POLITICAL PARTIES

The participants refer to affiliating, collaborating or voting for a particular party as a strategy to bring changes. The reference can describe either the participant's personal strategy or action or their opinion on the utility of these activities.

6.3. EDUCATION

The participants refer to the strategy of educating their children in a particular way that allows changes. This may entail different strategies, from choosing specific schools to limit the "freedom of public school to indoctrinate their children" or home-schooling (all of these refer to the "educational system"). It may also entail more private strategies, such as educating children and youth in the family in particular values and ways of life ("family education"). The reference can describe either the participant's personal strategy or action or their opinion on the need to change the education system.

6.3.1. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

6.3.2. FAMILY EDUCATION

6.4. PROTEST

The participants refer to the strategy of expressing their disagreement by demonstrating in the streets or other media, mainly social media. The reference can describe either the participant's personal strategy or their opinion on the utility of these activities.

7.FEMINISM

(This is connected to the Gender Positional Deprivation theory. However, there is a connection with the Typology--GENDER CONCEPTS--Feminism and GENDER CONCEPTS--Gender norms and values).

This code tries to identify when the participants refer to feminism as a theory, movement or ideology in a broad sense. Participants may use the term implying meanings different from those regularly accepted in the academy. The code tries to locate where participants agree or discuss gender concepts pointed out by feminist scholars or scientists (as collected in the Typology). Given the substantially different nature of the data, it is not intended to capture the content in the same sense as the Typology.

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7.1.FEMINIST FEMINISM

The participants refer to feminism as they understand (or misunderstand) it from feminist movements. Most of the time, it might be evaluated negatively or with little things positive, although some might be mentioned. The participants do not recognise themselves in this type of feminism; they may think it as false or non-representative of the real needs of the people or even harmful to their needs in particular or the people's needs at large. Positive mentions of this type of feminism might happen concerning the

past, when inequality existed, or concerning other cultures where inequality persists. However, the general idea is that equality has been reached in the present; therefore, feminist feminism is no longer necessary, or even it is starting to generate negative consequences. Participants' positioning on specific gender norms or values collected in the Typology are also included within this code.

The sub-code tries to locate where participants agree or discuss gender concepts pointed out by feminist scholars or scientists (as collected in the Typology). Given the substantially different nature of the data, it is not intended to capture the content in the same sense as the Typology

7.1.1. NEGATIVE FEMINIST FEMINISM

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The participants refer to the excesses and negative consequences of feminist feminism—the contribution centres on the negative impacts of the feminist fights for the equality of men and women.

7.1.2. GENDER FATIGUE (FEMINIST FEMINISM)

The participants consider that feminist movements were needed and had a positive effect in the past but are no longer needed because, in our modern Western democracies, equality between the sexes has been reached. It also applies to the idea that continuing to discuss equality is pointless and a way of resources that should be devoted to more pressing issues for "real people".

7.1.3. ANTIFEMINIST IMMIGRATION

The participants understand that their culture is more advanced, fair, just, etc., regarding gender relations than other cultures/religions (i.e., Islamic). Therefore, feminism is for applying to those different cultures, not the participants, which is defined as advanced and equal in gender terms. This code is similar to the previous one (gender fatigue). Still, the difference is that here, the immigrant outgroup is proof that the participants' level of gender equality is fear, and therefore, no further feminist advance for the native group is needed.

7.1.4. BINARY GENDER BASED ON BIOLOGICAL SEX

Participants engage in discussing how many genders exist, usually recurring to arguments related to biology, external sexual attributes, etc.

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7.1.5. GENDER SUPREMACY

Participants engage in discussing gender supremacy, understanding that there is a cultural, political, economic and social system in which members of one sex control status, power and resources while other groups are subordinate. The debate may include opinions or conclusions regarding why a particular gender supremacy is acceptable or not.

7.1.6. SEXUAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION INTERACTION WITH GENDER

Participants engage in discussing forms of sexuality. Participants would more likely use moral and normative arguments to accept some sexual orientations as "normal" and qualify others as "deviant", with different

levels of respect toward those "deviant" sexuality (from permissiveness to outlawing or punishment).

7.2. ALTERNATIVE FEMINISM

The participants debate their own vision of what is/should be feminism. Usually, their definition uses positive adjectives compared to "feminist feminism". Participants engage in defining what feminism should be in their understanding. Usually, the term "feminism" is qualified.

8. GENDER ROLES/STEREOTYPES

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(This is connected to the Gender Positional Deprivation theory. However, there is a connection with the Typology--GENDER CONCEPTS--Gender roles/stereotypes).

The subcode tries to capture how the participants understand and define gender roles and societal stereotypes. The code tries to locate where participants agree or discuss gender concepts pointed out by feminist scholars or scientists (as collected in the Typology). Given the substantially different nature of the data, it is not intended to capture the content in the same sense as the Typology.

8.1. FEMININITY

The participants engage in defining femininity. Either in particular ways, referring to how they -and their context- are feminine, or in a normative way,

defining what shall be considered feminine in an idealised manner that can also bring examples for the past or aspirations for the future.

8.2. MASCULINITY

The participants engage in defining masculinity. Either in particular ways, referring to how they -and their context- are masculine, or in a normative way, defining what shall be considered masculine in an idealised manner that can also bring examples for the past or aspirations for the future.

8.3. MOTHERHOOD

The participants engage in defining motherhood. Either in particular ways, referring to how they -and their context- are mothers, or in a normative way, defining what shall be considered as maternal in an idealised manner that can also bring examples for the past or aspirations for the future. 322

8.4. FATHERHOOD

The participants engage in defining fatherhood. Either in particular ways, referring to how they -and their context- are fathers, or in a normative way, defining what shall be considered as paternal in an idealised manner that can also bring examples for the past or aspirations for the future.

9.DOMAINS

(This is a mixture of perspectives connected to the Gender Positional Deprivation theory and the section on THEMES-ISSUES of the Typology. The conceptualisation of sub-codes is closer to the organisation of arguments in the GPD theory, but the content of the domains themselves have many parallelisms with the Typology. We suggest connecting the findings under this code with the Typology later in the analytical process).

This code aims to capture different spheres where participants locate their needs, difficulties or problems. Some of them might be gendered in the own focus group discourse. For others, we will explore how they are gendered by comparing men's and women's groups. The application of the code will also allow us to locate where participants discuss some of the THEMES/ISSUES pointed out by feminist scholars or scientists (as collected in the Typology). However, DOMAINS is not intended as an exact translation of the Typology, nor can it capture the content in the same sense that is defined in there.

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9.1. ECONOMY

The code economy comprises various economic sub-areas, including the economic crisis and different spheres of the labour market.

9.1.1. ECONOMIC CRISIS

The participants refer to economic crisis and pauperisation from a personal point of view (how they are affected, including personal

experiences) or, in a broader sense, general reflections of economic crisis.

9.1.2. LABOR MARKET

The subcode captures those mentions regarding the context of the labour market. The participants discuss the relationships between employers and employees, salaries, working conditions, and access and availability of employment within the working space and among workers (including discourses related to women and immigrants). These contributions can be made from a personal point of view or at a more theoretical level.

9.1.2.1. MOTIVATION FOR PAID WORK

Participants reflect on their motivation to participate in the paid labour market. We expect that, particularly, men do not have an explicit motivation. Still, they may mention the need to provide for their family, their wish for material possessions (house, car, etc.), or their "realisation" as men. We expect women to have a more elaborate discourse since they usually make an explicit choice to participate in the paid labour market and may be more aware of the reasons for that choice. That may be motivated by economic need or the will to emancipate and enjoy financial independence. All the same, reasons pointed out for men may also appear for women.

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The contributions can be made from a personal point of view, or some broader approach discussing general motivations for men and women can be pointed out.

9.1.2.2. WORKING CONDITIONS: SALARIES, PROMOTION, TIME, STABILITY

Participants discuss their working conditions concerning some standards on their salaries, opportunities for promotion, working times (part-time), type of contracts, etc. They may include comparisons to qualify their situation as generally good or bad. They may express how their working conditions have worsened or fear they may decline in the future. They may reflect on their situation as a group compared to others (such as women, immigrants, younger or older workers, etc.).

The contributions can be made from a personal point of view, or some broader approach discussing general trends for men and women can be pointed out.

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9.1.2.3. FAMILY/WORK BALANCE

Participants discuss how participating in the paid labour market impacts their dedication to family and reproductive work. They can explain how they organise to meet their responsibilities in both realms; they can complain about difficulties; they may express wishes for a different state of things, longing for a previous (or new) sexual distribution of work. They may conceptualise family as an obstacle to participating in the paid labour market, or they may

conceptualise participation in the labour market as an obstacle to having a family.

The contributions can be made from a personal point of view, or some broader approach discussing general trends for men and women can be pointed out.

9.1.2.4. EMPLOYABILITY AND COMPETENCE

Participants reflect on their probability of successfully entering and thriving in the labour market. They comment on the obstacles they have encountered or think they may face in the future, including competence with particular groups (such as women of immigrants). They may argue how they feel entitled to employment above other groups.

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The contributions can be made from a personal point of view, or some broader approach discussing general trends for men and women can be pointed out.

9.1.2.5. WORKING LEGISLATION: QUOTAS, HARASSMENT

Participants reflect on particular legislation within the labour market, both in positive and negative light. They may include personal experience and anecdotes on how they have been affected or reflect from a broader perspective on how working legislation impacts men and women.

9.1.2.6. *WORKING RELATIONS: EMPLOYERS AND COLLEAGUES*

Participants comment on the type of working relations they have with their employers (maybe noting their gender), and also the working conditions environment. The interest here is in comments regarding the relationship between men and women working together.

The contributions can be made from a personal point of view, or some broader approach discussing general working relations among men and women can be pointed out.

9.2. MIGRATION

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This subcode seeks to capture participants' mentions of migration and immigrants from any perspective (cultural, economic, negative, positive...). For example, the subcode must be applied to contributions referring to working migration, asylum seekers, and the rights and duties of immigrants vs. natives.

9.2.1. CULTURAL

Participants express opinions on immigrants' culture, implicitly defined as different from the native culture. Perceived differences may lead to negative comments and rejection of immigration or may call for acculturation of the immigrant groups (respect "our values", "our rules", etc.). Cultural differences may be presented as threats to the native

culture. A more favourable position on immigrants' culture may call for respect (or rich cultures) but keeping those cultures where they belong (in the immigrants' origin country). Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes, or in a broader sense.

The cultural subcode may also include references to reproductive cultures from a biological point of view.

9.2.2.ECONOMIC

Participants express opinions on immigrants' economic impact, including positive and negative stances. Among the positives is their inclusion into the labour market in sectors with labour scarcity; among the negatives is their consumption of welfare services. Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes, or in a broader sense.

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9.2.3.OTHER

9.3. SECURITY

This subcode is concerned with participants' perception of security (i.e., the absence of danger or risk) or the role of the State as an institution whose main objective is to ensure safety. Mentions can be made from a personal point of view (how participants perceive safety in their city or country, personal experiences regarding victimisation, etc.) or in a more general sense (referring to the general situation or alluding to more theoretical approaches when discussing security).

9.3.1. ECONOMY SECURITY

Participants express economic insecurity: 1) enjoying insufficient material conditions to live without suffering or risk in the present; 2) lacking certainty regarding their ability or probability of maintaining their status in the future (loss of job, loss of properties, etc.).

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes, or in a broader sense.

9.3.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY

Participants express physical insecurity: 1) threats to their own bodily integrity or life; 2) risks of being assaulted in their neighbourhoods, etc.

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense, comments on increasing criminality rates, types of crimes, etc.

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9.3.3. SOCIAL ORDER

Participants express concerns about social harmony, peaceful coexistence and respect for law and authority. It may refer to different domains: within the family (i.e. lack of the authority of parents), the society (i.e. the lack of respect of the youth), the political system or the government, etc. Sometimes, it may include longing to change the social order (including the political system).

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

9.4. WELFARE

This subcode tries to capture participant's discussions on the role of the State as a provider of welfare-related goods and policies. Concerning security, this subcode also tries to capture if participants think the existing Welfare protects them well, if it is in good shape, and how it should work.

9.4.1. WELFARE CHAUVINISM

9.4.1.1. *INCLUSIVENESS*

Participants feel they are adequately protected within the system as individuals and/or as national group members. Or, they do not think other (undeserving) groups have better advantages within the system. National ingroups and other outgroups are considered equally protected within the system (whether the level of protection is -high or low).

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

9.4.1.2. *EXCLUSIVENESS*

Participants feel they are not adequately protected within the system as individuals or part of a group. They feel entitled as members of the national ingroup to preferential or better access to Welfare than non-natives. They think other (undeserving) outgroups have better access and conditions than they have as national group members.

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Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

9.4.2. WELFARE SECTOR

9.4.2.1. *HEALTH*

Participants reflect on the health system from a personal perspective, experiences, opinions and perceptions when using public health services. From a broader perspective (and even if they are not users), participants may evaluate the system as good or bad, fair or unfair, and comment on the reasons for such a state. They may reflect on who should have access to the system and why. They may also reflect on how the system needs to be modified.

9.4.2.2. *CARE WORK*

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Participants reflect on the welfare care system from a personal perspective, experiences, opinions and perceptions when using them: childcare, elderly care, domestic help for dependents, etc. From a broader perspective (and even if they are not users), participants may evaluate the system as good or bad, fair or unfair, and comment on the reasons for such a state. They may reflect on who should have access to the system and why. They may also reflect on how the system needs to be modified.

9.4.2.3. *UNEMPLOYMENT AND PENSIONS*

Participants reflect on welfare public policies related to social benefits from a personal perspective, experiences, opinions and

perceptions when using them: unemployment benefits, pensions, etc. From a broader perspective (and even if they are not users), participants may evaluate the system as good or bad, fair or unfair, and comment on the reasons for such a state. They may reflect on who should have access to the system and why. They may also reflect on how the system needs to be modified.

9.4.2.4. *EDUCATION*

Participants reflect on public education from a personal perspective, experiences, opinions and perceptions when using them: curriculum, teachers, philosophy, control, etc. From a broader perspective (and even if they are not users), participants may evaluate the system as good or bad, fair or unfair, and comment on the reasons for such a state. They may reflect on who should have access to the system and why. They may also reflect on how the system needs to be modified.

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9.5. FAMILY

This code tries to capture participants' references to areas that are often considered from a family perspective.

9.5.1. REPRODUCTIVE WORK

This subcode refers to participants' reproductive work in the private sphere, related to the household and caring for dependents, children

and older people. How the dedication to reproductive work impacts participation in the paid labour market is reflected in code 7.1.2.3.

9.5.1.1. HOUSEHOLD/HOUSEWORK

Participants mention their dedication to housework. They may comment if house chores are a worry for them, if they have enough time, and if they like or hate house chores. If they would rather stay at home than participate in the paid labour market. If they want the partner to stay home instead of participate in the paid labour market. If they would like the house chores to be equally distributed. If they are happy with the current distribution of house chores among family members. Discourse about these works' social needs and dignity, even its economic value, are relevant to the subcode.

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

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9.5.1.2. CHILDCARE

Participants mention their dedication to raising and educating children. They may comment if raising and educating their children is a worry for them, if they have enough time for it, and if they like or hate having the responsibility to raise and educate them. If they would rather stay at home with children than participate in the paid labour market. If they want the partner to stay home with children instead of participating in the paid labour market. If they would like the rising and education of children to be equally distributed. If they are happy with the current task distribution for raising and

educating children among family members. Discourse about these works' social needs and dignity, even its economic value, are relevant to the subcode.

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

9.5.1.3. *ADULTS DEPENDENTS AND ELDER CARE*

Participants mention their dedication to care for dependent adults and elderly. They may comment if caring for dependents and the elderly is a worry for them, if they have enough time for it, and if they like or hate having the responsibility to care for adult dependents and older people. If they would rather stay at home with their dependents and elderly than participate in the paid labour market. If they want the partner to stay home with dependents and the elderly instead of participating in the paid labour market. If they would like the caring of dependents and the elderly to be equally distributed. If they are happy with the current task distribution for caring for dependents and older adults among family members. Discourse about these works' social need and dignity, even its economic value, are relevant to the subcode.

Mentions can be done from a personal point of view, including anecdotes or, in a broader sense.

9.5.2. MARRIAGE AND NEW FAMILIES

This subcode refers to participants' debates on marriage understood as a social institution both in a positive and negative sense (including

homosexual marriages). Also, it aims to capture mentions of new family models (homosexual couples, single-parent families, couples with no children, relationships with more than two persons, etc.).

UNTWIST – Deliverable 2.3

Appendix C: Moderation guidelines for focus groups (summarised version)

Guide

This guide must be adapted by the national team where it is needed.

BRIEFING		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Briefing: giving basic information before the group starts</p> <p>Participants meet in the designated room and sit.</p> <p>The moderator gives participants the information sheet, goes through it, and answers preliminary questions from participants.</p>	<p><i>Please, introduce the research and how the group will function. Get informed consent.</i></p>	<p><u>Regarding dynamic:</u></p> <p>Ensure covering legal and ethical requirements for carrying on the group (as established by the national team).</p> <p>Make sure that participants understand the rules and implications of participating.</p>

The moderator gets informed consent before starting the group on paper or on recording, as agreed by the national team.		
PHASE I		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE I	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Phase I: participants screen and signal to determine the frame of interaction in the group</p> <p>During this phase, participants do not know who the other people in the group are. Therefore participants are cautious about what they say (not knowing which impression it will cause others). This phase is very tentative. It is usually characterised by short interventions, doubts, questions, relatively long silences, nervous laughing, etc. What each participant says is a signal that other participants will pick up to deduce who they are, and everyone is well aware of this.</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants about their perception of the current situation in the country.</i></p> <p>WHY??</p> <p>IN WHAT SENSE??</p> <p>REGARDING WHAT ASPECTS??</p> <p>--Living conditions of individuals and families</p> <p>--Economy and employment</p> <p>--Education</p>	<p><u>Regarding dynamics:</u></p> <p>Do not try to fill in the silences. Let the participants break silences when it feels uncomfortable.</p> <p>Do not give word turns. Participants need to learn how to self-regulate. If necessary, remind them they do not need to ask for word turns, only not to talk on top of each other.</p> <p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>In this phase, the moderator lets the participant speak freely. The main purpose is for the participants to create a sense of group and build trust.</p>

	<p>--Support for vulnerable people</p> <p>--Respect and social order</p>	<p>In discussing the country's current situation, ask for concreteness: why is the current situation as it is?</p> <p>In what sense is the situation good or bad, better or worse, or the same.</p> <p>Ask for concreteness without directing. As much as possible, let participants bring up the topics (included in the list are those of higher interest for the groups, which can be suggested in the group gets stuck).</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p> <p>**Do not bring sex, gender or feminism explicitly into the discussion unless it is mentioned by the group. Gender is a transversal question on all the topics on the list.</p>
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PHASE II – GENERAL		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE II		DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Phase II: participants game to establish the majoritarian opinion on the group</p> <p>From the previous phase, participants might have already inferred that they all are ideologically close and similar in some other opinions and preferences. Therefore, they will feel more at ease discussing sensitive topics (potentially affecting their reputation), knowing that the group will not judge negatively.</p> <p>During this phase, they will therefore work out the majoritarian opinion of the group on the topic posed by the moderator.</p>		<p><u>Regarding dynamics:</u></p> <p>Silence should be less of a problem in this phase. On the contrary, try to allow all participants to express themselves and control that the discourse is not monopolised by one or a small group of participants.</p> <p>Remind about rules for participation, if necessary, regarding word turns.</p> <p>Particularly, remind rules of participation and reconduct the situation if there is any verbal personal attack among participants. Cut personal attack at the very beginning. Avoid escalation.</p> <p>Reconduct the group to the main topics of interest if the discussion wanders too far away. As much as possible, use participants' verbatims to refocus the debate.</p>

Some sexist, xenophobic or racist comments are likely to happen. Do not rebuke them. Do not give explicit or implicit approval either. Let the conversation follow if the attack is not personally directed among participants.

Pay attention to signs of distress by participants and try to reconduct and reduce the stress of the situation if necessary.

Regarding topic:

Ask for concreteness without directing. Suggest participants review the topics they started discussing in the previous phase, particularly those on the interest list. Use their framing and verbatims on the topics, so there is no big jump in the conversation. Use their frame and verbatims on some previous issues to revitalise the conversation if they get stuck.

****Do not bring sex, gender or feminism explicitly into the discussion unless it is mentioned by the group. Gender is a transversal question on all the topics on the list.**

PHASE II – SECTIONS		
SECTION A		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE II – SECTION A	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Section a) explores the feeling of status loss as compared with the past (an idealised past where "people like me" live better lives or in which things were easier for "people like me").</p> <p>We expect participants to talk about a sexist retropian past in which they think "men's/women's" lives were better and/or easier for people like them.</p> <p>This discussion does not need to be based on the participants' experiences. Particularly for young participants, it might be based on how they think the lives of their parents or grandparents were like. Or even other sources.</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants how they think the current situation differs from the past.</i></p> <p>WHY??</p> <p>IN WHAT SENSE??</p> <p>REGARDING WHAT ASPECTS??</p> <p>--Living conditions of individuals and families</p> <p>--Economy and employment</p> <p>--Education</p> <p>--Support for vulnerable people</p> <p>--Respect and social order</p>	<p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>Suggest concreteness by asking participants to compare to their parents, grandparents, or other sources they have learned about the past.</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p> <p>**Do not bring sex, gender or feminism explicitly into the discussion unless it is mentioned by the group. Gender is a transversal question on all the topics on the list.</p>

SECTION B		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE II – SECTION B	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Sections b) and c) explore the fear of losing status in the future.</p> <p>In section b) we want participants to imagine the future if the social dynamics they commented on continue. That is the evolution that they foresee if the dynamics from the past that have provoked the current situation continue. Here we want to know their cognitive expectations (what they think is likely in the future).</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants how they think the future will be likely.</i></p> <p>WHY??</p> <p>IN WHAT SENSE??</p> <p>REGARDING WHAT ASPECTS??</p> <p>--Everyday life of normal people like you.</p> <p>--Quality of life</p> <p>--Difficulties</p> <p>--Support for vulnerable people: elderly, sick people, unemployed... (public, private, family)</p>	<p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>Emphasise expectations -- The question is not about how they would like the future to be.</p> <p>Reassure them that those aspects will be discussed later. Ask them to imagine how the country would look on the above-commented aspects if social trends continue the same.</p> <p>Ask for concreteness without directing. Suggest participants review the topics they started discussing in the previous sections, particularly those on the interest list. Use their framing and verbatims on the topics so there is no big jump in the conversation. Use their frame and verbatims on some previous issues to revitalise the conversation if they get stuck.</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be</p>

		<p>included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p> <p>**Do not bring sex, gender or feminism explicitly into the discussion unless it is mentioned by the group. Gender is a transversal question on all the topics on the list.</p>
SECTION C		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE II – SECTION C	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Sections b) and c) explore the fear of losing status in the future.</p> <p>In section c) we want them to focus on what aspects they would change in the foreseen future. Here we want to measure their wishes for the future (or how they would imagine a future that is good for them).</p> <p>The aspects they would like to change would probably create a bigger threat to their status.</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants about how they would like the future to be.</i></p> <p>--Everyday life of normal people like you.</p> <p>--Quality of life</p> <p>--Difficulties</p> <p>--Support for vulnerable people: elderly, sick people,</p>	<p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>Emphasise aspirations (i.e. wishes) -- The question is about what they would like and think must be changed for the future to be better, without considering if they believe the change is likely or feasible.</p> <p>Ask for concreteness without directing. Ask participants to specify what concrete aspect of the previously imagined future they would change and in what sense. Use their framing of the topics</p>

	unemployed... (public, private, family)	<p>and/or verbatims so there is no big jump in the conversation. Use their framing or verbatims in previous issues to revitalise the conversation if they get stuck.</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p> <p>**Do not bring sex, gender or feminism explicitly into the discussion unless it is mentioned by the group. Gender is a transversal question on all the topics on the list.</p>
PHASE III – GENERAL		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE III		DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
Phase III: participants end the negotiation and reach an agreement on what is acceptable regarding sex and gender		<u>Regarding dynamics:</u>

<p>After phase II, participants would have co-created the majoritarian frame for the discourse on gender and sex, which they would largely share. They would have all the relevant information from other participants' opinions, preferences, expectations and aspirations. Now, the moderator can ask them to summarise their agreements and make them explicit (or more explicit) regarding sex and gender.</p> <p>Questions relating sex and gender might have appeared in the previous discussion, maybe in a scattered manner or with a superficial treatment. In this phase, we ask participants to conclude what they consider good and just regarding sex and gender.</p>	<p>By now, the group should have learned the rules of participation, and therefore we do not anticipate any additional threat that the moderation needs to be particularly attentive to.</p> <p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>Ask for concreteness without directing. If the different topics on the list below have not been discussed deeply enough, the moderator brings them back to the discussion. Use references to previous verbatims by the group to reintroduce the topics, and ask participants to go deeper into their discourses.</p> <p>In this phase, the moderator brings sex and gender, also feminism, into the group's focus.</p>
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SECTION A

DESCRIPTION OF PHASE III – SECTION A	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>Participants will be positioning themselves regarding the patriarchal model in this section. We ask them to express their preferences regarding the distribution of gender roles and generational relations.</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants about "family" in a two-fold sense: gender relations and relations among generations (age: elderly and youngsters).</i></p>	<p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>If the different topics on the list have not been discussed deeply enough, the moderator brings them back to the discussion. Use references to previous verbatims by the group to reintroduce the</p>

<p>They might have already discussed these topics earlier in other group blocks. If this is the case, this phase can be shortened.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Relations between parents and children --Respect for elderly people --Education --Care works --Relations between men and women 	<p>topics, and ask participants to go deeper into their discourses.</p> <p>Focus on those aspects that have not been discussed deeply enough in previous phases. But let participants re-elaborate from previous interventions on these topics if they feel like doing so.</p> <p>Participation of women in the labour market is expected to be discussed implicitly concerning the topics on the list; otherwise, bring it to the discussion.</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p>
SECTION B		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE III – SECTION B	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE

<p>In this section, participants will give their vision about how politics (political parties and government) and social movements treat sex and gender. We ask them to make explicit their political opinions.</p> <p>They might have already given their opinions earlier in other group blocks. If this is the case, this phase can be shortened.</p>	<p><i>Please, ask participants how they think politics (political parties and government) and social movements treat those issues discussed above.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Relations between parents and children --Respect for elderly people --Education --Care works --Relations between men and women 	<p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>If the different topics on the list have not been discussed deeply enough, the moderator brings them back to the discussion. Use references to previous verbatims by the group to reintroduce the topics, and ask participants to go deeper into their discourses.</p> <p>Focus on those aspects that have not been discussed deeply enough in previous phases. But let participants re-elaborate from previous interventions on these topics if they feel like doing so.</p> <p>Participation of women in the labour market is expected to be discussed concerning the topics on the list; otherwise, bring it to the discussion.</p> <p>Feminism as a social movement is expected to be discussed concerning the topics on the list.</p>
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		<p>Otherwise, please bring it to discussion so the group discuss it explicitly.</p> <p>All the topics suggested have some implications for gender roles and relations. Others might be included or substituted in the list by the national teams.</p>
SECTION C		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE III – SECTION C	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
In this final section, we try to learn about the participants' rationale for voting for RWPP. We want to know how their vision and preferences of sex and gender guide their political behaviour.	<p><i>Please, ask participants about what they actually do, or what they could do, to change those things they do not like.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Participate in civil society organisations, social organisations, religious organisations -Participate in social networks 	<p><u>Regarding dynamic:</u></p> <p>First, present just the question and let participants develop their answers spontaneously.</p> <p>Once the first round of answers and debate is exhausted, present those behaviours on the list that have not been discussed (or have been discussed only very lightly).</p> <p><u>Regarding topic:</u></p> <p>Make sure that participants evaluate the importance of voting behaviour.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Vote for specific political parties -Nurture and educate children and the youth in a different way -Change specific laws -Change the ruling system 	
DEBRIEFING		
DESCRIPTION OF PHASE -DEBRIEFING	MODERATOR GUIDE	DETAILS ON THE MODERATOR ROLE
<p>This phase has three objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Invite participants to develop any other topic they think is important but has not been touched on in the debate. -Ask participants to fill in a form (anonymous, no name or address required) for profiling. They may choose the pseudonym they want us to refer them 	<p><i>Please, ask participants if there is any other thing they would like to share with the group.</i></p> <p><i>Please, ask the participants to fill in the form.</i></p>	<p><u>Regarding the dynamic:</u></p> <p>Reassure participants that even if they are filling out a form, that remains anonymous because we are not asking for names, residence or any other personal information of that type.</p> <p>Ensure participants that any personal information mentioned in the group will be anonymised (either erased or substituted by an imaginary name).</p>

<p>to in the transcriptions (in other to identify the profile). The information to be compiled includes sex, age, education level, professional status, social class, household and personal income, ideology and voting recall.</p> <p>-Answer some more specific questions that the participants may have concerning how the group went, particularly regarding how we will handle the data (anonymity in the transcription and confidentiality).</p>	<p><i>Please, ask the participants if they are any further questions for the moderator before closing the group.</i></p>	<p>Invite participants to give us the pseudonym for the transcription of their interventions.</p>
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